47 research outputs found

    The distribution of oportunities: a normative theory

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    In this paper, we consider the problem of ranking protiles of opportunity sets. First, we take each agent's preferences over (individual) opportunity sets as given. Then, rather than discriminate among possibly competing evaluative criteria, we consider minimal standards for any such ranking. We impose four normative principies, in each case limiting the conditions under which ethical conclusions might be drawn to only those cases that are unambiguous. The first three principles are subrestrictions of the Pareto criterion; they require that Pareto improvements unambiguously enhance social welfare only when they do not conflict with other social objectives. The fourth principle is a minimal equity condition. It requires that if an agent can be identified as being the worst-off, then a necessary condition for social welfare to unambiguously increase when sorne agents gain is that this agent gains as well, however slightly. We then study the properties of social optima under these restrictions. We show that while optima need not be Pareto efficient, they must be envy-free. Thus, accepting these principies requires commitment to a world in which no agent envies the opportunities available to another

    Equitable opportunities in economic environments

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    In this paper, we extend the axiomatic analysis of equitable opportunities developed in Kranich [6] from finite to continuous opportunity sets. This extended framework is amenable to economic applications. The main results establish conditions under which an ordinal ranking of profiles of opportunity sets can be represented by a cardinal advantage function which describes both the extent of inequality and the distribution of advantage among the agents

    Equity and economic theory: reflections on methodology and scope

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    This paper provides an introduction to the recent literature on ordinal distributive justice. Its objetive is to explain the process of the mathematical analysis of fairness and to consider its potential for solving real allocative problems by means of several illustrative examples

    Equity and economic theory: reflections on methodology and scope.

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    This paper provides an introduction to the recent literature on ordinal distributive justice. Its objetive is to explain the process of the mathematical analysis of fairness and to consider its potential for solving real allocative problems by means of several illustrative examples.Fairness; Equity; Distributive justice;

    Equitable opportunities in economic environments.

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    In this paper, we extend the axiomatic analysis of equitable opportunities developed in Kranich [6] from finite to continuous opportunity sets. This extended framework is amenable to economic applications. The main results establish conditions under which an ordinal ranking of profiles of opportunity sets can be represented by a cardinal advantage function which describes both the extent of inequality and the distribution of advantage among the agents.Equity; Fairness; Opportunities; Advantage;

    The distribution of oportunities: a normative theory.

    Get PDF
    In this paper, we consider the problem of ranking protiles of opportunity sets. First, we take each agent's preferences over (individual) opportunity sets as given. Then, rather than discriminate among possibly competing evaluative criteria, we consider minimal standards for any such ranking. We impose four normative principies, in each case limiting the conditions under which ethical conclusions might be drawn to only those cases that are unambiguous. The first three principles are subrestrictions of the Pareto criterion; they require that Pareto improvements unambiguously enhance social welfare only when they do not conflict with other social objectives. The fourth principle is a minimal equity condition. It requires that if an agent can be identified as being the worst-off, then a necessary condition for social welfare to unambiguously increase when sorne agents gain is that this agent gains as well, however slightly. We then study the properties of social optima under these restrictions. We show that while optima need not be Pareto efficient, they must be envy-free. Thus, accepting these principies requires commitment to a world in which no agent envies the opportunities available to another.

    The measurement of opportunity inequality: a cardinality-based approach

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    We consider the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets on the basis of equality. First, conditional on agents' preferences over individual opportunity sets, we formulate the analogues ofthe notions ofthe Lorenz partial ordering, equalizing Dalton transfers, and inequality averse social welfare functionals -concepts which play a central role in the literature on income inequality. For the particular case in which agents rank opportunity sets on the basis of their cardinalities, we establish an analogue of the fundamental theorem of inequality measurement: one distribution Lorenz dominates another if and only if the former can be obtained from the latter by a finite sequence of equalizing transfers, and if and only if the former is ranked higher than the latter by all inequality averse social welfare functionals. In addition, we characterize the smallest monotonic and transitive extension of the cardinality-based Lorenz inequality ordering

    Can Wages Signal Kindness?

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    We model the interaction between an employer and a worker with interdependent preferences in a simple one-shot production process. In particular, we assume that the worker becomes kinder if she senses that her employer is an altruist. We assume that intentions are private information. Thus, the wage proposal signals the intentions of the employer to the worker. We show that if the workers have ”reasonable” beliefs, then the unique prediction of the game is a separating equilibrium outcome in which wages are fully informative about the intentions of the employer. However, if there are several employers simultaneously bidding to hire a single worker, then there may exist another equilibrium in which wages are completely uninformative.altruism; asymmetric information; behavioral economy; game theory; labour relations; reciprocity

    Allocating environmental costs among heterogeneous sources: The linear damage equivalent mechanism.

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    A group of firms has to divide the costs associated with environmental damages jointly generated as a by-product of their heterogeneous production activities. We propose a specific procedure to assign costs, the Linear Damage Equivalent Mechanism (LDE), which satisfies several appealing strategic and axiomatic properties. The LDE induces a strategic game that has an unambiguous noncooperative prediction, a unique Nash equilibrium which is also robust to coalitional deviations; moreover, the equilibrium is efficient. Among its other properties, we find that the LDE is immune to arbitrary changes in the units of account of the outputs.Environmental damages; Cost-sharing; Heterogeneous sources;

    Equalizing opportunities through public education when innate abilities are unobservable

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    I consider the problem of equalizing opportunities among agents who differ in both their tastes and innate productive abilities when these characteristics are unobservable. The government specifically wishes to offset the effects of differences in innate talents by affording public education or training to those with lesser skills. I first show that in the benchmark case involving complete infonnation it is possible to fully equalize opportunities as defmed axiomatically by Bossert and Fleurbaey. Moreover, in the incomplete infonnation case, it is possible to implement any input progressive education policy by means of a direct implementation/revelation mechanism. However, it is not possible to afford equal opportunities. I conclude with an example demonstrating the alternative, social welfare function approach which I argue is more suitable for second-best analyses
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