New Directions in Philosophy of Medicine

The purpose of this chapter is to describe what we see as several important new directions for philosophy of medicine. This recent work (i) takes existing discussions in important and promising new directions, (ii) identifies areas that have not received sufficient and deserved attention to date, and/or (iii) brings together philosophy of medicine with other areas of philosophy (including bioethics, philosophy of psychiatry, and social epistemology). To this end, the next part focuses on what we call the “epistemological turn” in recent work in the philosophy of medicine; the third part addresses new developments in medical research that raise interesting questions for philosophy of medicine; the fourth part is a discussion of philosophical issues within the practice of diagnosis; the fifth part focuses on the recent developments in psychiatric classification and scientific and ethical issues therein, and the final part focuses on the objectivity of medical research

Neural Semiotics: A Biological Foundation for Belief

Master of Arts (MA

The Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act: Protecting Women’s Health While Potentially Allowing Human Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer into Non-Human Oocytes

Caulfield and Bubela (2007) argue that the Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act (An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and Related Research (S.C. 2004, c.2) imposes a complete “criminal ban” on somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) that is unwarranted because, they contend, the ban was based on concerns regarding the moral status of the human embryo, which is inappropriate in a “pluralistic society.

The Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act: Protecting Women’s Health While Potentially Allowing Human Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer into Non-Human Oocytes

Caulfield and Bubela (2007) argue that the Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act (An Act Respecting Assisted Human Reproduction and Related Research (S.C. 2004, c.2) imposes a complete “criminal ban” on somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) that is unwarranted because, they contend, the ban was based on concerns regarding the moral status of the human embryo, which is inappropriate in a “pluralistic society.

Dr. Cezanne and the Art of Re(peat)search: Competing Interests and Obligations in Clinical Research

Clinician researchers have a number of roles, each of which carries specific obligations. There are times when these obligations may be in competition (up to and including conflict) with each other. Using a narrative case study that describes a group of colleagues discussing their clinical department\u27s participation in an industry-sponsored research protocol, we illustrate a number of the obligations faced by clinician researchers, and discuss how competing interests and obligations can lead to ethical problems. The case study is followed by a discussion of the effect of university-industry relations on competing interests and obligations in both clinical research and the role of the university, and a suggested framework that could be used to determine when university involvement in commercial research is ethically acceptable

In Conversation: Ruth Macklin, Alison Reiheld, Robyn Bluhm, Sidney Callahan, and Frances Kissling Discuss the Marlise Munoz Case, Advance Directives, and Pregnant Women

Feminist bioethicists of a variety of persuasions discuss the 2013 case of Marlise Munoz, a pregnant woman whose medical care was in dispute after she became brain dead

Research problems and methods in the philosophy of medicine

Philosophy of medicine encompasses a broad range of methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives—from the uses of statistical reasoning and probability theory in epidemiology and evidence-based medicine to questions about how to recognize the uniqueness of individual patients in medical humanities, person-centered care, and values-based practice; and from debates about causal ontology to questions of how to cultivate epistemic and moral virtue in practice. Apart from being different ways of thinking about medical practices, do (and should) these different philosophical approaches have anything in common? Are they committed to incompatible assumptions about the nature of science and its relationship to experience, value, and the art of medicine, or are different approaches nonetheless complementary? The chapter examines the questions these different approaches and perspectives raise and considers why so many theorists of medicine seek to find a “base” or “center” for medicine—as though there is, or should be, some general conceptual thread linking the things we call “usual clinical practice” in the real world. It further considers whether there are alternative approaches to the philosophy of medicine, which do not embody this philosophical assumption; and it suggests that a key tool for evaluating approaches must be their ability to contribute something of genuine value to clinical medicine