Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences

The European Commission (2001a) has recently presented a directive proposal to the European Parliament and Council in order to implement a greenhouse gas emission trading scheme. If this proposal survives the policy process, it will create the most ambitious trading system ever implemented. However the legislative process is an opportunity for various interest groups to amend envi-ronmental policies which, as a result, generally deviate further from what eco-nomic literature proposes. A close look at implemented emission trading schemes, stressing their discrepancies with economic literature requests, is thus useful to increase the chances of forthcoming emission trading schemes to go through the political process. We thus review ten emission trading systems, that are either implemented or at an advanced stage of the policy process. We draw attention to major points to be aware of when designing an emission trading system: sectoral and spatial coverage, permits allocation, temporal flexibility, trading organisation, moni-toring, enforcement, compliance, and the harmonisation vs. subsidiarity issue. The aim is to evaluate how far experiences in emission trading move away from theory and why. We then provide some lessons and recommendations on how to implement a greenhouse gas emission trading program in Europe. We identify some pros of the Commission proposal (spatial and sectoral coverage, temporal flexibility, trading organisation, compliance rules), some potential drawbacks (allocation rules, monitoring and enforcement) and items on which further guidance is needed (monitoring and allocation rules). Lastly, the European Commission should devote prominent attention to the U.S. NOX Ozone Transport Commis-sion budget program, as the only example of integration between the federal and state levels.Emission trading, climate change policy, policy-making and implementation

Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences

International audienceThe European Commission (2001a) has recently presented a directive proposal to the European Parliament and Council in order to implement a greenhouse gas emission trading scheme. If this proposal survives the policy process, it will create the most ambitious trading system ever implemented. However the legislative process is an opportunity for various interest groups to amend envi-ronmental policies which, as a result, generally deviate further from what eco-nomic literature proposes. A close look at implemented emission trading schemes, stressing their discrepancies with economic literature requests, is thus useful to increase the chances of forthcoming emission trading schemes to go through the political process. We thus review ten emission trading systems, that are either implemented or at an advanced stage of the policy process. We draw attention to major points to be aware of when designing an emission trading system: sectoral and spatial coverage, permits allocation, temporal flexibility, trading organisation, moni-toring, enforcement, compliance, and the harmonisation vs. subsidiarity issue. The aim is to evaluate how far experiences in emission trading move away from theory and why. We then provide some lessons and recommendations on how to implement a greenhouse gas emission trading program in Europe. We identify some pros of the Commission proposal (spatial and sectoral coverage, temporal flexibility, trading organisation, compliance rules), some potential drawbacks (allocation rules, monitoring and enforcement) and items on which further guidance is needed (monitoring and allocation rules). Lastly, the European Commission should devote prominent attention to the U.S. NOX Ozone Transport Commis-sion budget program, as the only example of integration between the federal and state levels

Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: Lessons from economic theory and international experiences

The European Commission (2001a) has recently presented a directive proposal to the Parliament and the Council in order to implement a tradable permits scheme. However, as stressed by the positive political economy, due to the influence of various interest groups, very few environmental policies are implemented in their textbook forms. A close look at implemented emission trading schemes, stressing their discrepancies with textbook requests, is thus useful to increase the chances of forthcoming emission trading schemes to go through the political process without being watered down. We thus review ten emission trading systems, that are either implemented or at an advanced stage of the policy process. We draw attention to major points to be aware of when designing an emission trading system: participants, spatial coverage, permits allocation, temporal flexibility, trading organisation, monitoring, enforcement, compliance, and the harmonisation vs. subsidiarity issue. The aim is to evaluate how far experiences in emission trading move away from theory and why. We then provide some lessons and recommendations on how to implement a greenhouse gas emission trading program in Europe. A review of the theoretical and applied literature, and some interviews, lead us to the assessment of the European system

Les instruments économiques au service de l'environnement : une efficacité mal comprise

L'utilisation d'instruments économiques dans les politiques d'environnement est un fait récent. Ce nést qu'à partir des années quatre-vingt que certains gouvernements commencent à écouter la critique que font les économistes de l'approche dominante fondée sur des normes et s'intéressent à leur suggestion d'utiliser, en ces matières comme en d'autres, des signaux-prix. Mais il se trouve que la façon la plus simple de lancer de tels signaux, les écotaxes, se heurte à límpopularité de tout ce qui touche à la fiscalité et que l'autre mode de procéder, les permis d\'émission négociables va devenir, après traduction médiatique en droits à polluer, un symbole de la marchandisation de lénvironnement. Ceci explique que le diagnostic, tôt émis par lÓCDE (1987), de l'implementation gap dont souffrent ces instruments soit toujours d'actualité malgré l'évolution dont témoigne le tableau 1. Les économistes défendent ces outils au nom de l'efficacité, mais peut-être est-ce l'ambiguïté même de ce mot qui provoque les malentendus qui font obstacle à leur plus large utilisation. On essaiera ici de la lever en distinguant trois critères d'évaluation de ces instruments : leur fonction d'incitation pour un coût économique donné, leur coût social ultime, et leur capacité de coordination internationale

Les instruments économiques au service de l'environnement : une efficacité mal comprise

L'utilisation d'instruments économiques dans les politiques d'environnement est un fait récent. Ce nést qu'à partir des années quatre-vingt que certains gouvernements commencent à écouter la critique que font les économistes de l'approche dominante fondée sur des normes et s'intéressent à leur suggestion d'utiliser, en ces matières comme en d'autres, des signaux-prix. Mais il se trouve que la façon la plus simple de lancer de tels signaux, les écotaxes, se heurte à límpopularité de tout ce qui touche à la fiscalité et que l'autre mode de procéder, les permis d\'émission négociables va devenir, après traduction médiatique en droits à polluer, un symbole de la marchandisation de lénvironnement. Ceci explique que le diagnostic, tôt émis par lÓCDE (1987), de l'implementation gap dont souffrent ces instruments soit toujours d'actualité malgré l'évolution dont témoigne le tableau 1. Les économistes défendent ces outils au nom de l'efficacité, mais peut-être est-ce l'ambiguïté même de ce mot qui provoque les malentendus qui font obstacle à leur plus large utilisation. On essaiera ici de la lever en distinguant trois critères d'évaluation de ces instruments : leur fonction d'incitation pour un coût économique donné, leur coût social ultime, et leur capacité de coordination internationale.environnement; instruments economiques; efficacite; couts; reduction de la pollution

Mieux aménager la mer

http://www.metropolitiques.eu/Mieux-amenager-la-mer.htmlParu dans Métropolitiques (2013)National audienceLe projet d'aménagement littoral s'arrête trop souvent au trait de côte. Or les territoires immergés sont tout aussi artificiels que les terres côtières. Les auteurs proposent des pistes pour une meilleure intégration des espaces de part et d'autre de la ligne d'eau. Texte intégral en ligne ici : http://www.metropolitiques.eu/Mieux-amenager-la-mer.htm

Interspecific competition between entomopathogenic nematodes (Steinernema) is modified by their bacterial symbionts (Xenorhabdus)

BACKGROUND: Symbioses between invertebrates and prokaryotes are biological systems of particular interest in order to study the evolution of mutualism. The symbioses between the entomopathogenic nematodes Steinernema and their bacterial symbiont Xenorhabdus are very tractable model systems. Previous studies demonstrated (i) a highly specialized relationship between each strain of nematodes and its naturally associated bacterial strain and (ii) that mutualism plays a role in several important life history traits of each partner such as access to insect host resources, dispersal and protection against various biotic and abiotic factors. The goal of the present study was to address the question of the impact of Xenorhabdus symbionts on the progression and outcome of interspecific competition between individuals belonging to different Steinernema species. For this, we monitored experimental interspecific competition between (i) two nematode species: S. carpocapsae and S. scapterisci and (ii) their respective symbionts: X. nematophila and X. innexi within an experimental insect-host (Galleria mellonella). Three conditions of competition between nematodes were tested: (i) infection of insects with aposymbiotic IJs (i.e. without symbiont) of both species (ii) infection of insects with aposymbiotic IJs of both species in presence of variable proportion of their two Xenorhabdus symbionts and (iii) infection of insects with symbiotic IJs (i.e. naturally associated with their symbionts) of both species. RESULTS: We found that both the progression and the outcome of interspecific competition between entomopathogenic nematodes were influenced by their bacterial symbionts. Thus, the results obtained with aposymbiotic nematodes were totally opposite to those obtained with symbiotic nematodes. Moreover, the experimental introduction of different ratios of Xenorhabdus symbionts in the insect-host during competition between Steinernema modified the proportion of each species in the adults and in the global offspring. CONCLUSION: We showed that Xenorhabdus symbionts modified the competition between their Steinernema associates. This suggests that Xenorhabdus not only provides Steinernema with access to food sources but also furnishes new abilities to deal with biotic parameters such as competitors

Interaction in EU climate policy, final report to DG research under the Framework V project interaction in EU climate policy

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Le sauvage dans les aires marines protégées, expérimenter une métamorphose de notre rapport au vivant ?

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