International Supply Chains and the Volatility of Trade

The world trade collapsed in the most recent recession. Some analysts have suggested the increasing offshoring of the supply chain, or vertical specialization (VS) trade, can explain the apparent increase in volatility of trade over the business cycle. This paper develops a model of VS trade to examine its impact on the volatility of trade. The model features increased trade volatility as VS trade increases when goods production is more volatile than services production. While the simulated model generates the observed increase in relative volatility of trade to GDP from 1967 to 2002, most of the increase is due to GDP’s shift to less volatile services production. VS trade only accounts for a third of the increase. Counterintuitively, VS trade can moderate trade volatility.

Sustainable Miracles

Growth Miracles, Total Factor Productivity, Brazil

Threatening to increase productivity

The wave of privatization in the 1980s and 1990s increased productivity of many previously state owned enterprises (SOEs). However, governments often do not have su±cient support to privatize SOEs. We provide evidence that threatening privatization and market competition (entry of new firms) can increase the productivity of SOEs, even though privatization and entry of new ¯rms does not occur. We study productivity at Brazil's state-owned oil company Petrobras. After it lost its legal monopoly Petrobras's total factor productivity increased sharply. These large gains occurred despite the fact that Petrobras faced no immediate de facto competition. The threat of competition and privatization was su±cient to generate large productivity gains. These findings suggest that changing the competitive environment can be a powerful force for improving productivity at state-owned firms.Productivity; Competition; Oil Industry

Does regulation reduce productivity? Evidence from regulation of the U.S. beet-sugar manufacturing industry during the Sugar Acts, 1934-74

We study the impact of regulation on productivity and welfare in the U.S. sugar manufacturing industry. While this U.S. industry has been protected from foreign competition for nearly 150 years, it was regulated only during the Sugar Act period, 1934-74. We show that regulation significantly reduced productivity, with these productivity losses leading to large welfare losses. Our initial results indicate that the welfare losses are many times larger than those typically studied ? those arising from higher prices. We also argue that the channels through which regulation led to large productivity and welfare declines in this industry were also present in many other regulated industries, like banking and trucking.Productivity ; Regulation ; Competition ; Sugar

Threatening to increase productivity

The wave of privatization in the 1980s and 1990s increased productivity of many previously state owned enterprises (SOEs). However, governments often do not have su±cient support to privatize SOEs. We provide evidence that threatening privatization and market competition (entry of new firms) can increase the productivity of SOEs, even though privatization and entry of new ¯rms does not occur. We study productivity at Brazil's state-owned oil company Petrobras. After it lost its legal monopoly Petrobras's total factor productivity increased sharply. These large gains occurred despite the fact that Petrobras faced no immediate de facto competition. The threat of competition and privatization was su±cient to generate large productivity gains. These findings suggest that changing the competitive environment can be a powerful force for improving productivity at state-owned firms

Threatening to increase productivity

The wave of privatization in the 1980s and 1990s increased productivity of many previously state owned enterprises (SOEs). However, governments often do not have su±cient support to privatize SOEs. We provide evidence that threatening privatization and market competition (entry of new firms) can increase the productivity of SOEs, even though privatization and entry of new ¯rms does not occur. We study productivity at Brazil's state-owned oil company Petrobras. After it lost its legal monopoly Petrobras's total factor productivity increased sharply. These large gains occurred despite the fact that Petrobras faced no immediate de facto competition. The threat of competition and privatization was su±cient to generate large productivity gains. These findings suggest that changing the competitive environment can be a powerful force for improving productivity at state-owned firms