3,378 research outputs found
Some remarks on varieties with degenerate Gauss image
We consider projective varieties with degenerate Gauss image whose focal
hypersurfaces are non-reduced schemes. Examples of this situation are provided
by the secant varieties of Severi and Scorza varieties. The Severi varieties
are moreover characterized by a uniqueness property.Comment: 9 pages, to be published in Pacific Journal of Mathematic
Differential-geometric methods for the lifting problem and linear systems on plane curves
Let be an integral projective variety of codimension two, degree and
dimension and be its general hyperplane section. The problem of lifting
generators of minimal degree from the homogeneous ideal of to the
homogeneous ideal of is studied. A conjecture is given in terms of ,
and ; it is proved in the cases . A description is given of
linear systems on smooth plane curves whose dimension is almost maximal.Comment: 19 pages, AmS-TeX 2.1, report
Projective varieties with many degenerate subvarieties
We study the problem of classifying the irreducible projective varieties
of dimension in which contain an algebraic family \Cal F
of dimension () of subvarieties of dimension , each one
contained in a . We prove that one of the following happens:
(i) there exists an integer , such that is contained in a
variety of dimension at most containing a family of dimension
of subvarieties of dimension , each one contained in a linear space of
dimension ; (ii) The degree of is bounded by a function of and
(in this case is called of isolated type). Successively we study some
special cases; in particular we give a complete classification of surfaces in
containing a family of dimension of curves of .Comment: 19 pages, AMS-TeX 2.
On quadrisecant lines of threefolds in P^5
We study smooth threefolds of the projective space of dimension 5 whose
quadrisecant lines don't fill up the space. We give a complete classification
of those threefolds X whose only quadrisecant lines are the lines contained in
X. Then we prove that, if X admits "true" quadrisecant lines, but they don't
fill up the space, then either X is contained in a cubic hypersurface, or it
contains a family of dimension at least two of plane curves of degree at least
four.Comment: Plain Tex, 12 page
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction
If valuations are interdependent and agents observe their own allocation payoffs, then two-stage revelation mechanisms expand the set of implementable decision functions. In a two-stage revelation mechanism agents report twice. In the first stage - before the allocation is decided - they report their private signals. In the second stage - after the allocation has been made, but before final transfers are decided - they report their payoffs from the allocation. Conditions are provided under which an uninformed seller can extract (or virtually extract) the full surplus from a sale to privately informed buyers, in spite of the buyers’ signals being independent random variables.Auctions; Surplus Extraction; Interdependent Valuations; Mechanism Design
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if at any preference profile, the set of all pure and mixed Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f-optimal alternatives at that preference profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition of Nash implementation in that it does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure Nash equilibrium. We show that the condition of weak set-monotonicity, a weakening of Maskin’s monotonicity, is necessary for implementation. We provide sufficient conditions for implementation and show that important social choice correspondences that are not Maskin monotonic can be implemented in mixed Nash equilibrium
A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement
The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post individually rational, constrained efficient, and makes sincere bidding a dominant strategy equilibrium. Under a weak dependence and an identifiability condition, our double clock auction is also asymptotically efficient. Asymptotic efficiency is achieved by estimating demand and supply using information from the bids of traders that have dropped out and following a tâtonnement process that adjusts the clock prices based on the estimates
On linear spaces of skew-symmetric matrices of constant rank
We describe the space of projective planes of complex skew-symmetric matrices
of order six and constant rank four. We prove that it has four connected
components, all of dimension 26 and homogeneous under the action of PGL_6.Comment: 12 page
On the construction of some Buchsbaum varieties and the Hilbert scheme of elliptic scrolls in P^5
We study the degeneracy loci of general bundle morphisms from the direct sum
of m copies of the structural sheaf on to , also from the
point of view of the classical geometrical interpretation of the sections of
as linear line complexes. We consider in particular the case of
with m=2, 3. For n=5 and m=3 we give an explicit description of the
Hilbert scheme H of elliptic normal scrolls in , by defining a natural
rational map from the Grassmannian G(2,14) to H, which results to be dominant
with general fibre of degree four.Comment: 17 pages, 1 figure, to be published in Geometriae Dedicat
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