Table_1_Applicability of taxonomic sufficiency of macrofaunal assemblages in benthic ecological quality assessments: Insights from a semi-enclosed bay.docx

To explore the applicability of taxonomic sufficiency in benthic ecological quality assessments, we analyzed the similarity of data matrices under different taxonomic levels and transformations based on macrofaunal data sampled from a semi-enclosed bay. The data matrix similarity revealed a highly significant correlation among the similarity matrices at the species level and those at the higher taxonomic levels (genus, family and order), while the correlation coefficients among the matrices decreased with increasing taxonomic levels. Second-stage CLUSTER plots showed that the quantitative genus level was the closest to the quantitative species level. The loss of family level data varied among seasons. The results of the response to environmental factors at the genus and family levels were similar to those at the species level. In the assessment of the benthic ecological quality of semi-enclosed bays, the level of macrofauna identification can be at the genus or family level to improve the cost performance, depending on logistical conditions.</p

Investment sensitivity.

In modern enterprises with a separation of powers, the ultimate controller can effectively influence the implementation of corporate strategy and operational management efficiency, as well as improve corporate governance by monitoring and limiting the management entrenchment effect within enterprises. Based on the information pertaining to ultimate controllers disclosed by enterprises in their annual reports, this study empirically tested whether the absence of the ultimate controller impacts investment efficiency using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020. It was found that the investment efficiency of enterprises without ultimate controllers is relatively lower than those with ultimate controllers. This is reflected in the insufficient investment of enterprises without an ultimate controller. Moreover, the effect is more significant when the financial environment, internal governance environment, and external governance environment of firms are worse. The mechanism analysis demonstrated that the absence of an ultimate controller causes a more severe insider agency problem and a significantly higher degree of financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment and reduces investment efficiency of firms. The economic consequence test also found that the inefficient investment caused by the absence of ultimate controllers would damage the future value of enterprises, but would increase managers’ compensation. Overall, this study suggests that ultimate controllers are an important part of a firm’s internal governance, especially for monitoring management behavior and resolving agency conflicts.</div

Descriptive statistics of main variables.

In modern enterprises with a separation of powers, the ultimate controller can effectively influence the implementation of corporate strategy and operational management efficiency, as well as improve corporate governance by monitoring and limiting the management entrenchment effect within enterprises. Based on the information pertaining to ultimate controllers disclosed by enterprises in their annual reports, this study empirically tested whether the absence of the ultimate controller impacts investment efficiency using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020. It was found that the investment efficiency of enterprises without ultimate controllers is relatively lower than those with ultimate controllers. This is reflected in the insufficient investment of enterprises without an ultimate controller. Moreover, the effect is more significant when the financial environment, internal governance environment, and external governance environment of firms are worse. The mechanism analysis demonstrated that the absence of an ultimate controller causes a more severe insider agency problem and a significantly higher degree of financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment and reduces investment efficiency of firms. The economic consequence test also found that the inefficient investment caused by the absence of ultimate controllers would damage the future value of enterprises, but would increase managers’ compensation. Overall, this study suggests that ultimate controllers are an important part of a firm’s internal governance, especially for monitoring management behavior and resolving agency conflicts.</div

The annual distribution of samples.

In modern enterprises with a separation of powers, the ultimate controller can effectively influence the implementation of corporate strategy and operational management efficiency, as well as improve corporate governance by monitoring and limiting the management entrenchment effect within enterprises. Based on the information pertaining to ultimate controllers disclosed by enterprises in their annual reports, this study empirically tested whether the absence of the ultimate controller impacts investment efficiency using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020. It was found that the investment efficiency of enterprises without ultimate controllers is relatively lower than those with ultimate controllers. This is reflected in the insufficient investment of enterprises without an ultimate controller. Moreover, the effect is more significant when the financial environment, internal governance environment, and external governance environment of firms are worse. The mechanism analysis demonstrated that the absence of an ultimate controller causes a more severe insider agency problem and a significantly higher degree of financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment and reduces investment efficiency of firms. The economic consequence test also found that the inefficient investment caused by the absence of ultimate controllers would damage the future value of enterprises, but would increase managers’ compensation. Overall, this study suggests that ultimate controllers are an important part of a firm’s internal governance, especially for monitoring management behavior and resolving agency conflicts.</div

Over-investment or under-investment.

In modern enterprises with a separation of powers, the ultimate controller can effectively influence the implementation of corporate strategy and operational management efficiency, as well as improve corporate governance by monitoring and limiting the management entrenchment effect within enterprises. Based on the information pertaining to ultimate controllers disclosed by enterprises in their annual reports, this study empirically tested whether the absence of the ultimate controller impacts investment efficiency using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020. It was found that the investment efficiency of enterprises without ultimate controllers is relatively lower than those with ultimate controllers. This is reflected in the insufficient investment of enterprises without an ultimate controller. Moreover, the effect is more significant when the financial environment, internal governance environment, and external governance environment of firms are worse. The mechanism analysis demonstrated that the absence of an ultimate controller causes a more severe insider agency problem and a significantly higher degree of financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment and reduces investment efficiency of firms. The economic consequence test also found that the inefficient investment caused by the absence of ultimate controllers would damage the future value of enterprises, but would increase managers’ compensation. Overall, this study suggests that ultimate controllers are an important part of a firm’s internal governance, especially for monitoring management behavior and resolving agency conflicts.</div

Channel test.

In modern enterprises with a separation of powers, the ultimate controller can effectively influence the implementation of corporate strategy and operational management efficiency, as well as improve corporate governance by monitoring and limiting the management entrenchment effect within enterprises. Based on the information pertaining to ultimate controllers disclosed by enterprises in their annual reports, this study empirically tested whether the absence of the ultimate controller impacts investment efficiency using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020. It was found that the investment efficiency of enterprises without ultimate controllers is relatively lower than those with ultimate controllers. This is reflected in the insufficient investment of enterprises without an ultimate controller. Moreover, the effect is more significant when the financial environment, internal governance environment, and external governance environment of firms are worse. The mechanism analysis demonstrated that the absence of an ultimate controller causes a more severe insider agency problem and a significantly higher degree of financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment and reduces investment efficiency of firms. The economic consequence test also found that the inefficient investment caused by the absence of ultimate controllers would damage the future value of enterprises, but would increase managers’ compensation. Overall, this study suggests that ultimate controllers are an important part of a firm’s internal governance, especially for monitoring management behavior and resolving agency conflicts.</div

Benchmark regression.

In modern enterprises with a separation of powers, the ultimate controller can effectively influence the implementation of corporate strategy and operational management efficiency, as well as improve corporate governance by monitoring and limiting the management entrenchment effect within enterprises. Based on the information pertaining to ultimate controllers disclosed by enterprises in their annual reports, this study empirically tested whether the absence of the ultimate controller impacts investment efficiency using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020. It was found that the investment efficiency of enterprises without ultimate controllers is relatively lower than those with ultimate controllers. This is reflected in the insufficient investment of enterprises without an ultimate controller. Moreover, the effect is more significant when the financial environment, internal governance environment, and external governance environment of firms are worse. The mechanism analysis demonstrated that the absence of an ultimate controller causes a more severe insider agency problem and a significantly higher degree of financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment and reduces investment efficiency of firms. The economic consequence test also found that the inefficient investment caused by the absence of ultimate controllers would damage the future value of enterprises, but would increase managers’ compensation. Overall, this study suggests that ultimate controllers are an important part of a firm’s internal governance, especially for monitoring management behavior and resolving agency conflicts.</div

Smart Conducting PANI/P(St-NIPAM) Particles and Their Switchable Conductivity

Particles with circumstance-responsive conductivity have an appealing performance in constructing sensors. Here, “smart” conducting polyaniline-doped poly­(styrene-co-N-isopropylacrylamide) composite spheres, i.e. PANI/P­(St-NIPAM) particles, are reported. A series of PANI/P­(St-NIPAM) particles can be prepared with different ratios of N-isopropylacrylamide to monomers, i.e. N/M ratios. With the improved N/M ratios in polymerization, the amount of polyaniline (PANI) incorporating into the produced particles increased, resulting in an enhanced conductivity. With the improved N/M ratios, the hydrodynamic diameters of PANI/P­(St-NIPAM) particles increased at a low temperature, whereas they decreased at a high temperature; resulting in the enhanced volume-change ability with the increasing poly­(N-isopropylacrylamide) (PNIPAM) content in particles. Depending on the temperature-induced volume change, these particles exhibit “smart” conductivity in a homemade device, in which these particles can be used as a temperature-responsive conducting medium to construct an “on–off” circuit, and the switch of an LED lamp can be triggered by temperature. These particles with the smart conducting property provide wide potential applications in sensors, microelectronics, energy storage, and other fields

Other robust tests.

In modern enterprises with a separation of powers, the ultimate controller can effectively influence the implementation of corporate strategy and operational management efficiency, as well as improve corporate governance by monitoring and limiting the management entrenchment effect within enterprises. Based on the information pertaining to ultimate controllers disclosed by enterprises in their annual reports, this study empirically tested whether the absence of the ultimate controller impacts investment efficiency using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020. It was found that the investment efficiency of enterprises without ultimate controllers is relatively lower than those with ultimate controllers. This is reflected in the insufficient investment of enterprises without an ultimate controller. Moreover, the effect is more significant when the financial environment, internal governance environment, and external governance environment of firms are worse. The mechanism analysis demonstrated that the absence of an ultimate controller causes a more severe insider agency problem and a significantly higher degree of financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment and reduces investment efficiency of firms. The economic consequence test also found that the inefficient investment caused by the absence of ultimate controllers would damage the future value of enterprises, but would increase managers’ compensation. Overall, this study suggests that ultimate controllers are an important part of a firm’s internal governance, especially for monitoring management behavior and resolving agency conflicts.</div

Heckman two-stage test.

In modern enterprises with a separation of powers, the ultimate controller can effectively influence the implementation of corporate strategy and operational management efficiency, as well as improve corporate governance by monitoring and limiting the management entrenchment effect within enterprises. Based on the information pertaining to ultimate controllers disclosed by enterprises in their annual reports, this study empirically tested whether the absence of the ultimate controller impacts investment efficiency using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020. It was found that the investment efficiency of enterprises without ultimate controllers is relatively lower than those with ultimate controllers. This is reflected in the insufficient investment of enterprises without an ultimate controller. Moreover, the effect is more significant when the financial environment, internal governance environment, and external governance environment of firms are worse. The mechanism analysis demonstrated that the absence of an ultimate controller causes a more severe insider agency problem and a significantly higher degree of financing constraints, which leads to underinvestment and reduces investment efficiency of firms. The economic consequence test also found that the inefficient investment caused by the absence of ultimate controllers would damage the future value of enterprises, but would increase managers’ compensation. Overall, this study suggests that ultimate controllers are an important part of a firm’s internal governance, especially for monitoring management behavior and resolving agency conflicts.</div