On Boltzmann vs. Gibbs and the Equilibrium in Statistical Mechanics

In a recent article, Werndl and Frigg discuss the relationship between the Boltzmannian and Gibbsian framework of statistical mechanics, addressing in particular the question when equilibrium values calculated in both frameworks agree. In this paper, I address conceptual confusions that could arise from their discussion, concerning in particular the authors' use of "Boltzmann equilibrium". I also clarify the status of the Khinchin condition for the equivalence of Boltzmannian and Gibbsian, and show that it follows under the assumptions proposed by Werndl and Frigg from standard arguments in probability theory

Arrow(s) of Time without a Past Hypothesis

The paper discusses recent proposals by Carroll and Chen, as well as Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati to explain the (thermodynamic) arrow of time without a Past Hypothesis, i.e., the assumption of a special (low-entropy) initial state of the universe. After discussing the role of the Past Hypothesis and the controversy about its status, we explain why Carroll's model - which establishes an arrow of time as typical - can ground sensible predictions and retrodictions without assuming something akin to a Past Hypothesis. We then propose a definition of a Boltzmann entropy for a classical $N$-particle system with gravity, suggesting that a Newtonian gravitating universe might provide a relevant example of Carroll's entropy model. This invites comparison with the work of Barbour, Koslowski, and Mercati that identifies typical arrows of time in a relational formulation of classical gravity on shape space. We clarify the difference between this gravitational arrow in terms of shape complexity and the entropic arrow in absolute spacetime and work out the key advantages of the relationalist theory. We end by pointing out why the entropy concept relies on absolute scales and is thus not relational.Comment: Contains small corrections with respect to the previous versio

Against Fields

Using the example of classical electrodynamics, I argue that the concept of fields as mediators of particle interactions is fundamentally flawed and reflects a misguided attempt to retrieve Newtonian concepts in relativistic theories. This leads to various physical and metaphysical problems that are discussed in detail. In particular, I emphasize that physics has not found a satisfying solution to the self-interaction problem in the context of the classical field theory. To demonstrate the superiority of a pure particle ontology, I defend the direct interaction theory of Wheeler and Feynman against recent criticism and argue that it provides the most cogent formulation of classical electrodynamics

Against Fields

Using the example of classical electrodynamics, I argue that the concept of fields as mediators of particle interactions is fundamentally flawed and reflects a misguided attempt to retrieve Newtonian concepts in relativistic theories. This leads to various physical and metaphysical problems that are discussed in detail. In particular, I emphasize that physics has not found a satisfying solution to the self-interaction problem in the context of the classical field theory. To demonstrate the superiority of a pure particle ontology, I defend the direct interaction theory of Wheeler and Feynman against recent criticism and argue that it provides the most cogent formulation of classical electrodynamics

On Boltzmann vs. Gibbs and the Equilibrium in Statistical Mechanics

In a recent article, Werndl and Frigg discuss the relationship between the Boltzmannian and Gibbsian framework of statistical mechanics, addressing in particular the question when equilibrium values calculated in both frameworks agree. In this paper, I address conceptual confusions that could arise from their discussion, concerning in particular the authors' use of "Boltzmann equilibrium". I also clarify the status of the Khinchin condition for the equivalence of Boltzmannian and Gibbsian, and show that it follows under the assumptions proposed by Werndl and Frigg from standard arguments in probability theory