Comprehensive and Practical Policy Compliance in Data Retrieval Systems

Data retrieval systems such as online search engines and online social networks process many data items coming from different sources, each subject to its own data use policy. Ensuring compliance with these policies in a large and fast-evolving system presents a significant technical challenge since bugs, misconfigurations, or operator errors can cause (accidental) policy violations. To prevent such violations, researchers and practitioners develop policy compliance systems. Existing policy compliance systems, however, are either not comprehensive or not practical. To be comprehensive, a compliance system must be able to enforce users' policies regarding their personal privacy preferences, the service provider's own policies regarding data use such as auditing and personalization, and regulatory policies such as data retention and censorship. To be practical, a compliance system needs to meet stringent requirements: (1) runtime overhead must be low; (2) existing applications must run with few modifications; and (3) bugs, misconfigurations, or actions by unprivileged operators must not cause policy violations. In this thesis, we present the design and implementation of two comprehensive and practical compliance systems: Thoth and Shai. Thoth relies on pure runtime monitoring: it tracks data flows by intercepting processes' I/O, and then it checks the associated policies to allow only policy-compliant flows at runtime. Shai, on the other hand, combines offline analysis and light-weight runtime monitoring: it pushes as many policy checks as possible to an offline (flow) analysis by predicting the policies that data-handling processes will be subject to at runtime, and then it compiles those policies into a set of fine-grained I/O capabilities that can be enforced directly by the underlying operating system

Shai: Enforcing Data-Specific Policies with Near-Zero Runtime Overhead

Data retrieval systems such as online search engines and online social networks must comply with the privacy policies of personal and selectively shared data items, regulatory policies regarding data retention and censorship, and the provider's own policies regarding data use. Enforcing these policies is difficult and error-prone. Systematic techniques to enforce policies are either limited to type-based policies that apply uniformly to all data of the same type, or incur significant runtime overhead. This paper presents Shai, the first system that systematically enforces data-specific policies with near-zero overhead in the common case. Shai's key idea is to push as many policy checks as possible to an offline, ahead-of-time analysis phase, often relying on predicted values of runtime parameters such as the state of access control lists or connected users' attributes. Runtime interception is used sparingly, only to verify these predictions and to make any remaining policy checks. Our prototype implementation relies on efficient, modern OS primitives for sandboxing and isolation. We present the design of Shai and quantify its overheads on an experimental data indexing and search pipeline based on the popular search engine Apache Lucene

Trusted storage

We study the properties, design, implementation and performance of trusted storage, an architecture that ensures the integrity, confidentiality and accountability of data, by enforcing storage policies at the lowest layer of a storage system, within the hardware and firmware of disk enclosures. The guarantees provided by trusted storage depend only on the integrity and correctness of the trusted device/enclosure firmware and hardware, not on the absence of bugs and security vulnerabilities in any higher level software of a system and operator error or malice. Trusted storage primitives enable applications to associate and enforce a policy with each data object they create, and to obtain firmware-generated, cryptographically signed certificates, which attest to a given stored data object’