Fiscal Transparency and Fiscal Policy Outcomes in OECD Countries.

It is widely believed and often argued that fiscal, or budgetary, transparency has large, positive effects on fiscal performance. However, the evidence linking transparency and fiscal policy outcomes is far from compelling. We present a career-concerns model with political parties to analyze the effects of fiscal transparency on public debt accumulation. To test the predictions of the model, we construct a replicable index of fiscal transparency. Simultaneous estimates of debt and transparency on 19-country OECD data strongly confirm that a higher degree of fiscal transparency is associated with lower public debt and deficits.

The Political Budget Cycle is Where You Can't See It: Transparency and Fiscal Manipulation

We investigate the effects of fiscal transparency and political polarization on the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal balance. The recent political economy literature on electoral cycles identifies such cycles mainly in weak and recent democracies. In contrast, we show, conditioning on a new index of institutional fiscal transparency, that electoral cycles in fiscal balance are a feature also of advanced industrialized economies. Using a sample of nineteen OECD countries in the 1990’s, we identify a persistent pattern of electoral cycles in low(er) transparency countries, while no such cycles can be observed in high(er) transparency countries. Furthermore, we find, in accordance with recent theory, that electoral cycles are larger in more politically polarized countries.fiscal transparency; political polarization; fiscal policy; budget deficits; political budget cycles; electoral policy cycles

Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments

The paper investigates the effects of checks and balances on corruption. Within a presidential system, effective separation of powers is achieved under divided government, with the executive and legislative branches being controlled by different political parties. When government is unified, no effective separation exists even within a presidential system, but, we argue, can be partially restored by having an accountable judiciary. Our empirical findings show that divided government and elected, rather than appointed, state supreme court judges are associated with lower corruption and, furthermore, that the effect of an accountable judiciary is stronger under unified government, where government cannot control itself. The effect of an accountable judiciary seems to be driven primarily by judges chosen through direct elections, rather than those exposed to a retention vote following appointment.separation of powers; corruption; rent seeking; checks and balances; political institutions; judicial independence; rule of law

Inequality and Corruption: Evidence from US States

High-quality data on state-level inequality and incomes, panel data on corruption convictions, and careful attention to the consequences of including or excluding fixed effects in the panel specification allow us to estimate the impact of income considerations on the decision to undertake corrupt acts. Following efficiency wage arguments, for a given institutional environment the corruptible employee’s or official’s decision to engage in corruption is affected by relative wages and expected tenure in the public sector, the probability of detection, the cost of fines and jail terms, and the degree of inequality, which indicate diminished prospects facing those convicted of corruption. In US states over 25 years we show that inequality and higher government relative wages significantly and robustly produce less corruption. This reverses other findings of a positive association between inequality and corruption, which we show arises from long-run joint causation by unobserved factors.corruption; rent seeking; inequality; Gini coefficient; efficiency wage; public sector wages

Phonon-assisted optical absorption in BaSnO3_3 from first principles

The perovskite BaSnO$_3$ provides a promising platform for the realization of an earth abundant $n$-type transparent conductor. Its optical properties are dominated by a dispersive conduction band of Sn $5s$ states, and by a flatter valence band of O $2p$ states, with an overall indirect gap of about $2.9$ eV. Using first-principles methods, we study the optical properties of BaSnO$_3$ and show that both electron-phonon interactions and exact exchange, included using a hybrid functional, are necessary to obtain a qualitatively correct description of optical absorption in this material. In particular, the electron-phonon interaction drives phonon-assisted optical absorption across the minimum indirect gap and therefore determines the absorption onset, and it also leads to the temperature dependence of the absorption spectrum. Electronic correlations beyond semilocal density functional theory are key to detemine the dynamical stability of the cubic perovskite structure, as well as the correct energies of the conduction bands that dominate absorption. Our work demonstrates that phonon-mediated absorption processes should be included in the design of novel transparent conductor materials.Comment: 9 pages, 5 figures; includes supplemental materia

Enforcement and Public Corruption: Evidence from US States

We use high-quality panel data on corruption convictions, new panels of assistant U.S. attorneys and relative public sector wages, and careful attention to the consequences of modeling endogeneity to estimate the impact of prosecutorial resources on criminal convictions of those who undertake corrupt acts. Consistent with “system capacity” arguments, we find that greater prosecutor resources result in more convictions for corruption, other things equal. We find more limited, recent evidence for the deterrent effect of increased prosecutions. We control for and confirm in a panel context the effects of many previously identified correlates and causes of corruption. By explicitly determining the allocation of prosecutorial resources endogenously from past corruption convictions and political considerations, we show that this specification leads to larger estimates of the effect of resources on convictions. The results are robust to various ways of measuring the number of convictions as well as to various estimators.corruption; rent seeking; enforcement; efficiency wage; public sector wages; system capacity

Fiscal Transparency, Gubernatorial Popularity, and the Scale of Government: Evidence from the States.

We explore the effect of transparency of fiscal institutions on the scale of government and gubernatorial popularity using a formal model of accountability. We construct an index of fiscal transparency for the American states from detailed budgetary information. With cross-section data for 1986-1995, we find that - on average and controlling for other influential factors - fiscal transparency increases both the scale of government and gubernatorial popularity. The results, subjected to extensive robustness checks, imply that more transparent budget institutions induce greater effort by politicians, to which voters give higher job approval, on average. Voters also respond by entrusting greater resources to politicians where insittutions are more transparent, leading to larger size of government.

Automated mass spectrometer/analysis system: A concept

System performs rapid multiple analyses of entire compound classes or individual compounds on small amounts of sample and reagent. Method will allow screening of large populations for metabolic disorders and establishment of effective-but-safe levels of therapeutic drugs in body fluids and tissues