Two-loop off-shell QCD amplitudes in FDR

We link the FDR treatment of ultraviolet (UV) divergences to dimensional regularization up to two loops in QCD. This allows us to derive the one-loop and two-loop coupling constant and quark mass shifts necessary to translate infrared finite quantities computed in FDR to the MSbar renormalization scheme. As a by-product of our analysis, we solve a problem analogous to the breakdown of unitarity in the Four Dimensional Helicity (FDH) method beyond one loop. A fix to FDH is then presented that preserves the renormalizability properties of QCD without introducing evanescent quantities.Comment: 25 pages, 6 figure

A new behavioural intervention for tackling obesity: Do Something Different

Peer reviewe

Differential equations from unitarity cuts: nonplanar hexa-box integrals

We compute $\epsilon$-factorized differential equations for all dimensionally-regularized integrals of the nonplanar hexa-box topology, which contribute for instance to 2-loop 5-point QCD amplitudes. A full set of pure integrals is presented. For 5-point planar topologies, Gram determinants which vanish in $4$ dimensions are used to build compact expressions for pure integrals. Using unitarity cuts and computational algebraic geometry, we obtain a compact IBP system which can be solved in 8 hours on a single CPU core, overcoming a major bottleneck for deriving the differential equations. Alternatively, assuming prior knowledge of the alphabet of the nonplanar hexa-box, we reconstruct analytic differential equations from 30 numerical phase-space points, making the computation almost trivial with current techniques. We solve the differential equations to obtain the values of the master integrals at the symbol level. Full results for the differential equations and solutions are included as supplementary material.Comment: 31 pages, 2 figures. Version 2: final journal version; includes solutions to differential equation

Inaugurated Hyperspace

Several philosophers of religion have used contemporary work on the metaphysics of space to dismantle objections to Christian doctrine. In this paper I shall also make use of work in the metaphysics of space to explore a topic in Christian thought that has received little attention by philosophers, namely inaugurated eschatology. My aim will be to take the conclusions of some biblical scholars who have written on this topic, and then begin to provide some metaphysical models of this doctrine, so as to overcome objections against inaugurated eschatology based on metaphysical concerns

Presentism, Timelessness, and Evil

There is an objection to divine timelessness which claims that timelessness shouldn’t be adopted since on this view evil is never “destroyed,” “vanquished,” “eradicated” or defeated. By contrast, some divine temporalists think that presentism is the key that allows evil to be destroyed/vanquished/eradicated/defeated. However, since presentism is often considered to be inconsistent with timelessness, it is thought that the presentist solution is not available for defenders of timelessness. In this paper I first show how divine timelessness is consistent with a presentist view of time and then how defenders of Presentist-Timelessness can adopt the presentist solution to the removal of evil. After this, I conclude the paper by showing that it’s far from clear that the presentist solution is successful and that unless one weakens what is meant by the destruction/vanquishing/eradication/defeat of evil, one can only make the presentist solution work by adopting a number of additional assumptions that many will find unattractive

Timelessness à la Leftow

Brian Leftow has argued in significant detail for a timeless conception of God. However, his work has been interacted with less than one might expect, especially given that some have contended that divine timelessness should be put to death and buried. Further, the work that has critically interacted with Leftow does a very poor job at discrediting it, or so I will contend. As we shall see, the main reason for this is either because what is central to Leftow’s view is not affected by the objection, or because Leftow provides another way of getting his theory off the ground. Why, then, do so many objections miss the mark? I suspect it’s because many struggle to understand Leftow’s view and what is central to it. As such, one of the main goals of this paper will be to make Leftow’s account more accessible and to elucidate the main elements of the theory, whilst also providing responses to the main objections raised against his view. The overall result of this, I hope, will be a more fruitful examination of Leftow’s view in the future

Arguing to theism from consciousness

I provide an argument from consciousness for God’s existence. I first give a form of the argument which ultimately, I think is difficult to evaluate. As such I move on to provide what I take to be a stronger argument, where I claim that consciousness given our worldly laws of nature offers rather substantial evidence for God’s existence. It is this latter point the paper largely focuses on, both in setting it out and defending it from various objections

The ‘Power’-ful Trinity

This paper proposes a new orthodox Latin Trinitarian model of the Trinity, through employing current work from the metaphysics of powers. It outlines theses defended within the contemporary powers literature that form the backbone of the account and then shows how they can be combined to provide an orthodox metaphysics of the Trinity. Having done this it addresses a further element required for orthodoxy, the ontological priority of the Father, and then notes a particular benefit that comes along with the model. The paper concludes by posing and answering some objections one might raise against the account

Fine-tuned of necessity?

This paper seeks to explicate and analyze an alternative response to fine-tuning arguments from those that are typically given—namely, design or brute contingency. The response I explore is based on necessity, the necessitarian response. After showing how necessity blocks the argument, I explicate the reply I claim necessitarians can give and suggest how its three requirements can be met: firstly, that laws are metaphysically necessary; secondly, that constants are metaphysically necessary; and thirdly, that the fundamental properties that determine the laws and constants are necessary. After discussing each in turn, I end the paper by assessing how the response fares when running the fine-tuning argument in two ways, as an inference to best explanation and as a Bayesian argument