2,191 research outputs found
Federalism as an effective antidote to terrorism
Many governments as well as terrorist experts see the use of military and police forces as the only way to effectively counter terrorism. The most effective negative sanctions are considered to be military strikes, aggressive actions (including kidnapping and killing) against individuals known or suspected of being terrorists, or against persons supporting and harboring terrorists. Overt and covert military and paramilitary action is also thought advisable to pre-empt and prevent actions by terrorist groups, as well as against states suspected of hosting or tolerating terrorists. This paper argues that decentralization constitutes a powerful antidote as it strongly reduces the incentives for terrorists to attack and because the expected damage suffered is much smaller than in a centralized society. It moreover strengthens society, as economic, political and social decentralization (or polycentricity) is an essential element of a free and vigorous society. This in turn makes a society less vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Indeed, terrorism has no chance of success against a society that actively guards its fundamental liberal institutions, of which decentralized decision-making forms an essential part
Tullock Challenges: happiness, revolutions and democracy
Gordon Tullock has been one of the most important founders and contributors to Public Choice. Two innovations are typical âTullock Challengesâ. The first relates to method: the measurement of subjective well-being, or happiness. The second relates to digital social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, or to some extent Google. Both innovations lead to strong incentives by the governments to manipulate the policy consequences. In general âWhat is important, will be manipulated by the governmentâ. To restrain government manipulation one has to turn to Constitutional Economics and increase the possibilities for direct popular participation and federalism, or introduce random mechanisms.Happiness, social networks, constitutional economics, random mechanisms, public choice
Overprotected Politicians
This paper argues that politicians are overprotected. The costs of political assassination differ systematically depending on whether a private or a public point of view is taken. A politician attributes a very high (if not infinite) cost to his or her survival. The social cost of political assassination is much smaller as politicians are replaceable. Conversely, the private cost of the security measures is low for politicians, its bulk â including time loss and inconvenience â is imposed on taxpayers and the general public. The extent of overprotection is larger in dictatorial than in democratic countries.
A Multiplicity of Approaches to Institutional Analysis. Applications to the Government and the Arts
Institutional Analysis; Government; Arts; Political Economics
A Multiplicity of Approaches to Institutional Analysis. Applications to the Government and the Arts
Four types of âeconomicsâ relevant for institutional analysis are distinguished: Standard Neoclassical Economics; Socio-Economics or Social Economics; New Institutional Economics; and Psychological Economics (often misleadingly called Behavioural Economics). The paper argues that an extension of Neoclassical Economics with elements from other social sciences (including political science, sociology, psychology, law and anthropology) is fruitful to explain institutions because it allows us to maintain the strength of that approach. Social Economics can play an important role helping to overcome the limitations of Neoclassics. However, it should become more concrete, integrate what is useful in Neoclassics, and should seriously engage in empirical research.Institutional Economics, Neoclassics, Psychological Economics, Behavioural Economics, institutions
Knight Fever â Towards an Economics of Awards
Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive.The demand for awards relies on an individualâs desire for distinction, and the supply of awards on the provision of incentives. Relative price and income effects are shown to be identifiable and strong. A number of empirically testable propositions are formulated. As awards are (at least so far) impossible to measure adequately, empirical tests are carried out using the technique of analytic narrativesincentives, motivation, awards, orders, distinction, principal-agent
Tullock Challenges: Happiness, Revolutions and Democracy
Gordon Tullock has been one of the most important founders and contributors to Public Choice. Two innovations are typical âTullock Challengesâ. The first relates to method: the measurement of subjective well-being, or happiness. The second relates to digital social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, or to some extent Google. Both innovations lead to strong incentives by the governments to manipulate the policy consequences. In general âWhat is important, will be manipulated by the governmentâ. To restrain government manipulation one has to turn to Constitutional Economics and increase the possibilities for direct popular participation and federalism, or introduce random mechanisms.happiness, social networks, constitutional economics, random mechanisms, public choice
Punishment - and beyond
This paper argues that the âEconomics of Crimeâ concentrates too much on punishment as a policy to fight crime, which is unwise for several reasons. There are important instances in which punishment simply cannot reduce crime. Several feasible alternatives to punishment exist, such as offering positive incentives or handing out awards for law abiding behavior. These alternative approaches tend to create a positive sum environment. When people appreciate living in a society that is to a large extent law abiding, they are more motivated to observe the law.crime, punishment, incentives, motivation, framing, broken window theory
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