2,323 research outputs found

    Insurance and monopoly power in a mixed private/public hospital system, CHERE Discussion Paper No 55

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    Consumers, when ill, often have the choice of being treated for free in a public hospital or at a positive price in a private hospital. To compensate for the positive price, private hospitals offer a higher quality treatment. Private hospitals and doctors also have a degree of monopoly power in their pricing. In this setting, it is shown that the presence of insurance does not affect the number of consumers treated in the private hospital, rather the private hospital and the doctor respond to the presence of insurance by increasing the prices they charge and the quality of the private hospital experience.Physician payments

    The drug bargaining game: Pharmaceutical regulation in Australia, CHERE Discussion Paper No 51

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    Many countries, including Australia, regulate the price consumers pay for pharmaceuticals. In this paper, the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) is modelled as a multi-stage game played between the regulator and pharmaceutical firms. Conditions are derived under which vertically differentiated firms are regulated and a number of issues are discussed. These include efficiency, regulated firm profitability, leakage, and price discrimination. An extension examines the introduction of new drugs and concludes that if all the benefits of a new drug are to be realised, then existing agreements and transfers (per-unit subsidies) need to be renegotiated.Pharmaceuticals, Australia

    Specialist payment schemes and patient selection in private and public hospitals, CHERE Discussion Paper No 54

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    It has been observed that specialist physicians who work in private hospitals are usually paid by fee-for-service while specialist physicians who work in public hospitals are usually paid by salary. This paper provides an explanation for this observation. Essentially, fee-for-service aligns the interests of income preferring specialist with profit maximizing private hospitals and results in private hospitals treating a high proportion of short stay patients. On the other hand, salary aligns the interests of fairness preferring specialists with welfare maximizing public hospital and results in public hospitals treating all patients irrespective of their length of stay.Physician payments

    Medical Malpractice and Physician Liability Under a Negligence Rule

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    A model of costly medical malpractice claims, based on Bayes Rule, is developed to examine the effects of physicians being liable for actual damage under a negligence rule. This model is consistent with empirical evidence concerning the pattern of claims. It is shown that compensating actual damage does not provide physicians with appropriate incentives to spend the second best optimal amount of time with patients or to treat the second best optimal number of patients. As a result, too much medical malpractice occurs relative to the second best social optimum.Medical Malpractice; Liability

    A human factors approach to range scheduling for satellite control

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    Range scheduling for satellite control presents a classical problem: supervisory control of a large-scale dynamic system, with unwieldy amounts of interrelated data used as inputs to the decision process. Increased automation of the task, with the appropriate human-computer interface, is highly desirable. The development and user evaluation of a semi-automated network range scheduling system is described. The system incorporates a synergistic human-computer interface consisting of a large screen color display, voice input/output, a 'sonic pen' pointing device, a touchscreen color CRT, and a standard keyboard. From a human factors standpoint, this development represents the first major improvement in almost 30 years to the satellite control network scheduling task

    The Risk and Incentives Trade-off in the Presence of Heterogeneous Managers

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    Agency theory predicts a negative relationship between risk and incentives, yet recent empirical evidence has not consistently found such a relationship. In fact, some researchers have found a positive relationship. By introducing competition for heterogeneous managers, who differ in their degrees of risk aversion, into a standard agency model, this paper demonstrates that a negative or positive relationship is theoretically possible. Which arises depends on the relative risk aversion parameters of the managers and the absolute and relative riskiness of the environments

    Medical Malpractice and Physician Liability Under a Negligence Rule

    Get PDF
    A model of costly medical malpractice claims, based on Bayes Rule, is developed to examine the effects of physicians being liable for actual damage under a negligence rule. This model is consistent with empirical evidence concerning the pattern of claims. It is shown that compensating actual damage does not provide physicians with appropriate incentives to spend the second best optimal amount of time with patients or to treat the second best optimal number of patients. As a result, too much medical malpractice occurs relative to the second best social optimum

    An Equilibrium Model of General Practitioner Payment Schemes

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    In an environment where GPs are of differing quality and heterogeneous patients have different preferences for quality, it is shown that fee-for-service coupled with balance billing is a superior payment scheme to just fee-for-service or capitation payments as it generates an efficient allocation of GPs between high and low quality and an efficient allocation of patients between GPs. Where patients have more than one condition it is shown that fee-for-service allows patients to seek treatment from GPs of differing quality conditional on the medical condition they have

    Final Project Report: Hydraulic Model Study Pocket Wave Absorbers

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    https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/154195/1/39015101405200.pd

    Paper Session II-C - Astro: A Computer-Aided Scheduling Tool for Operational Satellite Control

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    Range scheduling for satellite control presents a classical problem of a data intensive task with a very small allowance for human error. On any given day, interrelated information depicting 600-1000 entries of satellite visibilities and scheduled range support must be interpreted and used to make decisions that can be critical to the survival of valuable orbital assets. Given an environment which must account for unexpected equipment outages and satellite anomalies, the scheduling task can exceed acceptable workload levels. Thus, range scheduling for satellite control can benefit greatly from computer assistance and a human factors approach to the task. This paper describes the development, user evaluation, and operational activation of a semi-automated network range scheduling system incorporating a synergistic humancomputer interface consisting of a large screen color display, voice input/output, a sonic penn pointing device, a touchscreen color CRT, and a standard keyboard. The development and operational use of ASTRO represent the first major improvement in almost 30 years to the range scheduling task
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