193 research outputs found

    Inter-market Arbitrage in Sports Betting

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    Unlike the existing literature on sports betting, which concentrates on arbitrage within a single market, this paper examines inter-market arbitrage by searching for arbitrage opportunities through combining bets at the bookmaker and the exchange market. Using the posted odds of eight different bookmakers and the corresponding odds traded at a well-known bet exchange for 5,478 football matches played in the top-five European leagues during three seasons, we find (only) ten intra-market arbitrage opportunities. However, we find 1,450 cases in which a combined bet at the bookmaker as well as at the exchange yields a guaranteed positive return. Further analyses reveal that inter-market arbitrage emerges from different levels of informational efficiency between the two markets.sports betting, inter-market arbitrage

    Talent and/or Popularity: What Does It Take to Be a Superstar?

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    We show that both talent and popularity significantly contribute to stars' market values in German soccer. The talent-versus-popularity controversy on the sources of stardom goes back to Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985). All attempts to resolve the controversy empirically face the difficulty of accurately identifying talent. In professional sports, rank-order tournaments help in ascertaining talent. Analyzing a team setting, we use 20 different performance indicators to estimate a player's talent according to his ability to increase the team's winning probability

    Flexibilität

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    Aufgabenfelder eines Informationsmanagement II

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    Contest Theory and its Applications in Sports

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    This paper outlines how the theory of contests is applied to professional team sports leagues. In the first part, we present the traditional Tullock contest and explain some basic properties of the equilibrium. We will then extend this static contest to a two-period model in order to analyze dynamic aspects of contests. In the second part, we will present applications of contest theory in sports. In particular, we will show how the Tullock framework is applied to models of team sports leagues. For this purpose, we will first explain the value creation process in team sports leagues and show how club revenues are related to the contest success function. Then, we present some basic modeling issues; for instance, we show how the assumption of flexible vs. fixed talent supply depends on the league under consideration and how it influences the equilibria. Furthermore, we explicate the effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance in the different models. Then we address the relationship between competitive balance and social welfare. Finally, we illustrate why many clubs tend to "overinvest" in playing talent in many team sports leagues.Contest theory, Tullock contest, sports leagues, competitive balance, revenue sharing, social welfare, overinvestment

    Welfare Effects of Salary Caps in Sports Leagues with Win-Maximizing Clubs

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    This paper studies the welfare effect of a percentage-of-revenue salary cap in a European context with win-maximizing clubs. It shows that a percentage-of-revenue cap increases competitive balance and decreases the overall salary payments in the league, therefore contributing to financial stability. A percentage-of-revenue cap will always increase social welfare if the weight on aggregate club surplus in the welfare function is sufficiently high. Additionally, if fans’ preferences for aggregate talent are sufficiently high then the percentage-of-revenue cap will also increase social welfare; no matter how much weight the league puts on financial stability.Salary Caps, Social Welfare, Competitive Balance, Team Sports League

    Organizational Differences between U.S. Major Leagues and European Leagues: Implications for Salary Caps

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    This paper outlines and compares the organizational structure of major sports leagues, explores the reasoning behind their formation, and derives implications for salary caps in European football. To understand why sports leagues have developed a specific organizational structure, one must take the economic peculiarities of team sports leagues into consideration. For this purpose, we analyze the production process and illuminate its major peculiarities. For example, we present the difference between economic competition and competition on the pitch and discuss the consequences of this distinction for an attractive final product. Furthermore, we show that a hold-up problem exists between the two stages of the production process and demonstrate how these problems are overcome by the organizational structure chosen by sports leagues. We also outline the differences between the U.S. major leagues and European leagues and document recent developments in that context. Finally, based on this comparative institutional analysis, we derive implications for the introduction of salary caps into European football.Sports leagues, organization, salary cap, hold-up problem

    A Contest Model of a Professional Sports League with Two-Sided Markets

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    This paper develops a model of a professional sports league with network externalities by integrating the theory of two-sided markets into a contest model. In professional team sports, leagues function as a platform that enables sponsors to interact with fans. In these league-mediated interactions, positive network effects operate from the fan market to the sponsor market, while negative network effects operate from the sponsor market to the fan market. Clubs react to these network effects by charging higher (lower) prices to sponsors (fans). Our analysis shows that the size of these network effects determines the level of competitive balance within the league. Traditional models, which do not take network externalities into account, under- or overestimate the actual level of competitive balance, which may lead to wrong policy decisions. Moreover, we show that clubs benefit from stronger combined network effects through higher profits. Finally, we derive policy recommendations for improving competitive balance by taking advantage of network externalities.Competitive balance, contest, multisided market, network externalities, team sports league

    Death-related publicity as informational advertising : evidence from the music industry

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    The sales of books, DVDs, and music albums frequently increase substantially after the death of an artist. Yet, the mechanism behind this stylized fact remains unclear. In this paper, we examine whether after-death sales increases reflect primarily an affective reaction of existing customers or informative advertising for previously uninformed new customers. In our main study, we use weekly sales data for 446 music albums of 77 artists who died between 1992 and 2010. We show that album sales increase on average by 54.1 % after death and that the relative increase in sales is higher for the artist’s better albums. This suggests that death-related publicity serves primarily as informational advertising that attracts new customers who buy the artist’s best albums after death. Complementary evidence from a survey study with more than 2,000 participants confirms this interpretation and shows that information-based motives are relatively more important for after-death consumption than affect-based motives

    Overshadowed by Popularity: The Value of Second-Tier Stars in European Football

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    While second-tier stars lack popularity compared to superstars, their marginal contribution to team performance on the pitch relative to that of superstars is unknown. Relying on league-specific preseason market value distributions to define superstars and second-tier stars, we compare the marginal contributions of superstars and second-tier stars to team performance on the pitch in the top five European football leagues. Examining the impact of unexpected injury-related absences, we find that second-tier stars’ marginal contribution is at least equal to that of superstars. Thus, the players with arguably the highest costs for clubs do not contribute accordingly to short-run sportive success
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