Financial Sector Development and Growth: The Chinese Experience

institutions, growth, financial intermediation, transition, China

The transparency of the banking industry and the efficiency of information-based bank runs

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system. We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit con-tract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to withdraw. An im-provement in transparency of a bank may reduce depositor welfare through increasing the chance of an inefficient contagious bank run on other banks. A deposit insurance system in which some depositors are fully insured and the others are partially insured can ameliorate this inefficiency. Under such a system, bank runs can serve as an efficient mechanism for disciplining banks. We also consider bank managers’ control over the timing of information disclosure, and find that they may lack the incentive to reveal in-formation about their banks.bank run; contagion; transparency; market discipline; deposit insurance

Subordinated debt, market discipline, and bank risk

This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (‘subdebt’ thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. Under our proposal, investors buy the subdebt of a bank only if they receive favourable information about the bank, and the bank is subject to a regulatory examination if it fails to issue subdebt. By forcing banks to be examined when they are likely weak, subdebt regulation not only reduces the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value-destroying actions to benefit themselves, but may also encourage banks to lower asset risk. It shows that subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks’ moral hazard problems. It also suggests that to make subdebt regulation effective, regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt, prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors, and require the subdebt to convert into the issuing bank’s equity when the government takes over or provides open assistance to the bank.subordinated debt regulation; bank capital regulation; market discipline; moral hazard; contingent capital certificate

Financial crises and bank failures: a review of prediction methods

In this article we provide a summary of empirical results obtained in several economics and operations research papers that attempt to explain, predict, or suggest remedies for financial crises or banking defaults, as well as outlines of the methodologies used. We analyze financial and economic circumstances associated with the US subprime mortgage crisis and the global financial turmoil that has led to severe crises in many countries. The intent of the article is to promote future empirical research that might help to prevent bank failures and financial crises.financial crises; banking failures; operations research; early warning methods; leading indicators; subprime markets

Real effects of bank capital regulations: global evidence

We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998-2011. Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much less potent effect on loan growth

Banks’ option to lend, interest rate sensitivity, and credit availability

Interest rate risk is a major concern for banks because of the nominal nature of their assets and the asset-liability maturity mismatch. This paper proposes a new way to derive a bank’s interest rate sensitivity, by examining separately the effects of interest rate changes on existing loans (loans-in-place) and potential loans (loans-in-process). A potential loan is shown to be equivalent to an American option to lend, and is valued using option theory. An increase in interest rates usually has a negative effect on existing loans. However, if both deposit and lending rates rise by the same amount, the value of a potential loan generally increases. Hence a bank’s lending slack (ratio of loans-in-process to loans-in-place) will determine its overall interest rate risk. Empirical evidence indicates that low-slack banks indeed have significantly more interest rate risk than high-slack banks. The model also makes predictions regarding the effect of deposit and lending rate parameters on bank credit availability. Empirical tests with quarterly data are generally supportive of these predictions.interest rate risk; option to lend; bank’s lending capacity; maturity intermediation

The Effects of (within and with EU) Regional Integration: Impact on Real Effective Exchange Rate Volatility, Institutional Quality and Growth for MENA Countries

institutions, exchange rate, economic policy

Are Expansions Cost Effective for Stock Exchanges? A Global Perspective

This paper investigates the existence and extent of economies of scale and scope among stock exchanges. Evidence from 38 exchanges in 32 countries and 4 continents around the world for the years 1989-1998 indicates the existence of significant economies of scale and scope. The degree of such economies however differs by size of exchange and region. The largest stock exchanges show an increasing trend of cost effectiveness. Exchanges in North America and Europe report substantially larger economies of scale than those in the Asia-Pacific regions.stock exchanges; mergers; regional alliances; economies of scale

Financial crises and bank failures: a review of prediction methods

In this article we analyze financial and economic circumstances associated with the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis and the global financial turmoil that has led to severe crises in many countries. We suggest that the level of cross-border holdings of long-term securities between the United States and the rest of the world may indicate a direct link between the turmoil in the securitized market originated in the United States and that in other countries. We provide a summary of empirical results obtained in several Economics and Operations Research papers that attempt to explain, predict, or suggest remedies for financial crises or banking defaults; we also extensively outline the methodologies used in them. The intent of this article is to promote future empirical research for preventing financial crises.Subprime mortgage ; Financial crises

Do networks in the stock exchange industry pay off? European evidence

The economic theory of network externalities provides the rationale for this paper, which investigates whether adoption of network strategies in European stock exchanges creates additional value in the provision of trading services. Using unbalanced panel data from all major European exchanges over the period 1996–2000, the paper examines empirically the presence of network effects on the liquidity, growth, and efficiency of the exchanges; the transaction cost of trades; and the cost of exchange operations. The evidence shows that adopting a network strategy is significantly associated with higher liquidity, growth and efficiency in the sample markets. Moreover, a network strategy helps to reduce transaction costs of trades as well as operational costs for stock exchanges.stock exchanges; network externalities; remote access; Europe