40 research outputs found

    The impact of firm failure rates on the development and nature of implicit long-term labor contracts

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    Implicit long-term labor contracts provide a characterization of the employment relationship markedly different from that suggested by a "spot" labor market. Long-term implicit agreements are of considerable interest because their use is consistent with many stylized facts of the labor market, and they help to explain other observed micro- and macroeconomic phenomena not easily rationalized within the conventional neoclassical paradigm. This thesis addresses a gap in the current literature by rigorously examining the impact of various firm, worker, and industry characteristics on the development and nature of implicit long-term labor contracts.Specifically, it is demonstrated that under certain conditions, the use of long-term implicit labor contracts is inversely related to the failure probability of firms. This result follows naturally from the shirk-deterring, end-weighted compensation scheme associated with incentives based extended contracts, coupled with worker risk aversion. Moreover, it is shown that the earnings profile under implicit contracts may also be influenced by the probability of unintentional firm default.The theoretical predictions are uniformly supported by appropriately designed empirical tests. Based on previous research in the area, pension coverage is used as a proxy for implicit long-term contract coverage. It is demonstrated that for workers most likely to be faced with the long-term/spot market dichotomy, industry failure rates exert a significant negative influence on the probability of implicit contract coverage. Furthermore, the evidence supports several related hypotheses concerning the impact of failure rates on the earnings profile under long-term agreements; for workers taken to be covered by implicit contracts, a compensating differential related to the probability of failure was found, as is a return to tenure that is positively related to firm failure rates.U of I OnlyETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permissio

    The Impact of the Threat of Bankruptcy on the Structure of Compensation.

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    This article builds and tests a model of the impact of a firm's bankruptcy probability on its propensity to offer deferred compensation schemes. Using 1983 Current Population Survey data, the authors find that, ceteris paribus, lower failure rates raise the incidence of pensions for nonunion workers outside manufacturing. Further, they find some evidence that, among those workers with a pension, a higher industry failure rate steepens tenure-earnings profiles (jointly controlling for union-nonunion and pension-no pension selectivity.) Such a result suggests that workers discount implicit promises of future earnings increases by the likelihood that the firm will not survive. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

    Pension Coverage and Borrowing Constraints

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    Using data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances and taking a measure of borrowing constraint status as an indication of a worker's discount rate, we find evidence that borrowing-constrained workers are less likely to be covered by a pension plan, and that the borrowing constraint effect is significant only for defined benefit plans.