Ontological Investigations of a Pragmatic Kind? A Reply to Lauer

This paper is a reply to Richard Lauer’s “Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology?” (2019) and an attempt to contribute to the meta-social ontological discourse more broadly. In the first part, I will give a rough sketch of Lauer’s general project and confront his pragmatist approach with a fundamental problem. The second part of my reply will provide a solution for this problem rooted in a philosophy of the social sciences in practice

Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice

In this article, I will discuss two prominent views on the relevance and irrelevance of ontological investigations for the social sciences, namely, ontological foundationalism and anti-ontological pragmatism. I will argue that both views are unsatisfactory. The subsequent part of the article will introduce an alternative role for ontological projects in the philosophy of the social sciences that fares better in this respect by paying attention to the ontological assumptions of actual social scientific theories, models, and related explanatory practices. I will illustrate and support this alternative through discussion of three concrete cases

How to move beyond epistemic battles: pluralism and contextualism at the science-society interface

The COVID-19 pandemic has been the scene of several epistemic battles at the science-society interface, creating deadlocks that have been hard to overcome. To cut through the paralysing elements of these discussions, we present an analysis of three epistemic battles, concerning empirical evidence, expertise, and model projections. Our analysis singles out a crucial factor that drives unhelpful disputes like these: the contested prioritisation of specific types of scientific knowledge, which are considered adequate for policy only if they meet predetermined standards. To move beyond these deadlocks, we introduce the conceptual tools of epistemic pluralism and contextualism, which give concrete indications in the three controversies we discuss and show us the way forward in debates on science-based policy

Follow *the* science? On the marginal role of the social sciences in the COVID-19 pandemic

In this paper, we use the case of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe to address the question of what kind of knowledge we should incorporate into public health policy. We show that policy-making during the COVID-19 pandemic has been biomedicine-centric in that its evidential basis marginalised input from non-biomedical disciplines. We then argue that in particular the social sciences could contribute essential expertise and evidence to public health policy in times of biomedical emergencies and that we should thus strive for a tighter integration of the social sciences in future evidence-based policy-making. This demand faces challenges on different levels, which we identify and discuss as potential inhibitors for a more pluralistic evidential basis. © 2021, The Author(s)

Introduction: Systematicity, the Nature of Science?

Introduction to Synthese SI: Systematicity: The Nature of Science

Introduction: Systematicity, the Nature of Science?

Introduction to Synthese SI: Systematicity: The Nature of Science

Pluralism and epistemic goals: why the social sciences will (probably) not be synthesised by evolutionary theory

This article discusses Mesoudi et al.’s suggestion to synthesise the social sciences based on a theory of cultural evolution. In view of their proposal, I shall discuss two key questions. (I) Is their theory of cultural evolution a promising candidate to synthesise the social sciences? (II) What is the added value of evolutionary approaches for the social sciences? My aim is to highlight some hitherto underestimated challenges for transformative evolutionary approaches to the social sciences that come into view when one looks at these questions against the backdrop of actual scientific practice in the social sciences

A transformation of human operation approach to inform system design for automation

Design of automation system relies on experts’ knowledge and experience accumulated from past solutions. In designing novel solutions, however, it is difficult to apply past knowledge and achieve design right-first-time, therefore wasting valuable resources and time. SADT/IDEF0 models are commonly used by automation experts to model manufacturing systems based on the manual process. However, function generalisation without benchmarking is difficult for experts particularly for complex and highly skilled-based tasks. This paper proposes a functional task abstraction approach to support automation design specification based on human factor attributes. A semi-automated clustering approach is developed to identify key functions from an observed manual process. The proposed approach is tested on five different automation case studies. The results indicate the proposed method reduces inconsistency in task abstraction when compared to the current approach that relies on the experts, which are further validated against the solutions generated by automation experts.</p

Pluralism and epistemic goals: why the social sciences will not be synthesised by evolutionary theory

This article discusses Mesoudi et al.’s suggestion to synthesise the social sciences based on a theory of cultural evolution. In view of their proposal, I shall discuss two key questions. (I) Is their theory of cultural evolution a promising candidate to synthesise the social sciences? (II) What is the added value of evolutionary approaches for the social sciences? My aim is to highlight some hitherto underestimated challenges for transformative evolutionary approaches to the social sciences that come into view when one looks at these questions against the backdrop of actual scientific practice in the social sciences