991 research outputs found

    Force-Control for the Automated Footwear Testing System

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    The Automated Footwear Testing System (AFTS) is a robotic system designed to replicated the movement and loading of a shoe as it contacts the ground during common human movements. By doing so, the AFTS can serve as a system for the functional testing of different footwear designs in a manner that is difficult to achieve by standard testing systems. The AFTS consists of four main components: a robotic Stewart platform, a rigid fixed frame, a load cell and a prosthetic foot. Motion of the foot relative to the ground is created by rigidly fixing the foot to the frame and moving the platform relative to the foot. The Stewart platform has six degrees of kinematic freedom and can reproduce the required complex three-dimensional motion path within the limitations of its range of motion. While the platform is in contact with the footwear, the six-axis load cell measures the three-dimensional forces and moments acting on the prosthetic foot. For the AFTS, a movement path is specified, translated into platform coordinates and executed on the machine. During the execution, the load cell measures the forces and moments that act on the prosthetic foot. We wish to find the particular movement path of the Stewart platform that will generate the target force profile. Thus, we are interested in solving an inverse problem. The main goal of the workshop was to investigate potential solution methods for this ‘force-control’ problem, including looking into its feasibility

    The College Admissions Problem Under Uncertainty

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    We consider a college admissions problem with uncertainty. We realistically assume that (i) students' college application choices are nontrivial because applications are costly, (ii) college rankings of students are noisy and thus uncertain at the time of application, and (iii) matching between colleges and students takes place in a decentralized setting. We analyze a general equilibrium model where two ranked colleges set admissions standards for student quality signals, and students, knowing their types, decide where to apply to. We show that the optimal student application portfolio need not be monotone in types, and we construct a robust example to show that this can lead to a failure of assortative matching in equilibrium. More importantly, we prove that a unique equilibrium with assortive matching exists provided application costs are small and the lower-ranked college has sufficiently high capacity. We also provide equilibrium comparative static results with respect to college capacities and application costs. We apply the model to the question of race-based admissions policiesmatching, directed search, noise

    The Opinion - Vol. 16, No. 03

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    Originally published in print for Fuller Theological Seminary\u27s community from 1962 through 1977.https://digitalcommons.fuller.edu/fts-opinion/1149/thumbnail.jp

    The Opinion - Vol. 16, No. 02

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    Originally published in print for Fuller Theological Seminary\u27s community from 1962 through 1977.https://digitalcommons.fuller.edu/fts-opinion/1148/thumbnail.jp
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