Philosophical expertise under the microscope

Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be partially vindicated. Arguing that extant discussion is problematically imprecise, we will finesse the notion of ‘philosophical expertise’ in order to better reflect the complex reality of the different practices involved in philosophical inquiry. On this basis, we offer a new version of the expertise defence that allows for distinct types of philosophical expertise. The upshot of our approach is that wholesale vindications or rejections of the expertise defence are shown to be unwarranted; we must instead turn to local, piecemeal investigations of philosophical expertise. Lastly, in the spirit of taking our own advice, we exemplify how recent developments from experimental philosophy lend themselves to this approach, and can empirically support one instance of a successful expertise defence

Why understanding-why is contrastive

Contrastivism about interrogative understanding is the view that ‘S understands why p’ posits a three-place epistemic relation between a subject S, a fact p, and an alternative to p, q. This thesis stands in stark opposition to the natural idea that a subject S can be said to understand why psimpliciter. I argue that contrastivism offers the best explanation for the fact that evaluations of the form ‘S understands why p’ vary depending on the alternatives to p under consideration. I also show that contrastivism offers valuable resources with which to explain the gradability of interrogative understanding attributions, as well as the sensitivity of these attributions to the perceived degree of epistemic demandingness of different contexts

Who's Afraid of Cognitive Diversity?

The Challenge from Cognitive Diversity (CCD) states that demography-specific intuitions are unsuited to play evidential roles in philosophy. The CCD attracted much attention in recent years, in great part due to the launch of an international research effort to test for demographic variation in philosophical intuitions. In the wake of these international studies, the CCD may prove revolutionary. For, if these studies uncover demographic differences in intuitions, then, in line with the CCD, there would be good reason to challenge philosophical views that rely on those intuitions for evidential support. I argue that philosophical views that rely on demography-specific intuitions for evidential support need not be threatened by such findings. I first provide a detailed analysis of the epistemological principles driving the CCD and distinguish three formulations of this challenge. I then show that there are good reasons to reject all such formulations of the CCD

Philosophical expertise under the microscope

Funding: Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland.Recent experimental studies indicate that epistemically irrelevant factors can skew our intuitions, and that some degree of scepticism about appealing to intuition in philosophy is warranted. In response, some have claimed that philosophers are experts in such a way as to vindicate their reliance on intuitions—this has become known as the ‘expertise defence’. This paper explores the viability of the expertise defence, and suggests that it can be partially vindicated. Arguing that extant discussion is problematically imprecise, we will finesse the notion of ‘philosophical expertise’ in order to better reflect the complex reality of the different practices involved in philosophical inquiry. On this basis, we offer a new version of the expertise defence that allows for distinct types of philosophical expertise. The upshot of our approach is that wholesale vindications or rejections of the expertise defence are shown to be unwarranted; we must instead turn to local, piecemeal investigations of philosophical expertise. Lastly, in the spirit of taking our own advice, we exemplify how recent developments from experimental philosophy lend themselves to this approach, and can empirically support one instance of a successful expertise defence.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Treatment options for subjective tinnitus: Self reports from a sample of general practitioners and ENT physicians within Europe and the USA

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Tinnitus affects about 10-15% of the general population and risks for developing tinnitus are rising through increased exposure to leisure noise through listening to personal music players at high volume. The disorder has a considerable heterogeneity and so no single mechanism is likely to explain the presence of tinnitus in all those affected. As such there is no standardized management pathway nor singly effective treatment for the condition. Choice of clinical intervention is a multi-factorial decision based on many factors, including assessment of patient needs and the healthcare context. The present research surveyed clinicians working in six Westernized countries with the aims: a) to establish the range of referral pathways, b) to evaluate the typical treatment options for categories of subjective tinnitus defined as acute or chronic, and c) to seek clinical opinion about levels of satisfaction with current standards of practice.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>A structured online questionnaire was conducted with 712 physicians who reported seeing at least one tinnitus patients in the previous three months. They were 370 general practitioners (GPs) and 365 ear-nose-throat specialists (ENTs) from the US, Germany, UK, France, Italy and Spain.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Our international comparison of health systems for tinnitus revealed that although the characteristics of tinnitus appeared broadly similar across countries, the patient's experience of clinical services differed widely. GPs and ENTs were always involved in referral and management to some degree, but multi-disciplinary teams engaged either neurology (Germany, Italy and Spain) or audiology (UK and US) professionals. For acute subjective tinnitus, pharmacological prescriptions were common, while audiological and psychological approaches were more typical for chronic subjective tinnitus; with several specific treatment options being highly country specific. All therapy options were associated with low levels of satisfaction.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Despite a large variety of treatment options, the low success rates of tinnitus therapy lead to frustration of physicians and patients alike. For subjective tinnitus in particular, effective therapeutic options with guidelines about key diagnostic criteria are urgently needed.</p

On the Peripheries of Planetary Urbanization: Globalizing Manaus and its Expanding Impact

In this paper I argue that global urbanism produces peripherality in ways that cannot be adequately problematized without taking into account its actual extent and geographically uneven development. Therefore, planetary urbanization needs to engage scholarly traditions attuned to regional urbanization if the discourse is to move past limitations in the urban globalization canon and its narrow focus on cities. To that end, I examine research on extensive urbanization in the Amazon region. Illustrative case studies show how attempts to globalize Manaus precipitated territorial restructuring and sociospatial change far beyond the city's boundaries. Manaus is now a more unequal city. Selective metropolitan expansion to the Rio Negro's south bank has led to the simultaneous upgrading and peripheralization of Iranduba. Yet, the building of a city-centric regional network of roadways also shaped Roraima State's transformation from isolated borderland to bypassed periphery. Moreover, financial and symbolic appropriations of standing rainforests by metropolitan conservationism marginalize remote communities even in the absence of exploitative deforestation and resource extraction. Final remarks emphasize the need for further research on the hybrid (urban—rural) conditions and functional articulations of distant-yet-impacted peripheries. Such efforts may broaden the political horizons of planetary urbanization by informing extensive contestations of entrepreneurial urbanism

<i>Can</i> We Talk It Out?

Research on the normative ideal of democracy has taken a sharp epistemic and deliberative turn. Increasingly, normative theories of democracy defend deliberative democracy by appealing to the putative cognitive benefits of political deliberation. I argue that the most prominent epistemic defences of deliberative democracy are unwarranted. Relying on a body of empirical findings on the workings of implicit bias, I explain that they all rely on exaggerated claims about the epistemic virtues of political deliberation. However, I also argue that findings in cognitive and social psychology can aid in the development of a new and improved generation of epistemic arguments for deliberative democracy that can sidestep these issues

Can We Talk It Out?

Research on the normative ideal of democracy has taken a sharp epistemic and deliberative turn. Increasingly, normative theories of democracy defend deliberative democracy by appealing to the putative cognitive benefits of political deliberation. I argue that the most prominent epistemic defences of deliberative democracy are unwarranted. Relying on a body of empirical findings on the workings of implicit bias, I explain that they all rely on exaggerated claims about the epistemic virtues of political deliberation. However, I also argue that findings in cognitive and social psychology can aid in the development of a new and improved generation of epistemic arguments for deliberative democracy that can sidestep these issues

Testing for the phenomenal:intuition, metacognition, and philosophical methodology

Recent empirical studies raise significant methodological concerns about the use of intuitions in philosophy. According to one prominent line of reply, these concerns are unwarranted since the empirical studies motivating them do not control for the putatively characteristic phenomenology of intuitions. This paper makes use of research on metacognitive states that share the phenomenology of intuitions to argue that this reply fails. Furthermore, it shows how empirical findings about these metacognitive states can help philosophers make better informed assessments of their warrant for relying on intuitions in inquiry