Is it Who You Ask or How You Ask? Findings of a Meta-Analysis on Genetically Modified Food Valuation Studies

This paper presents a meta-analysis of 46 primary studies reporting a total of 108 genetically modified food valuation estimates. The analysis shows that elicitation methods and formats used in the primary studies affect valuation estimates much more than do sample characteristics. Moreover, consumer aversion to genetically modified food seems to have increased over time. Previous findings are confirmed that consumer valuation strongly depends on the type of food product and varies among regions. --meta-analysis,consumer preferences,genetically modified food

Voting in international environmental agreements : experimental evidence from the lab

This paper experimentally analyzes the effects if signatories to an international environmental agreement (IEA) apply different voting schemes to determine the terms of the agreement. To this end, unanimity, qualified majority voting, and simple majority voting are compared with respect to the resulting pollution abatement level and social welfare. At first sight in line with theoretical predictions, the experiment shows that the change of the voting scheme implemented in an IEA does not significantly change social welfare. However, changing the majority required to determine the terms of an IEA alters the ‘depth and breadth’ of cooperation. The coalitions under the unanimity rule are relatively large and implement moderate effort levels while the coalitions with majority votes implement very high effort levels but attract only few participants

Is it who you ask or how you ask? : findings of a meta-analysis on genetically modified food valuation studies

This paper presents a meta-analysis of 46 primary studies reporting a total of 108 genetically modified food valuation estimates. The analysis shows that elicitation methods and formats used in the primary studies affect valuation estimates much more than do sample characteristics. Moreover, consumer aversion to genetically modified food seems to have increased over time. Previous findings are confirmed that consumer valuation strongly depends on the type of food product and varies among regions

The Effects of Norms on Environmental Behavior

The study of norms is of paramount importance in understanding human behavior. An interdisciplinary literature, using varying definitions and conceptions, shows when and why norms emerge and spread, what form they can take, and how they are enforced. Here, we focus on theoretical and empirical literatures that treat norms as a factor influencing human behavior. We first present a new taxonomy of norms, which builds upon and merges previous taxonomies, to distinguish between different types of norms and enforcement mechanisms. We then provide a conceptual framework that identifies causes of the effects of norms based on psychological theories, which can serve as a foundation for much of the empirical economic literature measuring norm effects. Finally, we present an overview of empirical economic papers that study the effects of norms on environmentally relevant behavior, as a particularly relevant area for the study of norms. The aim of this overview is to highlight which effects have been insufficiently studied and to give a sense of the potential of norms, which should help policymakers to intervene in a more targeted way to address existing environmental problems

A Comparison of Individual and Group Behavior in a Competition with Cheating Opportunities

While it is well established that individuals and groups make different economic decisions, the reasons for the behavioral differences are still not fully understood. We experimentally compare individual and group behavior in a competitive setting where cheating can be used to outperform the competitor. Our design allows us to exogenously control for the type of the decision maker, the type of the competitor, and expectations about the competitor’s performance. The results show that there is much more cheating in inter-group competition than inter-individual competition which is in line with findings from other interactive games. We show furthermore that this difference is not caused by a higher propensity to cheat of groups per se, but instead by expectations about the competitor. Once we control for the type of the competitor and the decision makers’ expectations, we no longer find differences between individuals and groups

On the formation of coalitions to provide public goods: Experimental evidence from the lab

The provision of public goods often relies on voluntary contributions and cooperation. While most of the experimental literature focuses on individual contributions, many real-world problems involve the formation of institutions among subgroups (coalitions) of players. International agreements serve as one example. This paper experimentally tests theory on the formation of coalitions in different institutions and compares those to a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment confirms the rather pessimistic conclusions from the theory: only few players form a coalition when the institution prescribes the full internalization of mutual benefits of members. Contrary to theory, coalitions that try to reduce the freeriding incentives by requiring less provision from their members, do not attract additional members. Substantial efficiency gains occur, however, both along the extensive and intensive margin when coalition members can each suggest a minimum contribution level with the smallest common denominator being binding. The experiment thereby shows that the acceptance of institutions depends on how terms of coalitions are reached. --public goods,institutions,coalition formation,cooperation

Does Mandatory Labeling of Genetically Modified Food Grant Consumers the Right to Know? Evidence from an Economic Experiment

Opponents of the voluntary labeling scheme for genetically modified (GM) food products often argue that consumers have the ?right to know? and therefore advocate mandatory labeling. In this paper we argue against this line of reasoning. Using experimental auctions conducted with a sample of the resident population of Mannheim, Germany, we show that the quality of the informational signal generated by a mandatory labeling scheme is affected by the number of labels in the market. If there are two labels, one for GM products and one for non-GM products, mandatory and voluntary labeling schemes generate a similar degree of uncertainty about the quality of products that do not carry a label. --labeling,genetically modified foods,consumer preferences,experimental auctions

Small is beautiful: Experimental evidence of donors' preferences for charities

This paper studies the effect of information about a charity's size on individuals' donations to that charity. We conducted a framed field experiment with a non-student sample, in which subjects had the opportunity to donate for various charitable purposes. The results show that if subjects are to choose between large organizations with high annual revenues and small organizations with low revenues, they prefer the small organizations. We also provide insights why donors prefer the small organizations and discriminate between different theoretical approaches. --charitable contributions,information,framed field experiment,fundraising

Do Equity Preferences Matter in Climate Negotiations? An Experimental Investigation

This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this purposes we conducted a simple experiment with people who have been involved in international climate policy. The experiment, which was run via the Internet, consisted of two simple non-strategic games suited to measure the parameters of inequity aversion in a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility function. We find that our participants show aversion against advantageous as well as disadvantageous inequity to a considerable amount. Moreover, the degree of inequity aversion is higher compared to that of students in the similar study of Dannenberg et al. (2007). Regarding the geographical variety in our sample, we cannot confirm significant differences in the degree of inequity aversion between different regions in the world, which is in line with previous findings from the experimental literature. This finding lends support to the hypothesis that equity preferences are "hard-wired" and not much influenced by socio-economic or cultural circumstances. --individual preferences,inequity aversion,climate policy,experimental economics,public goods

Coordinating to protect the global climate: Experimental evidence on the role of inequality and commitment

Free riding and coordination difficulties are held to be the primary causes of cooperation breakdown among nonrelatives. These thwarting effects are particularly severe in the absence of effective monitoring institutions capable of sanctioning deviant behavior. Unfortunately, solutions to global environmental dilemmas, like climate change, cannot depend on coercion mechanisms, given the transnational effects of emissions. A further complication is that it yields 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. Such asymmetries in wealth and carbon responsibilities among the actors, and the ensuing issues of equity, might further impede cooperation. Yet, a growing literature stresses the importance of non-economic factors in explaining human behavior; therefore, instruments that go beyond the traditional incentives might prove effective in facilitating the task. Given the empirical nature of the problem, we address it by means of a controlled laboratory experiment: a framed threshold public goods game is used to investigate the degree of cooperation and coordination achieved by groups of six participants in combating simulated catastrophic climate change. While necessarily simple for the sake of tractability, the game is designed to incorporate key real-world issues, such as inequity and the impact of emergent institutions based on nonbinding 'pledge and review' mechanisms. --experimental economics,threshold public goods game,climate change,inequality,pledge