Rare K+ Decays from Experiment E787

This paper presents the latest results from experiment E787, at Brookhaven National Laboratory, on K+ -> pi nu/nubar and radiative K+ decays. The result for K+ -> pi nu/nubar uses data collected in runs taken during 1995, 1996 and 1997. In addition, we discuss plans for future measurements of K+ -> pi nu/nubar.Comment: Invited talk at Heavy Quarks at Fixed Target, Rio De Janeiro, Oct. 9-12, 200

A Note On Transversals

Let $G$ be a finite group and $H$ a core-free subgroup of $G$. We will show that if there exists a solvable, generating transversal of $H$ in $G$, then $G$ is a solvable group. Further, if $S$ is a generating transversal of $H$ in $G$ and $S$ has order 2 invariant sub right loop $T$ such that the quotient $S/T$ is a group. Then $H$ is an elementary abelian 2-group.Comment: 7 page

Recent results from CLEO on Charm and Bottom hadrons

In this talk, I present new results from CLEO on charm and bottom hadrons. Most of the talk will be on the issue of the B semileptonic branching fraction, its connection to the number of charm quarks produced in the decay of a b quark, and the rate for the b -> ccbars transitionComment: Invited talk at "Production and decay of hyperons, charmed and beauty hadrons", Sept. 5-8, Strasbourg, France. Latex, 7 pages, figures include

Solvable and Nilpotent Right Loops

In this paper the notion of nilpotent right transversal and solvable right transversal has been defined. Further, it is proved that if a core-free subgroup has a generating solvable transversal or a generating nilpotent transversal, then the whole group is solvable.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1307.539

Dynamics of Individual Specialization and Global Diversification in Communities

We discuss a model of an economic community consisting of $N$ interacting agents. The state of each agent at any time is characterized, in general, by a mixed strategy profile drawn from a space of $s$ pure strategies. The community evolves as agents update their strategy profiles in response to payoffs received from other agents. The evolution equation is a generalization of the replicator equation. We argue that when $N$ is sufficiently large and the payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities, the community evolves to retain the full diversity of available strategies even as individual agents specialize to pure strategies.Comment: 13 pages, Late