92 research outputs found

    Cognition, Incentives, and Public Governance:Laboratory Federalism from the Organizational Viewpoint

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    The Second Generation Theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism, which draws upon contemporary economic and industrial organization theory, hitherto focuses only on the negative benefits of public decentralization: the potentially superior ability to align perverse incentives vis-Ă -vis the centralized governance alternative. The SGT neglects the positive benefits of decentralization (mistake-ridden learning, flexibility, and option discovery), although the limitations of organization theory do not justify such neglect. By likening intergovernmental grants to incomplete contracts, this work shows that the SGT can include the laboratory nature of decentralization.Experimentation, incomplete contracts, intergovernmental grants, learning, Second Generation Theory of fiscal federalism.

    Old and New Theories of Fiscal Federalism, Organizational Design Problems, and Tiebout

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    This work is a contribution to the Second Generation Theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism that studies fiscal federalism through contemporary economic and industrial organization theory. First, it establishes context by introducing the two classic motivations in support of federalism, namely, incentives and knowledge. Second, it succinctly discusses the incentive-based organizational approach of the SGT. Third, it shows that the Tiebout model already embeds an organizational approach, which instead rests on a knowledge motivation. The underlying theme is that the SGT should include both the incentive and knowledge motivations for fiscal decentralization.Economic organization, Incentives, Knowledge, Second Generation Theory of fiscal federalism.

    Institutions as Knowledge Capital: Ludwig M. Lachmann’s Interpretative Institutionalism

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    The paper revisits the socioeconomic theory of the Austrian School economist Ludwig M. Lachmann. By showing that the common claim that Lachmann’s idiosyncratic (read: eclectic and multidisciplinary) approach to economics entails nihilism is unfounded, it reaches the following conclusions. (1) Lachmann held a sophisticated institutional position to economics that anticipated developments in contemporary new institutional economics. (2) Lachmann’s sociological and economic reading of institutions offers insights for the problem of coordination. (3) Lachmann extends contemporary new institutional theory without simultaneously denying the policy approach of comparative institutional analysis

    Capability Coordination in Modular Organization: Voluntary FS/OSS Production and the Case of Debian GNU/Linux

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    The paper analyzes voluntary Free Software/Open Source Software (FS/OSS) organization of work. The empirical setting considered is the Debian GNU/Linux operating system. The paper finds that the production process is hierarchical notwithstanding the modular (nearly decomposable) architecture of software and of voluntary FS/OSS organization. But voluntary FS/OSS project organization is not hierarchical for the same reasons suggested by the most familiar theories of economic organization: hierarchy is justified for coordination of continuous change, rather than for the direction of static production. Hierarchy is ultimately the overhead attached to the benefits engendered by modular organization.Modularity, hierarchy, capabilities, coordination costs, software.

    Open Source Software Production, Spontaneous Input, and Organizational Learning

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    This work shows that the modular organization of voluntary Open Source Software (OSS) production, whereby programmers supply effort of their accord, capitalizes more on division than on specialization of labor. This is so because voluntary OSS production is characterized by an organizational learning process that dominates the individual one. Organizational learning reveals production choices that would otherwise remain unknown, thereby increasing productivity and indirectly reinforcing incentives to undertake collective problem solving.Division of Labor; Mistake-ridden Learning; Modularity; Open Source Software; Self-selection; Voluntary Production

    Is State Building the Road to World Order?

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    We summarize Francis Fukuyama’s State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-first Century (London, Profile Books, 2005)and explore the limits of its arguments. State Building is a book with a very wide scope that essentially tries to “ground” and expand the fields of political science and international relations with insights from the New Institutional Economics. We suggest that doubts remain concerning the theoretical framework proposed and that many links between theory and a series of substantive claims are left unarticulated; this raises the possibility that the book’s policy recommendations are unwarranted.Democracy, International Political Economy, New Institutional Economics, Political Economy, State building, World Order

    Cognition, incentives, and public governance: Laboratory federalism from the organizational viewpoint

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    The second-generation theory (SGT) of fiscal federalism, which draws upon contemporary economic and industrial organization theory, hitherto focuses only on the negative benefits of public decentralization: the potentially superior ability to align perverse incentives vis-Ă -vis the centralized governance alternative. The SGT neglects the positive benefits of decentralization (mistake-ridden learning, flexibility, and option discovery), although the limitations of organization theory do not justify such neglect. By likening intergovernmental grants to incomplete contracts, this work shows that the SGT can include the laboratory nature of decentralization

    Institutions as Knowledge Capital: Ludwig M. Lachmann’s Interpretative Institutionalism

    Get PDF
    The paper revisits the socioeconomic theory of the Austrian School economist Ludwig M. Lachmann. By showing that the common claim that Lachmann’s idiosyncratic (read: eclectic and multidisciplinary) approach to economics entails nihilism is unfounded, it reaches the following conclusions. (1) Lachmann held a sophisticated institutional position to economics that anticipated developments in contemporary new institutional economics. (2) Lachmann’s sociological and economic reading of institutions offers insights for the problem of coordination. (3) Lachmann extends contemporary new institutional theory without simultaneously denying the policy approach of comparative institutional analysis.Comparative institutional analysis; coordination; expectations; institutional evolution; interpretative institutionalism

    Knowledge, Coordination, and Fiscal Federalism: An Organizational Perspective

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    This essay brings fiscal federalism theory into contact with the knowledge perspective to economic organization. The question addressed is: can a central government be justified in the context of fiscal federalism on grounds of economic organization? We point out that if one looks at the organizational problem of the vertical structure of the public sector from the standpoint of knowledge asymmetry the question of a central government in a federation becomes primarily a story of coordination of dispersed and specific knowledge.Federalism, economic organization, information asymmetry, knowledge asymmetry, coordination, EU.
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