2,529 research outputs found

    On Quantity Competition and Transmission Constraints in Electricity Market

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    In this paper we characterize equilibria in a quantity game where symmetric firms face a local demand together with an export-constrained demand. Firms have unlimited access to a local demand but a restricted access to a second market, like in the electricity network where generators compete to satisfy demand but competition is restricted by transmission capacity. We show the existence of an effective demand that is continuous but not differentiable due to the transmission constraint. Three types of equilibria emerge in this context, parametrized by capacity. First, a symmetric equilibrium (unique) when the access to the second market is constrained. Second, a set of continuous and asymmetric equilibria with a fully used link but not constrained; and finally, a symmetric and unique equilibrium in which the link is not fully used. We also show how multiplicity of equilibria tends to disappear as the number of competitors increaseelectricity markets, Cournot games, capacity constraints

    Optimal pre-merger notification mechanisms - incentives and efficiency of mandatory and voluntary schemes

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    The authors compare the two merger control systems currently employed worldwide: a mandatory system based on merger size threshold and a voluntary system with ex-post monitoring and fines. The voluntary system possesses two informational advantages: (i) the enforcement agency employs more information -verifiable and non verifiable parameters- to decide the set of mergers to investigate, and (ii) the first move of merging firms reveals useful information to the agency about the competitive risk of a merger. If fines for undue omission to notify are upward limited, then a mixed mechanism is optimal, where small transactions are under a voluntary regime while the big mergers are obliged to report. Remedies for fixing anticompetitive mergers act as an instrument that induces firms to notify the operation, improving further the advantage of the voluntary mechanism.Microfinance,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress,Corporate Law,Economic Theory&Research,Small Scale Enterprise

    How concentrated are global infrastructure markets?

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    In infrastructure, the possibility of a positive relationship between operators'profitability and the degree of concentration is a major political issue in view of the wide diversity of feelings about the potential role of the private sector. This is particularly important in view of (i) the large residual degree of monopolies, (ii) the protection they are granted through exclusivity clauses built in service delivery contracts and (iii) the widespread sense that the same operators tend to be present in most of the privatized operations. The main purpose of this paper is to provide a first set of quantitative assessments of the degree of concentration in infrastructure at the global and at the regional level. Concentration issues were identified in only about 20 percent of the cases studied, a presumption of concentration was found in another 30 percent of the cases. We find no correlation between the degree of concentration and the degree of reform adopted by a region or a sector. In more general terms, we find no scope for simple encompassing regional or sectoral statements because issues are region- and sector-specific. We conclude by arguing that there are a few cases and regions in which it would make sense for a supranational competition or regulation agency to ensure that the interests of the users are protected more effectively against the risks of collusion and other types of anti-competitive behaviors local regulators would not be equipped to address.Earth Sciences&GIS,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance,Markets and Market Access,Decentralization,Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets,Environmental Economics&Policies,Earth Sciences&GIS,Health Economics&Finance

    Dealing with politics for money and power in infrastructure

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    Policy recommendations for infrastructure provision usually build on a well-established understanding of best practice for sector governance. Too rarely are they adapted to the country-specific political environment even if this is an area where policy choices are likely to be subject to private agendas in politics. The fact that such private agendas are often ignored goes a long way toward explaining why infrastructure policies fail and why best practice can be counterproductive. While non-benevolence and rent-seeking are well described in the literature and anecdotes abound, there is only limited consideration of how the different incentive problems in politics impede policy improvements in infrastructure. This paper addresses why politics in infrastructure cannot be ignored, drawing on theoretical results and a systematic review of experiences. It reviews how different private agendas in politics will have different impacts for sector-governance decisions -- and hence service delivery. The concept of best practice in policy recommendations should be reconsidered in a wide perspective and allow for tailored solutions based on an understanding of the given incentive problems. Policy recommendations should take into account how coordination trade-offs may complicate efforts to reduce the possible impact of private agendas on infrastructure policy decisions. Although more transparency linked to service delivery indicators is a"safe"recommendation, it is also clear that the demand for good governance will not be sufficient to secure political accountability in a sector with huge vested interests combined with complicated funding schemes and complex contracts.Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,National Governance,Governance Indicators,Environmental Economics&Policies,Transport Economics Policy&Planning

    Public Labeling Revisited: The Role of Technological Constraints Under Protected Designation of Origin Regulation

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    This paper takes into account technological and output constraints for firms to analyse PDO regulation. We first examine an original dataset of French Brie cheese producers and compare the cost structure of PDO producers with non-PDO ones. The paper also finds that PDO firms face a more costly production technology and do not profit from scale economies. Then, based on a theoretical model, the paper shows a clear tradeoff between the sunk advertising costs (net of certification costs) and the degree of diseconomies of scale. This tradeoff affects both the firms' incentive to certify, and the efficiency of public certification.Agricultural and Food Policy,

    Cape Verde's infrastructure : a continental perspective

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    Cape Verde stands out in West Africa as a country whose economic geography poses major and unique challenges for infrastructure development. Its small population of half a million people is spread across a nine-island archipelago. The islands need complementary infrastructure in terms of roads, water, transport, ports, power, and ICT. Cape Verde already has well-developed infrastructure networks. Road density is relatively high, and most of the national network is paved. Almost all islands have port and airport facilities. Around 70 percent of the population has power and utility water. Indicators for ICT coverage -- penetration, bandwidth, submarine cable, private sector participation -- are relatively good. Nevertheless, prices for all services are exceptionally high. The quality of services is often deficient. At least half of the national road network is in poor condition; power supply is unreliable; and half of the population receives water from standposts. Cape Verde devotes around 147millionperyeartoinfrastructure(almost15percentofGDP),amongthehighestlevelsofinfrastructurespendingonthecontinent.Some147 million per year to infrastructure (almost 15 percent of GDP), among the highest levels of infrastructure spending on the continent. Some 50 million of that is lost each year to operations inefficiencies and underpricing. The country's main challenges are to improve infrastructure management and reduce high costs of services.Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Infrastructure Economics,Energy Production and Transportation,E-Business,Banks&Banking Reform

    Frankliniella occidentalis (Pergande)

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    Las trampas adhesivas habitualmente se emplean para monitoreo pero como las de mayor tama帽o tambi茅n se recomiendan para control, se examin贸 el efecto del tama帽o de las amarillas en la captura total de Frankliniella occidentalis. En pimiento en floraci贸n se utilizaron trampas de 5 tama帽os en un dise帽o de bloques al azar (n = 10), replicado 5 veces. La comparaci贸n de la captura en ambas caras de la placa, mediante la prueba t-pareada, arroj贸 diferencias significativas en el 96 % de las pruebas. Los datos fueron separados para los an谩lisis posteriores. La diferencia en la captura/cm2 entre los tama帽os de trampa se compar贸 mediante ANOVA y Tukey. Por no registrarse diferencias significativas en el 90 % de los ensayos la eficacia de todos los tama帽os fue similar. La captura total se ajust贸 al modelo de regresi贸n: log Y = b log X + log a siendo Y = n煤mero de insectos capturados y X = medida lineal de su tama帽o (ra铆z cuadrada de la superficie). El ajuste al modelo fue significativo y la pendiente se aproxim贸 a 2. Por lo tanto, la captura total fue proporcional a la superficie total, no al per铆metro ni a la relaci贸n per铆metro/superficie. La utilizaci贸n de trampas grandes resultar铆a antiecon贸mica dado su dudosa eficacia como sistema de control.The most common use for sticky traps is monitoring. However, they are also advised for early control, by using higher ones. We examined the influence of trap size in yellow sticky traps in total caught for Frankliniella occidentalis. In flowering pepper, traps were placed in a completely random block, each comprising 5 different trap sizes (n = 10), replicated by 5 times. A paired t-test was performed on differences between trap faces. Because of meaningful differences obtained in 96 % of tests, each face was considered as independent. ANOVA and Tukey tests were performed to compare caught/cm2 between trap sizes. There were not meaningful differences between in 90 % of tests, then every size had a similar efficacy by counting surface. Data were fitted to the model: log Y = b log X + log a where Y = number of insects caught and X = linear measure of trap size (square root of total surface). There was a highly meaningful linear relationship, between parameters and slope was around 2. Then total caught was related on total trap surface, not diameter or perimeter. Counting takes considerable effort and time, which increases as trap size increases as well. Since there are doubts on control capability of higher traps, they would be not recommended for monitoring.Fil: Carrizo, Paola.Fil: Benitez, Daniel
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