Bonds and Brands : intermediaries and reputation in sovereign debt markets 1820-1830

How does sovereign debt emerge and become sustainable? This paper provides a new answer to this unsolved puzzle. Focusing on the early 19th century, we argue that intermediaries’ market power served to overcome information asymmetries and sustained the development of sovereign debt. Relying on insights from corporate finance, we argue that capitalists turned to intermediaries’ reputations to guide their investment strategies. The outcome was a two-tier global bond market, which was sustained by hierarchical relations among intermediaries. This novel theoretical perspective is backed by new archival evidence and empirical data that have never been gathered so far

Public borrowing in harsh times : the League of Nations Loans revisited

This paper reassesses the importance of the League of Nations loans of the 1920s. These long-term loans were an essential part of the League’s strategy to restore the productive basis of countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Whereas the literature is not conclusive as to the final result of this experience, we argue that the League Loans were successful because they accomplished the task for which they were conceived—namely, to allow countries in financial distress to access capital markets. This success rested on the sustained efforts of the League of Nations to gather support from creditor countries’ governments and financial intermediaries, as well as its efforts to develop plans for economic reform for borrowing countries. We provide quantitative and qualitative evidence to show that the League provided market access in a difficult and hostile environment, and did so by building its own reputation as an actor that provided a credible commitment to economic and institutional reforms. Through the success of the placement of the initial issues, the League became capable of influencing borrowing costs, even if they continued to be predominately determined by the secondary market and remained high as a result of the risk involved. Much of the confusion in the literature is explained by the fact that the League lacked its own capital, which impeded its ability to act as a lender of last resort once the great depression hit Europe

Lending booms, underwriting and competition : the baring crisis revisited

This paper aims to provide new light on a famous episode in financial history, the so called Baring crisis. Taking a microeconomic approach, this paper addresses issues that were not emphasized in traditional explanations of the crisis. We analyze borrowing costs in the 1880s using new data from debt contracts. We argue that, despite a worsening macroeconomic situation in Argentina, its Government continued to have capital market access besides decreasing borrowing costs. This paper suggests that competition between financial intermediaries was a main cause behind the crisis

Lending Booms, Underwriting and Competition: The Baring Crisis Revisited

This paper aims to provide new light on a famous episode in financial history, the so called Baring crisis. Taking a microeconomic approach, this paper addresses issues that were not emphasized in traditional explanations of the crisis. We analyze borrowing costs in the 1880s using new data from debt contracts. We argue that, despite a worsening macroeconomic situation in Argentina, its Government continued to have capital market access besides decreasing borrowing costs. This paper suggests that competition between financial intermediaries was a main cause behind the crisis.

Lending booms, underwriting and competition : the baring crisis revisited.

This paper aims to provide new light on a famous episode in financial history, the so called Baring crisis. Taking a microeconomic approach, this paper addresses issues that were not emphasized in traditional explanations of the crisis. We analyze borrowing costs in the 1880s using new data from debt contracts. We argue that, despite a worsening macroeconomic situation in Argentina, its Government continued to have capital market access besides decreasing borrowing costs. This paper suggests that competition between financial intermediaries was a main cause behind the crisis.

Information asymmetries and financial intermediation during the Baring crisis : 1880-1890

This paper analyses the information structure of European investors on the eve of the Baring crisis in 1890. We argue that financial intermediaries were in a privileged position by having the monopoly of information. This situation led to conflicting interests because business and proper investors’ advice were not always compatible, as they are not even today. Even though spreads in secondary market prices between Argentina’s long-term sovereign bonds and U.K. consols remained stable throughout the 1880s, primary market variables such as underwriting fees or total amounts of “money left on the table” in Argentina’s Initial Public Offerings reflect the deteriorating macroeconomic situation of the country. In fact, this paper suggests that lessons from the Baring crisis can be transferred to contemporaneous crises.Investment Banking, Information Asymmetries, Financial Crises, Sudden-Stops, Economic History

Information asymmetries and financial intermediation during the Baring crisis : 1880-1890

This paper analyses the information structure of European investors on the eve of the Baring crisis in 1890. We argue that financial intermediaries were in a privileged position by having the monopoly of information. This situation led to conflicting interests because business and proper investors’ advice were not always compatible, as they are not even today. Even though spreads in secondary market prices between Argentina’s long-term sovereign bonds and U.K. consols remained stable throughout the 1880s, primary market variables such as underwriting fees or total amounts of “money left on the table” in Argentina’s Initial Public Offerings reflect the deteriorating macroeconomic situation of the country. In fact, this paper suggests that lessons from the Baring crisis can be transferred to contemporaneous crises