'Good' state vs. 'bad' warlords? A critique of state-building strategies in Afghanistan

The current Afghan government, having weak social roots has been forced to rely on the support of ‘warlords’ to stay in power. But a high price had to be paid. Despite the predominant stress in much current analysis on the issue of regional warlordism, the limited reform achievements in the Kabul ministries and the enduring domination by the militias of some key ministries are potentially much more threatening to the reform and re-establishment of the Afghan state. Widespread corruption is preventing some key ministries from achieving the minimal effectiveness required. Even within Kabul, the focus of the international community has been misplaced. In particular, the pressure of donors on the Ministry of the Interior has been nowhere near as strong as that exerted over the Ministry of Finance. The international community also failed to support adequately the attempts by ‘civil society’ to change the corrupt practices of the state administration

The debate on warlordism: the importance of military legitimacy

Despite the careless use of the terms ' warlord' and ' warlordism' by the media, both have become increasingly popular among academics, even if some scholars object to their use. This paper draws on direct field experience as well as the ongoing debate. It aims, on the one hand, to reconcile the different perspectives - which are often not necessarily at odds with each other - and on the other hand, to propose a definition of 'warlordism' for the social sciences that is both closer to that used so far by historians and at the same time consistent with emerging evidence from the field

Afghan presidential elections: a mirror of self-deception

Judgement over the 20 August Afghan elections has varied widely among observers. The most critical has been the Free and Fair Election Foundation, which reported widespread fraud. The EU observers, by contrast, judged that the elections were ‘free and fair’ despite widespread violence. Most diplomats congratulated Afghanistan over a voter turnout estimated at 40-50%, which despite being well below the official 70% of 2004 is believed to be acceptable in the face of ‘widespread’ violence

The Islamic State and the Taliban’s Counter-terrorism

As the Taliban develops its state and governance apparatus in Afghanistan, it is also confronted with the unexpected task of developing a counter-terrorism strategy. As Antonio Giustozzi explains, the Islamic State in Khorasan has now turned on the Taliban, drawing attention to the complexity of extreme right-wing terrorism, deeply entrenched as it is in the social fabric of Afghanistan

Taliban Networks in Afghanistan

Dr. Antonio Giustozzi relies on his extensive experience as a researcher in Afghanistan to create an insightful analysis of a wide range of topics including assessments of the Taliban’s strengths and weaknesses, their ability to reassess and adapt, and their operational and strategic successes and failures. He has presented a balanced treatment of the subject matter; however, balance does not mean that the case study will be uncontroversial. In fact, Giustozzi’s analysis contains some rather blunt appraisals of many of the major actors in this conflict; including both ISAF and the Taliban.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ciwag-case-studies/1006/thumbnail.jp

Taliban and the future of the state in Afghanistan

As Afghanistan walks through the second year of Taliban rule, and world powers and global media move on to other things, what is the future of the political state, the Emirate, in Afghanistan? The Taliban maintain that they have learnt from the mistakes of their earlier tenure in the 1990s, but are they able to create any state apparatus of governance? Antonio Giustozzi analyses their performance since August 2021, and the road ahead