Contests and other topics in multi-agent systems

Contests are games where agents compete by making costly and irreversible investments to win valuable prizes. They model diverse scenarios ranging from competition among Bitcoin miners to crowdsourcing. My work has touched upon the following topics in contests theory: (i) design of contests to get a moderate output from many agents rather than a very high output from a few; (ii) design of contests to get higher output from an underrepresented group of agents; (iii) existence, computational complexity, and price of anarchy of equilibria in a model where agents participate in several simultaneous contests; (iv) convergence of best-response dynamics in contests. In addition to the above, my ongoing work focuses on topics in contest theory like learning dynamics in contests and analysis of contests where groups of agents (and not just individual agents) compete to get an outcome that affects all of them. More broadly, I have also worked on the following topics: (i) improved, near-optimal algorithms for restless multi-armed bandits with applications to healthcare; (ii) analysis of coalition formation dynamics for deliberation

Best-Response Dynamics in Tullock Contests with Convex Costs

We study the convergence of best-response dynamics in Tullock contests with convex cost functions (these games always have a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium). We show that best-response dynamics rapidly converges to the equilibrium for homogeneous agents. For two homogeneous agents, we show convergence to an $\epsilon$-approximate equilibrium in $\Theta(\log\log(1/\epsilon))$ steps. For $n \ge 3$ agents, the dynamics is not unique because at each step $n-1 \ge 2$ agents can make non-trivial moves. We consider the model proposed by Ghosh and Goldberg (2023), where the agent making the move is randomly selected at each time step. We show convergence to an $\epsilon$-approximate equilibrium in $O(\beta \log(n/(\epsilon\delta)))$ steps with probability $1-\delta$, where $\beta$ is a parameter of the agent selection process, e.g., $\beta = n^2 \log(n)$ if agents are selected uniformly at random at each time step. We complement this result with a lower bound of $\Omega(n + \log(1/\epsilon)/\log(n))$ applicable for any agent selection process.Comment: 43 pages. WINE '23 versio

Contests: equilibrium analysis, design and learning

Contests are games where agents compete by making costly and irreversible investments to win valuable prizes. They model diverse scenarios ranging from crowdsourcing to competition among Bitcoin miners. Using tools from theoretical computer science, we contribute to the understanding of the agents' behavior in contests and make design recommendations to optimize practical objectives. In particular, we (i) analyze learning dynamics in Tullock contests using tools from probabilistic analysis of algorithms and optimization, (ii) design contests that improve diversity in participation, and (iii) study the existence, welfare efficiency, and computational complexity of equilibrium in a class of simultaneous contests

On the Welfare of Cardinal Voting Mechanisms

A voting mechanism is a method for preference aggregation that takes as input preferences over alternatives from voters, and selects an alternative, or a distribution over alternatives. While preferences of voters are generally assumed to be cardinal utility functions that map each alternative to a real value, mechanisms typically studied assume coarser inputs, such as rankings of the alternatives (called ordinal mechanisms). We study cardinal mechanisms, that take as input the cardinal utilities of the voters, with the objective of minimizing the distortion - the worst-case ratio of the best social welfare to that obtained by the mechanism. For truthful cardinal mechanisms with m alternatives and n voters, we show bounds of Theta(mn), Omega(m), and Omega(sqrt{m}) for deterministic, unanimous, and randomized mechanisms respectively. This shows, somewhat surprisingly, that even mechanisms that allow cardinal inputs have large distortion. There exist ordinal (and hence, cardinal) mechanisms with distortion O(sqrt{m log m}), and hence our lower bound for randomized mechanisms is nearly tight. In an effort to close this gap, we give a class of truthful cardinal mechanisms that we call randomized hyperspherical mechanisms that have O(sqrt{m log m}) distortion. These are interesting because they violate two properties - localization and non-perversity - that characterize truthful ordinal mechanisms, demonstrating non-trivial mechanisms that differ significantly from ordinal mechanisms. Given the strong lower bounds for truthful mechanisms, we then consider approximately truthful mechanisms. We give a mechanism that is delta-truthful given delta in (0,1), and has distortion close to 1. Finally, we consider the simple mechanism that selects the alternative that maximizes social welfare. This mechanism is not truthful, and we study the distortion at equilibria for the voters (equivalent to the Price of Anarchy, or PoA). While in general, the PoA is unbounded, we show that for equilibria obtained from natural dynamics, the PoA is close to 1. Thus relaxing the notion of truthfulness in both cases allows us to obtain near-optimal distortion

Best-response dynamics in lottery contests

We study the convergence of best-response dynamics in lottery contests. We show that best-response dynamics rapidly converges to the (unique) equilibrium for homogeneous agents but may not converge for non-homogeneous agents, even for just two non-homogeneous agents

Continuous-time best-response and related dynamics in Tullock contests with convex costs

Tullock contests model real-life scenarios that range from competition among proof-of-work blockchain miners to rent-seeking and lobbying activities. We show that continuous-time best-response dynamics in Tullock contests with convex costs converges to the unique equilibrium using Lyapunov-style arguments. We then use this result to provide an algorithm for computing an approximate equilibrium. We also establish convergence of related discrete-time dynamics, e.g., when the agents best-respond to the empirical average action of other agents. These results indicate that the equilibrium is a reliable predictor of the agents' behavior in these games

Contests to incentivize a target group

We study how to incentivize agents in a target subpopulation to produce a higher output by means of rank-order allocation contests, in the context of incomplete information. We describe a symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibrium for contests that have two types of rank-based prizes: (1) prizes that are accessible only to the agents in the target group; (2) prizes that are accessible to everyone. We also specialize this equilibrium characterization to two important sub-cases: (i) contests that do not discriminate while awarding the prizes, i.e., only have prizes that are accessible to everyone; (ii) contests that have prize quotas for the groups, and each group can compete only for prizes in their share. For these models, we also study the properties of the contest that maximizes the expected total output by the agents in the target group

Simultaneous contests with equal sharing allocation of prizes: computational complexity and price of anarchy

We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as the number of winners increases. The players produce outputs for a set of activities, and the winning criteria of the contests are based on these outputs. We consider two variations of the model: (i) players have costs for producing outputs; (ii) players do not have costs but have generalized budget constraints. We observe that these games are exact potential games and hence always have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The price of anarchy is 2 for the budget model, but can be unbounded for the cost model. Our main results are for the computational complexity of these games. We prove that for general versions of the model exactly or approximately computing a best response is NP-hard. For natural restricted versions where best response is easy to compute, we show that finding a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete, and finding a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is (PPAD PLS)-complete. On the other hand, an approximate pure-strategy Nash equilibrium can be found in pseudo-polynomial time. These games are a strict but natural subclass of explicit congestion games, but they still have the same equilibrium hardness results

Indexability is not enough for Whittle: improved, near-optimal algorithms for restless bandits

We study the problem of planning restless multi-armed bandits (RMABs) with multiple actions. This is a popular model for multi-agent systems with applications like multi-channel communication, monitoring and machine maintenance tasks, and healthcare. Whittle index policies, which are based on Lagrangian relaxations, are widely used in these settings due to their simplicity and near-optimality under certain conditions. In this work, we first show that Whittle index policies can fail in simple and practically relevant RMAB settings, even when the RMABs are indexable. We discuss why the optimality guarantees fail and why asymptotic optimality may not translate well to practically relevant planning horizons. We then propose an alternate planning algorithm based on the mean-field method, which can provably and efficiently obtain near-optimal policies with a large number of arms, without the stringent structural assumptions required by the Whittle index policies. This borrows ideas from existing research with some improvements: our approach is hyper-parameter free, and we provide an improved non-asymptotic analysis which has: (a) no requirement for exogenous hyper-parameters and tighter polynomial dependence on known problem parameters; (b) high probability bounds which show that the reward of the policy is reliable; and (c) matching sub-optimality lower bounds for this algorithm with respect to the number of arms, thus demonstrating the tightness of our bounds. Our extensive experimental analysis shows that the mean-field approach matches or outperforms other baseline