102 research outputs found
An Intergenerational Common Pool Resource Experiment
intergenerational common pool resources;growth and altruism;free-riding intentions
The corruptive force of AI-generated advice
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly becoming a trusted advisor in
people's lives. A new concern arises if AI persuades people to break ethical
rules for profit. Employing a large-scale behavioural experiment (N = 1,572),
we test whether AI-generated advice can corrupt people. We further test whether
transparency about AI presence, a commonly proposed policy, mitigates potential
harm of AI-generated advice. Using the Natural Language Processing algorithm,
GPT-2, we generated honesty-promoting and dishonesty-promoting advice.
Participants read one type of advice before engaging in a task in which they
could lie for profit. Testing human behaviour in interaction with actual AI
outputs, we provide first behavioural insights into the role of AI as an
advisor. Results reveal that AI-generated advice corrupts people, even when
they know the source of the advice. In fact, AI's corrupting force is as strong
as humans'.Comment: Leib & K\"obis share first authorshi
The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts: A Signaling Approach
We analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals. Fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements, whereas selfish principals are not. Principals are privately informed about their types. We investigate a separating equilibrium in which principals reveal their type through the contract o er to the agent. If this equilibrium is played, explicit and implicit contracts are substitutes. Since the agent learns the principal's type, a selfish principal has to rely on explicit incentives. A fair principal, by contrast, can effectively induce implicit incentives and hence does not need to use explicit incentives. Interestingly, if a selfish principal can rely on more effective explicit incentives, a fair principal becomes more likely to be able to separate from the selfish type and, hence, to make better use of implicit incentives. In this sense, there is a strategic complementarity between explicit and implicit incentives
How private is private information?:The ability to spot deception in an economic game
First Online: 22 February 2016We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer–seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the value of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary whether buyers can interrogate the seller and the contextual richness. The buyers’ prediction accuracy is above chance, and is substantial for confident buyers. There is no evidence that the option to interrogate is important and only weak support that contextual richness matters. These results show that the information asymmetry is partly eliminated by people’s ability to spot deception
Competition and Prosociality: A Field Experiment in Ghana
Competitive bonuses are commonly used to promote higher productivity in the workplace. Yet, these types of incentives could have negative spillovers on coworkers' prosocial behavior in subsequent tasks. To investigate this question, we conduct a lab-in-the-eld experiment in Ghana. In a between-subjects design, participants complete a real-eort task under a competitive, threshold, or random payment while holding payment dierentials constant across treatments. Before and after, we measure prosociality through a public goods and a social value orientation game. Competition reduces prosociality when the dispersion of payments is high. However, when there is less at stake, competition does not aect prosociality
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