Optimal Control of Brucellosis in Bison in the Yellowstone National Park Area

Brucellosis is a highly infectious bacterial disease that causes infected females to abort their calves. It has caused devastating losses to U.S. farmers over the last century. The only known focus of Brucellosis left in the nation is wildlife such as bison and elk in the Greater Yellowstone Area. Vaccination and test-and-slaughter have been applied to brucellosis management in bison, and there has been discussion that a combination of both could potentially eradicate the disease in the Yellowstone National Park. However, there is no study on how to allocate resources between the two actions. This paper investigates the optimal allocation of these two selective management options, in a bioeconomic framework, when there are both existence and recreational values for the wildlife host (bison) and when the host puts the livestock sector at risk.Bioeconomics, brucellosis, disease ecology, epidemiology, optimal control, susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Economic Incentives for Controlling Trade-Related Biological Invasions in the Great Lakes

Ballast water from commercial ships engaged in international trade has been implicated as the primary invasion pathway in over 60 percent of new introductions of invasive alien species (IAS) in the Great Lakes since 1960. Recent policies have recognized that IAS are a form of biological pollution and have become focused on preventing new introductions. Given that emissions-based incentives are infeasible for the case of biological emissions, we investigate the cost-effectiveness of various performance proxy-based and technology-based economic incentives to reduce the threat of new invasions of Ponto-Caspian species in the Great Lakes.aquatic nuisance species, ballast water, uncertainty, risk management, performance-based incentives, environmental subsidies, International Relations/Trade, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

THE ECONOMICS OF GREEN PAYMENTS FOR REDUCING AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION IN THE CORN BELT

We develop a watershed-based model of green payments to examine how payments applied to different environmental performance measures compare on the basis of economic efficiency, equity, and environmental outcomes. We also explore how targeting in the specification of water quality goals (e.g., TMDLs) affects program performance.Environmental Economics and Policy,

RESOURCE OR NUISANCE? MANAGING AFRICAN ELEPHANTS AS A MULTI-USE SPECIES

Increasing human interference with natural systems causes us to re-think our perception of wildlife species and the economic choices society makes with regards to their management. Accordingly, we generalize existing 'bioeconomic' models by proposing an economically-based classification of species. The theoretical model is applied to the case of African elephant management. We demonstrate that the classification of the steady state population of a species depends on both species' density and economic factors. Our main results are threefold. First, we demonstrate the classification-dependent possibility of multiple equilibria and perverse comparative statics for multi-use species. Second, upon comparing the optimal stock of a multi-use species to the stock under an open access regime, we find that the ranking in terms of abundance is ambiguous. Finally, and consistent with existing literature on resource management in a second-best world, our case study supports the idea that trade measures have ambiguous effects on wildlife abundance under open access.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

ENVIRONMENTAL RISK AND AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DESIGN

Agricultural nonpoint pollution is inherently stochastic (e.g., due to weather). In theory, this randomness has implications for the choice and design of policy instruments. However, very few empirical studies have modeled natural variability. This paper investigates the importance of stochastic processes for the choice and design of alternative nonpoint instruments. The findings suggest that not explicitly considering the stochastic processes in the analysis can produce significantly biased results.Agricultural and Food Policy, Environmental Economics and Policy,

TRADABLE RISK PERMITS TO PREVENT FUTURE INTRODUCTIONS OF ALIEN INVASIVE SPECIES INTO THE GREAT LAKES

Alien invasive species contribute to biodiversity loss and cause billions of dollars of economic damage in the Great Lakes. We examine the design and efficiency of a tradeable permit system for biological pollution due to alien species that invade the Great Lakes through the ballast water of commercial ships.Risk and Uncertainty,

THE ECONOMICS OF MANAGING WILDLIFE DISEASE

The spread of infectious disease among and between wild domesticated animals has become a major problem worldwide. Upon analyzing the dynamics of wildlife growth and infection when the disease animals cannot be identified separately from healthy wildlife prior to the kill, we find that harvest-based strategies alone have no impact on disease transmission. Other controls that directly influence disease transmission and/or mortality are required. Next, we analyze the socially optimal management of infectious wildlife. The model is applied to the problem of bovine tuberculosis among Michigan white-tailed deer, with non-selective harvests and supplemental feeding being the control variables. Using a two-state linear control model, we find a two-dimensional singular path is optimal (as opposed to a more conventional bang-bang solution) as part of a cycle that results in the disease remaining endemic in the wildlife. This result follows from non-selective harvesting and intermittent wildlife productivity gains from supplemental feeding.Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

The Coordination and Design of Point-Nonpoint Trading Programs and Agri-Environmental Policies

Agricultural agencies have long offered agri-environmental payments that are inadequate to achieve water quality goals, and many state water quality agencies are considering point-nonpoint trading to achieve the needed pollution reductions. This analysis considers both targeted and nontargeted agrienvironmental payment schemes, along with a trading program which is not spatially targeted. The degree of improved performance among these policies is found to depend on whether the programs are coordinated or not, whether double-dipping (i.e., when farmers are paid twice-once by each program-to undertake particular pollution control actions) is allowed, and whether the agri-environmental payments are targeted. Under coordination, efficiency gains only occur with double-dipping, so that both programs jointly influence farmers' marginal decisions. Without coordination, doubledipping may increase or decrease efficiency, depending on how the agri-environmental policy is targeted. Finally, double-dipping may not solely benefit farmers, but can result in a transfer of agricultural subsidies to point sources.Environmental Economics and Policy,

A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response

This paper uses a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the government and individual producers. Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated information asymmetry between livestock managers and social planners. By incorporating the asymmetry, we investigate the role of incentives in producer behavior that influences the duration and magnitude of a disease epidemic.livestock disease, moral hazard, principal-agent model, Institutional and Behavioral Economics,

Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard is Followed by Adverse Selection

Averting or limiting the outbreak of infectious disease in domestic livestock herds is an economic and potential human health issue that involves both the government and individual livestock producers. Producers have private information about preventive biosecurity measures they adopt on their farms prior to outbreak (ex ante moral hazard), and following outbreak they possess private information about whether or not their herd is infected (ex post adverse selection). We investigate how indemnity payments can be designed to provide incentives to producers to invest in biosecurity and report infection to the government, while simultaneously addressing the information asymmetry between producers and the government. We show how addressing the adverse selection problem leads to a risk-sharing tradeoff in the moral hazard problem. We compare the relative magnitude of the first- and second-best levels of biosecurity investment and indemnity payments to further demonstrate the tradeoff between risk-sharing and efficiency, and we discuss the implications for status quo U.S. policy.Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety, Livestock Production/Industries, Risk and Uncertainty,