Indicators of Innovation in Canadian Natural Resource Industries

This report develops a set of indicators of innovation in a number of the natural resource industries in Canada. It then uses these indicators to assess trends in innovation over time in these industries. The innovative performance of Canadian natural resource industries is also compared with the average for all industries in Canada and with natural resource industries in other countries. The report finds that on most innovation indicators, Canadian natural resource industries perform either at or above the all-industries average and at a an average level internationally.Indicators, Indexes, Indices, Innovation, Natural resource, Productivity, Productivity growth, Innovation trends, R&D, Research and Development, Mechinery and equipment, foreign direct investment

Confidence-Enhanced Performance

There is ample evidence that emotions affect performance. Positive emotions can improve performance, while negative ones may diminish it. For example, the fears induced by the possibility of failure or of negative evaluations have physiological consequences (shaking, loss of concentration) that may impair performance in sports, on stage or at school. There is also ample evidence that individuals have distorted recollection of past events, and distorted attributions of the causes of successes of failures. Recollection of good events or successes is typically easier than recollection of bad ones or failures. Successes tend to be attributed to intrinsic aptitudes or own effort, while failures are attributed to bad luck. In addition, these attributions are often reversed when judging the performance of others. The objective of this paper is to incorporate the first phenomenon above into an otherwise standard decision theoretic model, and show that in a world where performance depends on emotions, biases in information processing enhance welfare.confidence, perception, psychology

Confidence-Enhanced Performance

There is ample evidence that emotions affect performance. Positive emotions can improve performance, while negative ones may diminish it. For example, the fears induced by the possibility of failure or of negative evaluations have physiological consequences (shaking, loss of concentration) that may impair performance in sports, on stage or at school. There is also ample evidence that individuals have distorted recollection of past events, and distorted attributions of the causes of successes of failures. Recollection of good events or successes is typically easier than recollection of bad ones or failures. Successes tend to be attributed to intrinsic aptitudes or own effort, while failures are attributed to bad luck. In addition, these attributions are often reversed when judging the performance of others. The objective of this paper is to incorporate the first phenomenon above into an otherwise standard decision theoretic model, and show that in a world where performance depends on emotions, biases in information processing enhance welfare.Confidence, Perception, Psychology

Repeated Relationships with Limits on Information Processing

Many important strategic problems are characterized by repeated interactions among agents. There is a large literature in game theory and economics illustrating how considerations of future interactions can provide incentives for cooperation that would not be possible in one-shot interactions. Much of the work in repeated games assumes public monitoring: players observe precisely the same thing at each stage of the game. It is well-understood that even slight deviations from public monitoring increase dramatically the difficulty the problems players face in coordinating their actions. Repeated games with private monitoring incorporate differences in what players observe at each stage. Equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring, however, often seem unrealistic; the equilibrium strategies may be highly complex and very sensitive to the fine details of the stochastic relationship between players’ actions and observations. Furthermore, there is no realistic story about how players might arrive at their equilibrium strategies. We propose an alternative approach to understanding how people cooperate. Each player is endowed with a mental system that processes information: a mental system consists of a number of psychological states and a transition function between states that depends on observations made. In this world, a strategy is just a function from states to actions. Our framework has the following desirable properties: (i) players restrict attention to a relatively small set of simple strategies. (ii) the number of strategies that players compare is small enough that players might ultimately learn which perform well. We find that some mental systems allow agents to cooperate under a broad set of parameters, while others are not conducive to cooperation.Repeated Games, Private Monitoring, Mental States

Plausible Cooperation, Second Version

There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of this literature assumes public monitoring: players always observe precisely the same thing. Even slight deviations from public monitoring to private monitoring that incorporate differences in players’ observations dramatically complicate coordination. Equilibria with private monitoring often seem unrealistically complex. We set out a model in which players accomplish cooperation in an intuitively plausible fashion. Players process information via a mental system — a set of psychological states and a transition function between states depending on observations. Players restrict attention to a relatively small set of simple strategies, and consequently, might learn which perform well.Repeated games, private monitoring, bounded rationality, cooperation

Effecting Cooperation

There is a large repeated games literature illustrating how future interactions provide incentives for cooperation. Much of this literature assumes public monitoring: players always observe precisely the same thing. Even slight deviations from public monitoring to private monitoring that incorporate differences in players’ observations dramatically complicate coordination. Equilibria with private monitoring often seem unrealistically complex. We set out a model in which players accomplish cooperation in an intuitively plausible fashion. Players process information via a mental system — a set of psychological states and a transition function between states depending on observations. Players restrict attention to a relatively small set of simple strategies, and consequently, might learn which perform well.Repeated games, private monitoring, bounded rationality, cooperation

Investment and Sales: Some Empirical Evidence

This paper attempts to give a structural interpretation to the distributed lag of sales on investment at the two-digit level in US manufacturing. It first presents a simple model which captures the various sources of lags and their respective implications. It then estimates the model, using both data on investment and sales as well as direct evidence on the sources of lags. The spirit of the paper is exploratory ; the model is used mainly as a vehicle to construct, present and interpret the data. We find that the following model can roughly generate the distributed lag structure found in the data. Firms face delivery lags of 3 quarters. They also face adjustment costs, which lead them to take into account expected future sales, with discount factor -9 when constructing the desired capital stock, and to close about 5% of the gap between actual and desired capital per quarter. They pay for orders at a constant rate between the time of order and that of delivery. The model is however not very successful in explaining differences in dynamics across sectors.

How bad Isn't the agent-based model CATCHSCAPE?

Due to mounting human pressure, stakeholders in northern Thailand are facing crucial natural resource management issues. The impact of upstream irrigation management on the downstream agricultural viability is a common source of conflict. It has often both biophysical and social origins. CATCHSCAPE has been developed as an Agent-Based model that enables us to describe the whole catchment: hydrology, farmers' behaviour and water management rules. It is meant to simulate scenarios based on assumptions about value of these features as well as some assumptions about context, such as levels of prices for various commodities or climate. The biophysical modules are made of a hydrological system with its distributed water balance, irrigated schemes management, crop and vegetation dynamics. The social dynamics are described as a set of resource management processes (water, land, cash, labour force). Water management is described according to the actual different levels of control (individual, scheme and catchment). Virtual experiments according to a first defined plan are made with two aims: sensitivity analysis of the model through variation of different parameters and extreme scenarios on one hand; overall behaviour of the basin under various realistic scenarios on the other hand. Both sets are meant to give more insight on the consequences of this very virtual catchment behaviour and improve the collective understanding on the real basin. Simulations show that the model is quite robust from a variation of results point of view and help to identify key factors such as farmers' representation on the expected amount of water for a cropping season or pluri-annual climatic trends. (Résumé d'auteur

Noise Trading and Exchange Rate Regimes

Both the literature and new empirical evidence show that exchange rate regimes differ primarily by the noisiness of the exchange rate, not be measurable macroeconomic fundamentals. This motivates a theoretical analysis of exchange rate regimes with noise traders. The presence of noise traders can lead to multiple equilibria in the foreign exchange market. The entry of noise traders both create and share the risk associated with exchange rate volatility. In such circumstances, monetary policy can be used to lower exchange rate volatility without altering macroeconomic fundamentals.