1,018 research outputs found

    Comment on the Revised Proposed Final Judgement

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    In these comments, we argue that the Revised Proposed Final Judgement (RPFJ) is not in the "public interest," as that test is applied under the Tunney Act. Accordingly, the RPFJ should either be rejected outright now, or the court should refrain from ruling on the RPFJ until it has completed its further factual inquiry regarding the remedy proposed by the nine states not party to the RPFJ. If, however, the court accepts the RPFJ in the meantime, we strongly urge it to treat the RPFJ as an interim remedy and expressly leave open the possibility of supplementing the RPFJ with the additional remedies discussed in detail in this comment. We also recommend that in conducting its further factual inquiry in the remedy phase of this litigation that the court actively consider a structural remedy that would create some competition in the PC operating system market that, but for Microsoft's unlawful acts, reasonably could have been expected to have emerged by this time.

    Pay and Performance in Baseball: Modeling Regulars, Reserves and Expansion

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    Although the relationship between pay and performance in baseball has been convincingly demonstrated by Scully, a number of unresolved questions remain. Using a large sample of player salaries from contracts on file at the American League office, new estimates of this relationship are reported. The primary findings are as follows. First, while Scully's basic results are qualitatively robust, the salary elasticities for various performance and experience variables are substantially lower for our sample and specification. Second, for most variables, recent performance, as well as career average, contributes to the explanation of salary differences. Third, expansion has a significant effect on salary structure, and, in our model, makes it statistically invalid to estimate a single salary equation from pooled time-series data that includes an expansion year

    In Search of Scientific Regulation: The UHF Allocation Experiment

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    This paper reports the results of one attempt to introduce an objective, quantitative, scientific mechanism for making allocational regulatory decisions. The case is the allocation of UHF television stations among cities by the Federal Communications Commission. The mechanism is an experiment which is designed to reveal the preferences of the subjects with respect to alternative allocations. Pilot experiments were performed on FCC staff, the purposes of which were to refine the experimental design and instructions and to provide data for comparing different specifications of the final estimated equation. Participating in the final experiment were six FCC commissioners, nine members of the Commission's congressional oversight committee, and eleven members of the staffs of both groups. Data collected from these experiments have been fitted to theoretical stochastic models of qualitative choice behavior to obtain estimates of allocation preferences as a function of market characteristics. These preference functions are then used (a) to check the coherence of preferences across individuals; (b) to examine differences in policy objectives between congressional oversight committees and the regulatory agency; (c) to determine whether individual preferences can be aggregated into a social decision function with normatively compelling properties, such as consistency with individual preferences or majority-rule equilibrium; and (d) to test the sensitivity of committee decisions to voting institutions and alternative agendas

    In Search of Scientific Regulation: The UHF Allocation Experiment

    Get PDF
    This paper reports the results of one attempt to introduce an objective, quantitative, scientific mechanism for making allocational regulatory decisions. The case is the allocation of UHF television stations among cities by the Federal Communications Commission. The mechanism is an experiment which is designed to reveal the preferences of the subjects with respect to alternative allocations. Pilot experiments were performed on FCC staff, the purposes of which were to refine the experimental design and instructions and to provide data for comparing different specifications of the final estimated equation. Participating in the final experiment were six FCC commissioners, nine members of the Commission's congressional oversight committee, and eleven members of the staffs of both groups. Data collected from these experiments have been fitted to theoretical stochastic models of qualitative choice behavior to obtain estimates of allocation preferences as a function of market characteristics. These preference functions are then used (a) to check the coherence of preferences across individuals; (b) to examine differences in policy objectives between congressional oversight committees and the regulatory agency; (c) to determine whether individual preferences can be aggregated into a social decision function with normatively compelling properties, such as consistency with individual preferences or majority-rule equilibrium; and (d) to test the sensitivity of committee decisions to voting institutions and alternative agendas
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