Poems for My Woofie The Story of Lt. Wilfred V. Michaud, 1st Parachute Battalion, 1st Marine Division

My senior capstone project is the creation of a book of investigative poetry. The subject of the work is my grandfather, Wilfred V. Michaud. He was a lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps during World War II. The poetry addresses the history of Michaud’s battalion and the battles it fought, as well as personal stories of Michaud’s life and experience in the service. Several secondary sources were used to gain historical context for the poetry. Additionally, primary sources were used to provide information about Michaud’s personal experiences. The combination of primary and secondary sources established the necessary background and inspiration for the project

The Trouble with Amicus Facts

The number of amicus curiae briefs filed at the Supreme Court is at an all-time high. Most observers, and even some of the Justices, believe that the best of these briefs are filed to supplement the Court’s understanding of facts. Supreme Court decisions quite often turn on generalized facts about the way the world works (Do violent video games harm children? Is a partial birth abortion ever medically necessary?). To answer these questions, the Justices are hungry for more information than the parties and the record can provide. The consensus is that amicus briefs helpfully add factual expertise to the Court’s decision making. The goal of this Article is to chip away at that conventional wisdom. The trouble with amicus facts, I argue, is that today anyone can claim to be a factual expert. With the Internet, factual information is easily found and cheaply manufactured. Moreover, the amicus curiae has evolved significantly from its origin as an impartial “friend of the court.” Facts submitted by amici are now funneled through the screen of advocacy. The result is that the Court is inundated with eleventh-hour, untested, advocacy-motivated claims of factual expertise. And the Justices are listening. This Article looks at the instances in recent years when a Supreme Court Justice cites an amicus for a statement of fact. It describes the way the brief, rather than the underlying factual source, is cited as authority and addresses the failure of the parties to act as an adequate check. I challenge this process as potentially infecting the Supreme Court’s decisions with unreliable evidence, and I make suggestions for ways to reform it. It is time to rethink the expertise-providing role of the Supreme Court amicus and to refashion this old tool for its new purpose

Bargaining Inside the Black Box

When jurors are presented with a menu of criminal verdict options and they cannot reach a consensus among them, what should they do? Available evidence suggests they are prone to compromise—that is, jurors will negotiate with each other and settle on a verdict in the middle, often on a lesser-included offense. The suggestion that jurors compromise is not new; it is supported by empirical evidence, well-accepted by courts and commentators, and unsurprising given the pressure jurors feel to reach agreement and the different individual views they likely hold. There are, however, some who say intrajury negotiation represents a failure of the jury process. Conventional wisdom clings to the notion that criminal verdicts reflect a jury’s unanimous factual assessment. That notion is thwarted when a juror votes for a verdict as a compromise, as a second choice to the one he thinks best reflects reality. To date, therefore, compromise verdicts are typically dismissed as examples of maverick jurors dishonoring their oath to apply the law and seek the truth. This Article challenges that conventional wisdom by way of a new analogy. If jurors each view the case differently and nonetheless negotiate with each other to reach a deal, why is that wrong when 95% of criminal convictions are the result of a similar process? I seek a new understanding of compromise verdicts by making a novel comparison to plea bargaining. I argue that the former should be understood in the context of the latter and that the best way to evaluate intrajury negotiation is to juxtapose it with the negotiation that dominates our criminal justice system. Instead of dismissing intrajury negotiation as illegitimate, I argue that we should accept it as a reality and from there seek to improve it with lessons drawn from plea negotiations

Factual Precedents

Lawyers and judges speak to each other in a language of precedents—decisions from cases that have come before. The most persuasive precedent to cite, of course, is an on-point decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. But Supreme Court opinions are changing. They contain more factual claims about the world than ever before, and those claims are now rich with empirical data. This Supreme Court factfinding is also highly accessible; fast digital research leads directly to factual language in old cases that is perfect for arguments in new ones. An unacknowledged consequence of all this is the rise of what I call “factual precedents”: the tendency of lower courts to cite Supreme Court cases as authorities on factual subjects, as evidence that the factual claims are indeed true. Rather than citing, for example, evidence from the record to establish that carpal tunnel syndrome regularly resolves without surgery, lower courts instead cite language from a Supreme Court opinion for that point. This Article carefully describes how lower courts are using Supreme Court facts today and then argues that these factual precedents are unwise. The Supreme Court is not a factfinding institution. Facts change over time. And, unlike legal precedents, one cannot be certain that factual statements from the Supreme Court are carefully deliberated and carry the force of law. I argue that Supreme Court statements of fact should not receive any authoritative force separate from the force that attaches to whatever legal conclusions they contributed to originally. If a fact is so central to the legal holding that the two meld together, then the Supreme Court is free to so state and thus insulate the factual conclusion from future challenges by making it part of the legal rule. But the presumption, I suggest, should be no precedential value for generalized factual claims—even if they are facts found in the U.S. Reports

Refining the real estate pricing model

Investment theory dictates that capitalisation (cap) rates for freehold real estate should be determined by the risk free nominal rate of return plus the risk premium (RP) less the expected growth rate, with an allowance for depreciation. However, importing the concept of the RP from the capital markets fails to guide investors through the complexities of the asset, or enable exploration of purchaser preferences and behaviour. A refined pricing model for real estate is proposed, based on a concept termed a risk scale, to distinguish between macro (market) and micro (stock) determinants of risk and growth within the RP. This pricing model is estimated for a major global investment market, using a cross-sectional inter-temporal framework, with a dataset of 497 transactions in the London office sector over 2010Q2-2012Q3. Average cap rates are estimated at just over 5%, with asset-specific attributes dominating yield determination, with submarket quality and tenant covenant most important; and unexpired term insignificant, surprising during the “flight to safety” characterising the period. International investors bought at lower cap rates, despite the ongoing economic and financial instability of the study period. Improving understanding of pricing behaviour and market transparency is important and may be advanced through the pricing model