Essais sur l'accumulation, distribution et taxation du patrimoine

This thesis analyzes the accumulation, distribution and taxation of wealth, usingthe Spanish context as a laboratory. The first two chapters have a particular focuson housing. In the first chapter, we reconstruct Spain's national wealth from 1900to 2017. By combining new sources with existing accounts, we estimate the wealth of both private and government sectors and use a new asset-specific decomposition of the long-run accumulation of wealth. We find that during the 20th century, the national wealth-to-income ratio remained within a relatively narrow range–between 400 and 600%–until the housing boom of the early 2000s led to an unprecedented rise to 800% in 2007. Our results highlight the importance of land, housing capital gains and international capital flows as key elements of wealth accumulation.In the second chapter, I study the implications of housing booms and busts forwealth inequality, examining two episodes over the last four decades in Spain. Icombine fiscal data with household surveys and national accounts to reconstruct the entire wealth distribution and develop a new asset-specific decomposition of wealth accumulation to disentangle the main forces behind wealth inequality dynamics (e.g., capital gains, saving rates). I find that the top 10% wealth share drops during housing booms, but the decreasing pattern reverts during busts. Differences in capital gains across wealth groups appear to be the main drivers of the decline in wealth concentration during booms. In contrast, persistent differences in saving rates across wealth groups and portfolio reshuffling towards financial assets among top wealth holders are the main explanatory forces behind the reverting evolution during housing busts. I show that the heterogeneity in saving responses is consistent with the existence of large differences in portfolio adjustment frictions across wealth groups and that tax incentives can exacerbate this differential saving behavior. These results provide novel empirical evidence to enrich macroeconomic theories of wealth inequality over the business cycle.In the third chapter, we study the effect of annual wealth taxes on migration. Weanalyze the unique decentralization of the Spanish wealth tax system following the reintroduction of the tax in 2011. Madrid is the only region that did not reintroducethe wealth tax. Using linked administrative wealth and income tax records, weexploit the quasi-experimental variation in tax rates generated by the reform tounderstand the mobility responses of high wealth individuals and the resulting effect on wealth tax revenue and wealth inequality. Aggregating the individual data to the region-year-wealth tax filer level, we find that five years after the reform, the stock of wealthy individuals and the stock of wealth residing in the region of Madrid increased, respectively, by 11% and 12% relative to other regions prior to the reform. Using an individual choice model, we show that conditional on moving, Madrid's zero tax rate increased the probability of changing one's fiscal residence to Madrid by 24 percentage points. We show that Madrid's status as a tax haven exacerbates regional wealth inequalities and erodes the effectiveness of raising tax revenue and curving wealth concentration.Cette thèse analyse l'accumulation, la distribution et la taxation du patrimoine, en utilisant le contexte espagnol comme laboratoire. Les deux premiers chapitres mettent l’accent sur l'immobilier. Dans le premier chapitre, nous reconstituons le patrimoine national de l'Espagne entre 1900 et 2017. En combinant de nouvelles sources avec des comptes nationaux existants, nous estimons le patrimoine des secteurs privés et publics, et nous réalisons une nouvelle décomposition spécifique par type d’actif de l'accumulation du patrimoine à long terme. Nous constatons qu'au cours du 20e siècle, le ratio patrimoine/revenu est resté dans une fourchette relativement étroite — entre 400 et 600% — jusqu’à ce que la bulle immobilière du début des années 2000 conduise à une augmentation jusqu’à 800% en 2007. Nos résultats mettent en évidence l'importance de l’immobilier, des plus-values et les flux de capitaux internationaux comme éléments clés de l'accumulation de richesses. Dans le deuxième chapitre, j’étudie les conséquences des bulles immobilières sur les inégalités du patrimoine, en examinant deux épisodes de ce type au cours des quatre dernières décennies en Espagne. Je combine des données fiscales avec des enquêtes des ménages et les comptes nationaux pour reconstruire la distribution du patrimoine total, et je développe une nouvelle décomposition spécifique par type d’actif de l'accumulation du patrimoine pour démêler les principales forces derrière la dynamique des inégalités (par exemple, les plus-values et le taux d'épargne). Je trouve que la part du patrimoine des 10% les plus riches diminue lorsque la valeur des logements augmente fortement, mais cette tendance s'inverse pendant les crises. Les différences de plus-value entre les différents groupes semblent être le principal moteur de la concentration de la richesse pendant les bulles. En revanche, des différences persistantes entre les taux d'épargne des différents groupes de richesse, ainsi que les rééquilibrages des portefeuilles vers des actifs financiers sont les principales forces qui expliquent l'évolution inverse après l’explosion de la bulle. Je montre que l'hétérogénéité des réponses enregistrées est cohérente avec l'existence de grandes différences dans les coûts d'ajustement de portefeuille entre les groupes de richesse et que les incitations fiscales peuvent exacerber ce comportement différentiel d'épargne. Ces résultats fournissent de nouveaux faits empiriques pour enrichir les théories macroéconomiques sur des inégalités du patrimoine au cours du cycle économique. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous étudions l'effet des impôts annuels sur le patrimoine sur la migration. Nous analysons la décentralisation unique du système espagnol de l'impôt sur la fortune après sa réintroduction en 2011. Madrid est la seule région qui n'a pas réintroduit cet impôt. En utilisant des registres administratifs de l'impôt sur le revenu appariés avec l'impôt sur la fortune, nous exploitons la variation quasi expérimentale des taux d’imposition générée par la réforme pour comprendre les réponses de mobilité des individus à haut patrimoine et l'effet qui en résulte sur les revenus collectés par l'impôt sur la fortune et des inégalités de patrimoine. En agrégeant les données individuelles par région, année, et niveau de richesse des déclarants, nous constatons que cinq ans après la réforme, le nombre d’individus riches et le stock de patrimoine résidant dans la région de Madrid augmentent respectivement de 11% et 12% par rapport aux autres régions avant la réforme. En utilisant un modèle de choix individuel, nous montrons que conditionnellement a fait de migrer, le taux d'imposition zero a augmenté la probabilité de changer de résidence fiscale pour Madrid de 24 points de pourcentage. Nous montrons que le statut de Madrid en tant que paradis fiscal aggrave les inégalités régionales de patrimoine, diminue l'efficacité de la taxe et aggrave la concentration du patrimoine

Changing Party Systems, Socio-Economic Cleavages, and Nationalism in Northern Europe, 1956-2017

This paper draws on a rich set of electoral surveys to explore the changing relationship between party support and electoral socioeconomic cleavages in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden from the mid-twentieth century until the present. All five countries have experienced a progressive decline in their strong class cleavages, which coincides with the emergence of multi-elite party systems, in line with most Western democracies. While in the 1950s-1960s the lowest-educated and lowest-income voters were more leftwing, since the 1970s-1980s the vote for the left has gradually become associated with the highest-educated voters, who have drifted apart from the more right-wing economic elites. We also investigate how this transformation relates to the success of populism and nationalism over the recent decades among the lowest-educated and lowest-income earners. Despite historical, cultural, and political links, the transition of Nordic countries towards a multi-elite party system has happened at different speeds, offering interesting insights on the specificities of the national trajectories

Replication Data for: 'Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020'

The data and programs replicate tables and figures from "Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020", by Gethin, Martinez-Toledano, and Piketty. Please see the ReadMe file for additional details

Wealth in Spain, 1900-2014: A Country of Two Lands

This study reconstructs Spain’s national wealth from 1900 to 2014. We compare the market value and book value definitions. We then present a new asset-specific decomposition of the long-run movements in the value of wealth into a volume effect (through saving) and a price effect (capital gains or losses). We also investigate the role of offshore assets using administrative records. Our results show that the national wealth-to income ratio followed a J-shaped evolution over the last century, contrary to the U-shaped trend observed in other rich economies. Spain’s wealth accumulation also differs in that both agricultural and urban land represented a larger share of national wealth in the early twentieth and twenty-first centuries, respectively. These findings are largely explained by capital gains coming from the housing sector, which account for 45% of the real growth of national wealth over the 1950-2010 period. When offshore assets are considered, Spain’s international indebtedness reduced by approximately one quarter since the 2000s. Overall, this study highlights the importance of capital gains, housing, and offshore assets as key elements in the long-term accumulation of wealth

Historical Political Cleavages and Post-Crisis Transformations in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, 1953-2020

This paper combines post-electoral surveys to analyze the transformation of the structure of political cleavages in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland over the last decades. Although all four countries were late industrializers and were heavily impacted by the 2008 global recession, leading to a profound reconfiguration and transformation of their party systems, socioeconomic cleavages have not followed the exact same patterns. We document aprogressive decline of class cleavages in Italy and Spain and an exacerbation of class divisions in Portugal and Ireland over the last decade. In Italy and Spain, despite their strong religious and regional divisions, we find growing support for social democratic, socialist, and affiliated parties among highest-educated voters, while top-income earners have remained more supportive of conservative forces, leading to the emergence of “multi-elite party systems” comparable to that found in other Western democracies. Portugal and Ireland have instead remained with their “single-elite party systems”, marked by the polarization of mainstream parties after the onset of the financial crisis in Portugal, the rise of Sinn Féin supported by low-income and lower-educated voters in Ireland, and the exceptional absence of strong farright parties capturing the lower classes in both countries

Applying Generalized Pareto Curves to Inequality Analysis

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Party System Transformation and the Structure of Political Cleavages in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland, 1967-2019

This paper combines post-electoral surveys to study the transformation of the structure of political cleavages in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland over the last five decades. Despite their history of linguistic, regional, and religious conflicts, all four countries share a common tradition of consensus decision-making, which has remained until the present. Yet, the weakening of historical cleavages, the emergence of new political formations (i.e. Green parties on the left and anti-immigration parties on the right), and the rise of new divides have significantly transformed their party systems since the 1980s. Support for green and left-wing parties among highest-educated voters, and for anti-immigration parties among the lower-educated has grown, while top-income earners have remained instead more supportive of the traditional right. Both the rise of new green and anti-immigration parties, but also changes within old parties have thus led to the emergence of "multi-elite party systems", as it has been shown in other Western democracies

Sperm freezability is neither associated with the expression of aquaporin 3 nor sperm head dimensions in dromedary camel (Camelus dromedarius)

7 Pág. Departamento de Reproducción Animal.The expression of aquaglyceroporin 3 (AQP-3) has been demonstrated in the spermatozoa of several mammalian species and its role has been associated with cryotolerance. Post-thaw sperm quality from individual dromedary males with different response to freezing-thawing process was evaluated through sperm head morphometry. In order to understand the cellular mechanisms affected by cryoinjury we have explored the presence and distribution of sperm AQP-3 using western blotting and immunocytochemistry. WB showed different intensity of the specific signal bands at 28 kDa. Immunofluorescence assessments allowed us to identify five different and clear AQP-3 distribution patterns of labelling in the sperm plasma membrane; acrosome, post-acrosome, mid-piece, and principal and final tail. Although expression of AQP-3 varied among male ejaculates, the individual sperm response to freeze-thawing was not associated with AQP-3 expression. Thus, AQP3 expressions do not seem like a reliable predictor of sperm response to freeze-thawing process in this species. This work is the first to describe the morphometric characteristics of the heads of dromedary spermatozoa. No correlation was found between sperm head dimensions and sperm quality variables after freeze-thawing suggesting that dromedary camel sperm head morphometry is also not a reliable predictor of cryosurvival.This work was supported by Zoitechlab S.L. (Arquimea Group) - INIA contract CON18-141, MCINN/AEI/FEDER and EU grant AGL2017-85753-R and PID2020-113288RB-100/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 grant.Peer reviewe