13,420 research outputs found

    Redistribution Policy: A European Model

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    Following the rationale for regional redistribution programs described in the official documents of the European Union, this paper studies a very simple multi-country model built around two regions: a core and a periphery. Technological spill-overs link firms' productivity in each of the two regions, and each country's territory falls partly in the core and partly in the periphery, but the exact shares vary across countries. We find that, in line with the EU view, the efficient regional allocation requires both national and international transfers. If migration is fully free across all borders, then optimal redistribution policy results from countries' uncoordinated policies, obviating the need for a central agency. But if countries have the option of setting even imperfect border barriers, then efficiency is likely to require coordination on both barriers and international transfers (both of which will be set optimally at positive levels). The need for coordination increases as the Union increases in size.

    Storable Votes and Agenda Order Control. Theory and Experiments

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    The paper studies a voting scheme where members of a committee voting sequentially on a known series of binary proposals are each granted a single extra bonus vote to cast as desired - a streamlined version of Storable Votes. When the order of the agenda is exogenous, a simple sufficient condition guarantees the existence of welfare gains, relative to simple majority voting. But if one of the voters controls the order of the agenda, does the scheme become less efficient? The endogeneity of the agenda gives rise to a cheap talk game, where the chair can use the order of proposals to transmit information about his priorities. The game has multiple equilibria, differing systematically in the precision of the information transmitted. The chair can indeed benefit, but the aggregate welfare effects are of ambiguous sign and very small in all parameterizations studied. The theoretical conclusions are tested through laboratory experiments. Subjects have difficulty identifying the informative strategies, and tend to cast the bonus vote on their highest intensity proposal. As a result, realized payoffs are effectively identical to what they would be if the agenda were exogenous. The bonus vote matters; the chair's control of the agenda does not.Storable Votes ; Agenda Power ; Cheap Talk ; Experiments

    Discussion of "Estimating Random Effects via Adjustment for Density Maximization" by C. Morris and R. Tang

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    Discussion of "Estimating Random Effects via Adjustment for Density Maximization" by C. Morris and R. Tang [arXiv:1108.3234]Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/11-STS349A the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

    Border guards as an alien police: usages of the Schengen Agreement in France

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    The creation of a common European space following the integration of the Schengen Agreement into the acquis communautaires through the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, and the subsequent treaties and summits, lead Member States to consider border control as a common issue. One could have thought that the lifting of the internal borders within the Schengen space would have threatened the border guard corps at the national level. This is not the case. I will show that, thanks to a change in the model of French border guards, their power and influence have in fact risen in the second part of the 1990’s. In response to the fear of a drastic cut in the workforce, French border guards mobilize to define a new model of border guard: the alien police model, which aimed at fighting against illegal immigration.administrative adaptation; Europeanization; France; free movement; immigration policy; national parliaments; policy analysis; public administration; Schengen

    Introducing Monte Carlo Methods with R Solutions to Odd-Numbered Exercises

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    This is the solution manual to the odd-numbered exercises in our book "Introducing Monte Carlo Methods with R", published by Springer Verlag on December 10, 2009, and made freely available to everyone.Comment: 87 pages, 11 figure

    Comment: On Random Scan Gibbs Samplers

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    Comment on ``On Random Scan Gibbs Samplers'' [arXiv:0808.3852]Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/08-STS252B the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

    Estimation in Dirichlet random effects models

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    We develop a new Gibbs sampler for a linear mixed model with a Dirichlet process random effect term, which is easily extended to a generalized linear mixed model with a probit link function. Our Gibbs sampler exploits the properties of the multinomial and Dirichlet distributions, and is shown to be an improvement, in terms of operator norm and efficiency, over other commonly used MCMC algorithms. We also investigate methods for the estimation of the precision parameter of the Dirichlet process, finding that maximum likelihood may not be desirable, but a posterior mode is a reasonable approach. Examples are given to show how these models perform on real data. Our results complement both the theoretical basis of the Dirichlet process nonparametric prior and the computational work that has been done to date.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/09-AOS731 the Annals of Statistics (http://www.imstat.org/aos/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

    Can Foreign Aid Accelerate Stabilization?

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    This paper studies the effect of foreign aid on economic stabilization. Following Alesina and Drazen (1991), we model the delay in stabilizing as the result of a distributional struggle: reforms are postponed because they are costly and each distributional faction hopes to reduce its share of the cost by outlasting its opponents in obstructing the required policies. Since the delay is used to signal each faction's strength, the effect of the transfer depends on the role it plays in the release of information. We show that this role depends on the timing of the transfer: foreign aid decided and transferred sufficiently early into the game leads to earlier stabilization; but aid decided or transferred too late is destabilizing and encourages further postponement of reforms.
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