The macroeconomic effects of world trade in financial assets

This article analyzes some of the potential effects of increased international financial integration within a simple two-country model. In the model, the article considers a switch in the menu of internationally traded financial securities from bonds to complete contingent claims and examines the impact of this switch on the stochastic properties, including the cross-country correlations, of standard macroeconomic aggregates like output, consumption, and labor effort, as well as the trade balance.International finance

Aggregate returns to scale: why measurement is imprecise

The extent to which there are aggregate returns to scale at the level of aggregate production has important implications both for the types of shocks generating business cycles and for optimal policy. However, prior attempts to measure the extent of these returns using instrumental variable techniques have yielded quite imprecise estimates. In this article, we show that the production shocks implied by a range of returns to scale that encompasses both large increasing returns and large decreasing returns are almost identical. This makes clear that there is a fundamental reason for the imprecision of prior estimates and casts doubt on our ability to generate more precise estimatesBusiness cycles

Shrinking money and monetary business cycles

In the postwar period velocity has risen so sharply in the U.S. that the ratio of money to nominal output has fallen by a factor of three. We analyze the implications of shrinking money for the real effects of a monetary shock in two classes of equilibrium monetary business cycle models: limited participation (liquidity) models and predetermined (sticky) price models. We show that the liquidity model predicts that a rise in velocity leads to a substantial reduction in the real effects of a monetary shock. In sharp contrast, we show that the real effects of a monetary shock in the sticky price model are largely invariant to changes in velocity. We provide evidence that suggests that the real effects of monetary shocks have fallen over the postwar period.Business cycles

The Great Depression in the United States from a neoclassical perspective

Can neoclassical theory account for the Great Depression in the United States—both the downturn in output between 1929 and 1933 and the recovery between 1934 and 1939? Yes and no. Given the large real and monetary shocks to the U.S. economy during 1929–33, neoclassical theory does predict a long, deep downturn. However, theory predicts a much different recovery from this downturn than actually occurred. Given the period’s sharp increases in total factor productivity and the money supply and the elimination of deflation and bank failures, theory predicts an extremely rapid recovery that returns output to trend around 1936. In sharp contrast, real output remained between 25 and 30 percent below trend through the late 1930s. We conclude that a new shock is needed to account for the Depression’s weak recovery. A likely culprit is New Deal policies toward monopoly and the distribution of income.Depressions

Valuation equilibria with clubs

This paper considers model worlds in which there is a continuum of individuals who form finite-sized associations to undertake joint activities. We show how, through a suitable choice of commodity space, restrictions on the composition of feasible groups can be incorporated into the specification of the consumption and production sets of the economy. We also show that if there are a finite number of types, then the classical results from the competitive analysis of convex finite-agent economies can be reinterpreted to apply.Consumption (Economics)

Self-fulfilling debt crises

We characterize the values of government debt and the debt's maturity structure under which financial crises brought on by a loss of confidence in the government can arise within a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model. We also characterize the optimal policy response of the government to the threat of such a crisis. We show that when the country's fundamentals place it inside the crisis zone, the government is motivated to reduce its debt and exit the crisis zone because this leads to an economic boom and a reduction in the interest rate on the government's debt. We show that this reduction may be quite gradual if debt is high or the probability of a crisis is low. We also show that, while lengthening the maturity of the debt can shrink the crisis zone, credibility-inducing policies can have perverse effects.Debt

New Deal policies and the persistence of the Great Depression: a general equilibrium analysis

There are two striking aspects of the recovery from the Great Depression in the United States: the recovery was very weak and real wages in several sectors rose significantly above trend. These data contrast sharply with neoclassical theory, which predicts a strong recovery with low real wages. We evaluate the contribution of New Deal cartelization policies designed to limit competition and increase labor bargaining power to the persistence of the Depression. We develop a model of the bargaining process between labor and firms that occurred with these policies, and embed that model within a multi-sector dynamic general equilibrium model. We find that New Deal cartelization policies are an important factor in accounting for the post-1933 Depression. We also find that the key depressing element of New Deal policies was not collusion per se, but rather the link between paying high wages and collusion.Depressions

Direct investment: a doubtful alternative to international debt

The paper considers a model in which private foreign investors make direct long-lived capital investments in a small developing country that is subject to stochastic shocks to production. Depending upon the preferences of the host country, we find that expropriation can occur because of either desperation or opportunism. We show that under reasonable assumptions, increased investment makes expropriation less likely to occur and that the level of investment chosen by atomistic foreign investors may be nonoptimal.International finance ; Developing countries

Reviving reputation models of international debt

A traditional explanation for why sovereign countries repay debt is that they want to keep a good reputation so they can easily borrow more. This explanation does not hold if a country has access to an adequate means of savings regardless of the country's past actions. With such access, a country gets only transient benefits from maintaining a good relationship with bankers, and such benefits cannot support borrowing. However, if a country is involved in a myriad of trust relationships, the country's reputation can spill over to a nondebt relationship which has enduring benefits. Such a spillover can allow a country's reputation to support a large amount of borrowing.International finance