768 research outputs found

    Oscillatory dynamics in evolutionary games are suppressed by heterogeneous adaptation rates of players

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    Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in oscillatory dynamics of densities of individual strategists. In finite-size populations, it is known that oscillations blow up until all but one strategies are eradicated if without mutation. In the present paper, we formalize replicator dynamics with players that have different adaptation rates. We show analytically and numerically that the heterogeneous adaptation rate suppresses the oscillation amplitude. In social dilemma games with cyclically competing strategies and homogeneous adaptation rates, altruistic strategies are often relatively weak and cannot survive in finite-size populations. In such situations, heterogeneous adaptation rates save coexistence of different strategies and hence promote altruism. When one strategy dominates the others without cyclic competition, fast adaptors earn more than slow adaptors. When not, mixture of fast and slow adaptors stabilizes population dynamics, and slow adaptation does not imply inefficiency for a player.Comment: 4 figure

    Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation

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    Real social interactions occur on networks in which each individual is connected to some, but not all, of others. In social dilemma games with a fixed population size, heterogeneity in the number of contacts per player is known to promote evolution of cooperation. Under a common assumption of positively biased payoff structure, well-connected players earn much by playing frequently, and cooperation once adopted by well-connected players is unbeatable and spreads to others. However, maintaining a social contact can be costly, which would prevent local payoffs from being positively biased. In replicator-type evolutionary dynamics, it is shown that even a relatively small participation cost extinguishes the merit of heterogeneous networks in terms of cooperation. In this situation, more connected players earn less so that they are no longer spreaders of cooperation. Instead, those with fewer contacts win and guide the evolution. The participation cost, or the baseline payoff, is irrelevant in homogeneous populations but is essential for evolutionary games on heterogeneous networks.Comment: 4 figures + 3 supplementary figure

    Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals

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    In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in idiosyncratic preferences, fighting abilities, and positions in a social network. In such a population, an individual may imitate successful and similar others, where similarity refers to that in the idiosyncratic fitness function. I propose an evolutionary game model with two subpopulations on the basis of multipopulation replicator dynamics to describe such a situation. In the proposed model, pairs of players are involved in a two-person game as a well-mixed population, and imitation occurs within subpopulations in each of which players have the same payoff matrix. It is shown that the model does not allow any internal equilibrium such that the dynamics differs from that of other related models such as the bimatrix game. In particular, even a slight difference in the payoff matrix in the two subpopulations can make the opposite strategies to be stably selected in the two subpopulations in the snowdrift and coordination games.Comment: 3 figure

    Directionality of contact networks suppresses selection pressure in evolutionary dynamics

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    Individuals of different types, may it be genetic, cultural, or else, with different levels of fitness often compete for reproduction and survival. A fitter type generally has higher chances of disseminating their copies to other individuals. The fixation probability of a single mutant type introduced in a population of wild-type individuals quantifies how likely the mutant type spreads. How much the excess fitness of the mutant type increases its fixation probability, namely, the selection pressure, is important in assessing the impact of the introduced mutant. Previous studies mostly based on undirected and unweighted contact networks of individuals showed that the selection pressure depends on the structure of networks and the rule of reproduction. Real networks underlying ecological and social interactions are usually directed or weighted. Here we examine how the selection pressure is modulated by directionality of interactions under several update rules. Our conclusions are twofold. First, directionality discounts the selection pressure for different networks and update rules. Second, given a network, the update rules in which death events precede reproduction events significantly decrease the selection pressure than the other rules.Comment: 7 figures, 2 table

    Evolutionary dynamics and fixation probabilities in directed networks

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    We investigate the evolutionary dynamics in directed and/or weighted networks. We study the fixation probability of a mutant in finite populations in stochastic voter-type dynamics for several update rules. The fixation probability is defined as the probability of a newly introduced mutant in a wild-type population taking over the entire population. In contrast to the case of undirected and unweighted networks, the fixation probability of a mutant in directed networks is characterized not only by the degree of the node that the mutant initially invades but by the global structure of networks. Consequently, the gross connectivity of networks such as small-world property or modularity has a major impact on the fixation probability.Comment: 7 figure

    Fragmenting networks by targeting collective influencers at a mesoscopic level

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    A practical approach to protecting networks against epidemic processes such as spreading of infectious diseases, malware, and harmful viral information is to remove some influential nodes beforehand to fragment the network into small components. Because determining the optimal order to remove nodes is a computationally hard problem, various approximate algorithms have been proposed to efficiently fragment networks by sequential node removal. Morone and Makse proposed an algorithm employing the non-backtracking matrix of given networks, which outperforms various existing algorithms. In fact, many empirical networks have community structure, compromising the assumption of local tree-like structure on which the original algorithm is based. We develop an immunization algorithm by synergistically combining the Morone-Makse algorithm and coarse graining of the network in which we regard a community as a supernode. In this way, we aim to identify nodes that connect different communities at a reasonable computational cost. The proposed algorithm works more efficiently than the Morone-Makse and other algorithms on networks with community structure.Comment: 5 figures, 3 tables, and SI include
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