9 research outputs found

    Color-coded (see bar on the right) fraction of cooperation and loners.

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    The multitude of transitions in the color map points towards a high complexity of the underlying mechanisms (see main text for more details).</p

    Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game with voluntary participation

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    <div><p>Voluntary participation, demonstrated to be a simple yet effective mechanism to promote persistent cooperative behavior, has been extensively studied. It has also been verified that the aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule promotes the evolution of cooperation. Inspired by this well-known fact, we combine the Win-Stay-Lose-Learn updating rule with voluntary participation: Players maintain their strategies when they are satisfied, or players attempt to imitate the strategy of one randomly chosen neighbor. We find that this mechanism maintains persistent cooperative behavior, even further promotes the evolution of cooperation under certain conditions.</p></div

    Special configurations of players.

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    <p>In all panels the cooperators are depicted blue while defectors are depicted red and loners are depicted green. Each small square corresponds to a single player. Denoted values correspond to the payoffs of individual players, as obtained for the presented configurations.</p

    Evolution of cooperation on stable state under some certain initial condition.

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    <p>Panel (a) (or (b)) features the characteristic snapshots of the spatial grid when A = 0.75 (A = 0.751) and b = 1.5, as obtained when using the initial conditions presented in <a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0171680#pone.0171680.g003" target="_blank">Fig 3(H)</a> (cooperators are yellow, defectors are red and loners are green).</p

    Phase separation lines on <i>K</i>-<i>b</i> parameter plane for different values of Δ<i>w</i>.

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    <p>From (a) to (c), the value of Δ<i>w</i> are equal to 0, 0.05 and 0.3, respectively. When Δ<i>w</i> is moderate, the space of pure C become wider and the space of mixed C+D+L become narrow, besides, the optimal uncertainty is disappear.</p

    Cooperation enhanced by the coevolution of teaching activity in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with voluntary participation - Fig 1

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    <p>The frequencies of coopertors (Fig 1(A)), defectors (Fig 1(B)) and loners (Fig 1(C)) as a function of Δ for different values of temptation to defect <i>b</i>. All results are obtain for <i>K</i> = 0.1.</p

    Typical snapshots of the distribution of strategies in step 0, 100, 800, 10,000.

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    <p>All results are obtain for <i>b</i> = 1.05 <i>K</i> = 0.1. From top to bottom, Δ<i>w</i> are equal to 0, 0.05 and 0.3 respectively. Cooperation, defection and loner are colored by red, green and blue, respectively.</p
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