778 research outputs found
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics
We model how lobbying by interest groups affects the level of investor protection. In our model, insiders in existing public companies, institutional investors (financial intermediaries), and entrepreneurs who plan to take companies public in the future, compete for influence over the politicians setting the level of investor protection. We identify conditions under which this lobbying game has an inefficiently low equilibrium level of investor protection. Factors that operate to reduce investor protection below its efficient level include the ability of corporate insiders to use the corporate assets they control to influence politicians, as well as the inability of institutional investors to capture the full value that efficient investor protection would produce for outside investors. The interest that entrepreneurs (and existing public firms) have in raising equity capital in the future reduces but does not eliminate the distortions arising from insiders' interest in extracting rents from the capital public firms already have. Our analysis generates testable predictions, and can explain existing empirical evidence, regarding the way in which investor protection varies over time and around the world.
Consent and Exchange
In some cases, the law permits a party that unilaterally provides a benefit to another party to recover the estimated value of this benefit. Despite calls for expanding the set of cases to which such a restitution rule applies, the law commonly applies a mutual consent rule under which a party providing another with a benefit cannot obtain any recovery without securing the advance consent of the beneficiary to the transaction. We provide an efficiency rationale for the undesirability of broad use of the restitution rule by identifying significant adverse ex ante effects of the rule that are avoided by the consent requirement. Even assuming that courts' errors in estimating buyer benefits would be unbiased, a restitution rule would strengthen sellers' hand by providing them with a put option that they may but do not have to use. As a result, the restitution rule would encourage inefficient market entry by low-quality sellers that would not contribute to any efficient transactions but would be able to extract payments from buyers seeking to avoid an exchange with them. Furthermore, the restitution rule would discourage efficient market entry by some or all potential buyers of a good or service. Beyond the restitution rule, we extend our analysis to show that similar adverse effects can also arise from other "pricing" rules that provide buyers or sellers with call or put options to force an exchange at a judicially-determined price.
Lucky CEOs
We study the relation between corporate governance and opportunistic timing of CEO option grants via backdating or otherwise. Our methodology focuses on how grant date prices rank within the price distribution of the grant month. During 1996-2005, about 12% of firms provided one or more lucky grant -- defined as grants given at the lowest price of the month -- due to opportunistic timing. Lucky grants were more likely when the board did not have a majority of independent directors and/or the CEO had longer tenure -- factors associated with increased influence of the CEO on pay-setting. We find no evidence that gains from manipulated grants served as a substitute for compensation paid through other sources; total reported compensation from such sources was higher in firms providing lucky grants. Finally, opportunistic timing has been widespread throughout the economy, with a significant presence in each of the economy's twelve (Fama-French) industries.
Executive Pensions
Because public firms are not required to disclose the monetary value of pension plans in their executive pay disclosures, financial economists have generally analyzed executive pay using figures that do not include the value of such pension plans. This paper presents evidence that omitting the value of pension benefits significantly undermines the accuracy of existing estimates of executive pay, its variability, and its sensitivity to performance companies. Studying the pension arrangements of CEOs of S&P 500, we find that the CEOs' plans had a median actuarial value of $15 million; that the ratio of the executives' pension value to the executives' total compensation (including both equity and non-equity pay) during their service as CEO had a median value of 34%; and that including pension values increased the median percentage of the executives' total compensation composed of salary-like payments during and after their service as CEO from 15% to 39%.
CEO Centrality
We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured by the CEO. We find that CEO centrality is negatively associated with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q). Greater CEO centrality is also correlated with (i) lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, (ii) lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, (iii) higher odds of the CEO’s receiving a “lucky” option grant at the lowest price of the month, (iv) greater tendency to reward the CEO for luck in the form of positive industry-wide shocks, (v) lower likelihood of CEO turnover controlling for performance, and (vi) lower firm-specific variability of stock returns over time. Overall, our results indicate that differences in CEO centrality are an aspect of firm management and governance that deserves the attention of researchers.
Lucky Directors
While prior empirical work and much public attention have focused on the opportunistic timing of executives' grants, we provide in this paper evidence that outside directors' option grants have also been favorably timed to an extent that cannot be fully explained by sheer luck. Examining events in which public firms granted options to outside directors during 1996-2005, we find that 9% were "lucky grant events" falling on days with a stock price equal to a monthly low. We estimate that about 800 lucky grant events owed their status to opportunistic timing, and that about 460 firms and 1400 outside directors were associated with grant events produced by such timing. There is evidence that the opportunistic timing of director grant events has been to a substantial extent the product of backdating and not merely spring-loading based on private information. We find that directors' luck has been correlated with executives' luck. Furthermore, grant events were more likely to be lucky when the firm had more entrenching provisions protecting insiders from the risk of removal, as well as when the board did not have a majority of independent directors.
Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?
Amid growing concerns for the effects that corporations have on stakeholders, supporters of stakeholder governance advocate relying on corporate leaders to use their discretion to protect stakeholders, and they seem to take corporate pledges to do so at face value. By contrast, critics question whether corporate leaders have incentives to protect stakeholders and to follow through on pledges to do so. We provide empirical evidence that can contribute to resolving the debate between these rival views.
The most celebrated pledge by corporate leaders to protect stakeholders was the Business Roundtable\u27s 2019 Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (the BRT Statement ). The BRT Statement expressed a commitment to deliver value to all stakeholders, not just shareholders, and was widely viewed as a major milestone that would usher in stakeholder capitalism and significantly improve the treatment of stakeholders. If any companies could be expected to follow through on stakeholder rhetoric, those whose CEOs signed the highly visible BRT Statement would be natural candidates to do so.
We review a wide array of hand-collected corporate documents of the 128 U.S. public companies that joined the BRT Statement (the BRT Companies ). Examining the two-year period following the issuance of the BRT Statement, we obtain the following six findings:
First, the numerous BRT Companies that updated their corporate governance guidelines during the two-year period generally did not add any language that improves the status of stakeholders and, indeed, most of them chose to retain a commitment to shareholder primacy in their guidelines.
Second, as of the end of the two-year period, most of the BRT Companies had governance guidelines that reflected a shareholder primacy approach.
Third, in SEC submissions or securities filings responding to the over forty shareholder proposals that were submitted to BRT Companies regarding their implementation of the BRT Statement, most of the BRT Companies explicitly stated that their joining the BRT Statement did not require any such changes, and none of them accepted that the Statement required any changes.
Fourth, all of the BRT Companies had and retained corporate bylaws that reflect a shareholder-centered view.
Fifth, in their proxy statements following the BRT Statement, the great majority of the BRT Companies did not even mention their joining the BRT Statement, and, among the minority of companies that did mention it, none indicated that their endorsement required or was expected to result in any changes in stakeholder treatment.
Sixth, the BRT Companies all continued to pay directors compensation that strongly aligns their interests with shareholder value and avoided any use or support of stakeholder-oriented metrics.
Overall, our findings support the view that the BRT Statement was mostly for show and that BRT Companies joining it did not intend or expect it to bring about any material changes in how they treat stakeholders
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