PESCO and the Prospect of a European Army: the ‘Constitutional Need’ to Provide for a Power of Control of the European Parliament on Military Interventions

The article examines the implications of the creation in 2017 of a 'Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence' (PESCO), that could lead to the gradual construction of a European Army. In particular, it focuses on the institutional issues linked to the possibility of deploying European armed forces in conflict scenarios and analyses the governance of the European common security and defence policy. In this respect, the decision-making power in matters of common defence and PESCO is concentrated in the hands of the Council and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, without the European Parliament being directly involved in the relevant decision-making processes. The article aims to illustrate the constitutional reasons in favour of greater involvement of the European Parliament in this area. Moreover, it will evaluate the ways in which the democratic control on future EU military missions could be increased

PESCO and the prospect of a European army : the ‘constitutional need’ to provide for a power of control of the European Parliament on military interventions

Published online on 5/2/2020The article examines the implications of the creation in 2017 of a 'Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence' (PESCO), that could lead to the gradual construction of a European Army. In particular, it focuses on the institutional issues linked to the possibility of deploying European armed forces in conflict scenarios and analyses the governance of the European common security and defence policy. In this respect, the decision-making power in matters of common defence and PESCO is concentrated in the hands of the Council and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, without the European Parliament being directly involved in the relevant decision-making processes. The article aims to illustrate the constitutional reasons in favour of greater involvement of the European Parliament in this area. Moreover, it will evaluate the ways in which the democratic control on future EU military missions could be increased

The Interpretation of the Commander in Chief Clause in the American Constitution in Comparison with the Recent Transformation of the Prerogative Power to Deploy Troops in the Unwritten British Constitution

Il saggio propone uno studio comparativo avente ad oggetto i poteri costituzionali di guerra dell’Esecutivo nell’esperienza britannica e in quella americana. L’obiettivo della ricerca è capire se l’evoluzione di tali poteri nell’esperienza del Regno Unito possa in qualche modo influenzare il dibattito sull’interpretazione dei poteri di guerra nella Costituzione degli Stati Uniti, nel senso di suggerire una rivalutazione del ruolo del Congresso.The article provides a comparative analysis concerning the constitutional war powers of the Executive Branch in the British and in the American experiences. The essay is aimed at understanding if the evolution of these powers in the United Kingdom could influence the debate on the interpretation of the war powers in the US Constitution, suggesting a strengthening of the Congress role