Hallucinations and perceptual inference

This commentary takes a closer look at how constructive models of subjective perception," referred to by Collerton et al. (sect. 2), might contribute to the Perception and Attention Deficit (PAD) model. It focuses oil the neuronal mechanisms that could mediate hallucinations, or false inference - in particular, the role of cholinergic systems in encoding uncertainty in the context of hierarchical Bayesian models of perceptual inference Friston 20021); Yu & Dayan 2002)

Modularity, segregation, and interactions

This commentary considers how far one can go in making inferences about functional modularity or segregation, based on the sorts of analyses used by Caplan & Waters in relation to the underlying neuronal infrastructure. Specifically an attempt is made to relate the "functionalist" approach adopted in the target article to "neuroreductionist" perspectives on the same issue

On the modelling of seizure dynamics.

This scientific commentary refers to ‘On the nature of seizure dynamics’, by V. Jirsa et al. (doi:10.1093/brain/awu133)

Active inference and oculomotor pursuit: the dynamic causal modelling of eye movements.

This paper introduces a new paradigm that allows one to quantify the Bayesian beliefs evidenced by subjects during oculomotor pursuit. Subjects' eye tracking responses to a partially occluded sinusoidal target were recorded non-invasively and averaged. These response averages were then analysed using dynamic causal modelling (DCM). In DCM, observed responses are modelled using biologically plausible generative or forward models - usually biophysical models of neuronal activity

Active inference and the anatomy of oculomotion

Given that eye movement control can be framed as an inferential process, how are the requisite forces generated to produce anticipated or desired fixation? Starting from a generative model based on simple Newtonian equations of motion, we derive a variational solution to this problem and illustrate the plausibility of its implementation in the oculomotor brainstem. We show, through simulation, that the Bayesian filtering equations that implement ‘planning as inference’ can generate both saccadic and smooth pursuit eye movements. Crucially, the associated message passing maps well onto the known connectivity and neuroanatomy of the brainstem – and the changes in these messages over time are strikingly similar to single unit recordings of neurons in the corresponding nuclei. Furthermore, we show that simulated lesions to axonal pathways reproduce eye movement patterns of neurological patients with damage to these tracts

The Computational Anatomy of Visual Neglect

Visual neglect is a debilitating neuropsychological phenomenon that has many clinical implications and—in cognitive neuroscience—offers an important lesion deficit model. In this article, we describe a computational model of visual neglect based upon active inference. Our objective is to establish a computational and neurophysiological process theory that can be used to disambiguate among the various causes of this important syndrome; namely, a computational neuropsychology of visual neglect. We introduce a Bayes optimal model based upon Markov decision processes that reproduces the visual searches induced by the line cancellation task (used to characterize visual neglect at the bedside). We then consider 3 distinct ways in which the model could be lesioned to reproduce neuropsychological (visual search) deficits. Crucially, these 3 levels of pathology map nicely onto the neuroanatomy of saccadic eye movements and the systems implicated in visual neglect

Analysis of family-wise error rates in statistical parametric mapping using random field theory.

This technical report revisits the analysis of family-wise error rates in statistical parametric mapping-using random field theory-reported in (Eklund et al. []: arXiv 1511.01863). Contrary to the understandable spin that these sorts of analyses attract, a review of their results suggests that they endorse the use of parametric assumptions-and random field theory-in the analysis of functional neuroimaging data. We briefly rehearse the advantages parametric analyses offer over nonparametric alternatives and then unpack the implications of (Eklund et al. []: arXiv 1511.01863) for parametric procedures. Hum Brain Mapp, 2017. © 2017 The Authors Human Brain Mapping Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc

From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind

Predictive processing (PP) approaches to the mind are increasingly popular in the cognitive sciences. This surge of interest is accompanied by a proliferation of philosophical arguments, which seek to either extend or oppose various aspects of the emerging framework. In particular, the question of how to position predictive processing with respect to enactive and embodied cognition has become a topic of intense debate. While these arguments are certainly of valuable scientific and philosophical merit, they risk underestimating the variety of approaches gathered under the predictive label. Here, we first present a basic review of neuroscientific, cognitive, and philosophical approaches to PP, to illustrate how these range from solidly cognitivist applications—with a firm commitment to modular, internalistic mental representation—to more moderate views emphasizing the importance of ‘body-representations’, and finally to those which fit comfortably with radically enactive, embodied, and dynamic theories of mind. Any nascent predictive processing theory (e.g., of attention or consciousness) must take into account this continuum of views, and associated theoretical commitments. As a final point, we illustrate how the Free Energy Principle (FEP) attempts to dissolve tension between internalist and externalist accounts of cognition, by providing a formal synthetic account of how internal ‘representations’ arise from autopoietic self-organization. The FEP thus furnishes empirically productive process theories (e.g., predictive processing) by which to guide discovery through the formal modelling of the embodied mind

A factor graph description of deep temporal active inference

Active inference is a corollary of the Free Energy Principle that prescribes how self-organizing biological agents interact with their environment. The study of active inference processes relies on the definition of a generative probabilistic model and a description of how a free energy functional is minimized by neuronal message passing under thatmodel. This paper presents a tutorial introduction to specifying active inference processes by Forney-style factor graphs (FFG). The FFG framework provides both an insightful representation of the probabilistic model and a biologically plausible inference scheme that, in principle, can be automatically executed in a computer simulation. As an illustrative example, we present an FFG for a deep temporal active inference process. The graph clearly shows how policy selection by expected free energy minimization results from free energy minimization per se, in an appropriate generative policy model