What Price Fairness? A Bargaining Study

Our study concerns bargaining behavior in situations where one party is in a stronger position than the other. We investigate both the tradeoff the favored party makes between pursuing his strategic advantage and giving weight to other players' concern for fairness, and the tradeoff the disadvantaged player makes between pursuing a fair outcome from a disadvantaged position and the cost of that pursuit. In particular, we hypothesize that the degree to which strategically strong players attempt to exploit their strategic advantage depends on their potential costs for doing so. Similarly, the degree to which weak players persist in seeking "fairness" is also a function of how much it (potentially) costs them to do so. Students negotiated in pairs over the division of $HK50 using a finite horizon, fixed-cost (per rejection) alternating offer rule. Each pair consisted of a high-cost and a low-cost bargainer. In accordance with the hypothesis, the willingness of the high-cost bargainers to demand fairness and to persist in their demands was a function of how much it cost them to do so, and the degree to which the low-cost bargainers attempted to exploit their strategic advantage depended on their own cost of rejection. We conclude that "fairness" has a price such that the higher its price, the lower the "demand" for it. This suggests that demands for fairness are subject to cost- benefit evaluation, are in this sense deliberate, and are well thought out.Fairness, bargaining, fixed-cost

The consistency of estimator under fixed design regression model with NQD errors

In this article, basing on NQD samples, we investigate the fixed design nonparametric regression model, where the errors are pairwise NQD random errors, with fixed design points, and an unknown function. Nonparametric weighted estimator will be introduced and its consistency is studied. As special case, the consistency result for weighted kernel estimators of the model is obtained. This extends the earlier work on independent random and dependent random errors to NQD case

When does group norm or group identity predict cooperation in a public goods dilemma? The moderating effects of idiocentrism and allocentrism

In this study we examined how perceived group norm and group identity influence individual cooperative behavior in a public goods dilemma across cultural settings. Six hundred and eight students in the United States and People's Republic of China participated in a laboratory experiment in which group norm and group identity were manipulated and the individual cultural orientations of idiocentrism and allocentrism were measured. We found that idiocentrism and allocentrism moderated the relationship between perceived group norm and cooperation but not between group identity and cooperation. In particular, members who endorsed allocentrism to a greater extent cooperated more when they perceived a more cooperative group norm than did members who endorsed lower levels of allocentrism. On the other hand, people scored high on idiocentrism cooperated less when perceiving a more cooperative norm than did people scored low on idiocentrism. The results suggest that allocentrics are not cooperative in every context but are rather highly sensitive to social cues whereas idiocentrics, while tending to behave in a way that maximizes personal outcomes at the expense of the group, are also somewhat aloof to the situation

The Nonlinear Permittivity Including Non-Abelian Self-interaction of Plasmons in Quark-Gluon Plasma

By decomposing the distribution functions and color field to regular and fluctuation parts, the solution of the semi-classical kinetic equations of quark-gluon plasma is analyzed. Through expanding the kinetic equations of the fluctuation parts to third order, the nonlinear permittivity including the self-interaction of gauge field is obtained and a rough numerical estimate is given out for the important \vk =0 modes of the pure gluon plasma.Comment: 7 pages, shortened version accepted by Chin.Phys.Let