55 research outputs found

    The race for polluting permits

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    International markets for tradable emission permits (TEP) co-exist with national energy taxation. A firm trading emission permits in the international market also pays energy taxes in its host country, thus creating an interaction between the international TEP-market and national energy taxes. In this paper we model that interaction in a framework of a perfectly competitive international TEP-market, where heterogeneous firms trade their TEP endowments. National governments set energy taxes non-cooperatively so as to maximize fiscal revenue from energy and profit taxes. We identify the driving forces behind Nash equilibrium taxes. We show how they depend on the total amount of TEPs in the market, on firms TEP-endowment and on thenumber of participating countries. We also show how energy taxation varies with the introduction of the market on a previously unregulated world. Finally, we highlight the fact that the TEP-market does not achieve abatement cost efficiency, despite itsbeing perfectly competitive.tradable permits, fiscal competition, Kyoto protocol

    Technological greening, eco-efficiency, and no-regret strategy

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    In this paper we analyze the relationship between technological greening, eco-efficiency and no- regret strategies. By using a simple theoretical model, we evaluate the effects of technological greening on creation value, pollution level, and eco-efficiency. We show three contrasting effects of technological greening. First, technological greening may increase the pollution of a firm, and also of the whole industry. Second, the indicator of eco-efficiency can be misleading because it may improve in situations where pollution increases and/or profit decreases after technological greening. Third, technological greening that induces an improvement of the eco-efficiency indicator does not necessarily lead to a no-regret strategy. As a result, the indicator should not be used for decision making.technological greening, clean technology, eco-efficiency, environmental performance, rebound effect

    The price of silence tradeable noise permits and airports

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    This paper presents a market design for the management of noise disturbance created by aircraft traffic around large airports. A market for tradable noise permits allows noise generators to compensate harmed residents. We show that the noise permit markets allow the achievement of the planner's optimal allocation of flights provided that she/he does not over-weight the benefit of economic activity compared to the disutility of noise disturbances. The fact that zones are likely to be strategic players does not fundamentally alter this finding. Because of the market auctioneer's information constraints, noise permits are likely to redistribute windfall gains to residents located in non-critical zones. This entices landlords to increase their land/house rents there and to design smaller houses in the long run.

    Can education be good for both growth and the environment?

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    We develop an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment with public policy on education. Beyond the traditional mechanisms through which knowledge, growth and the environment interplay, we stress out the role played by education on environmental awareness. Assuming first that environmental awareness is constant, we show the existence of a balanced growth path along which environmental quality increases continually. Then, if education enhances environmental awareness, the equilibrium properties are modi?ed: the economy can reach a steady state or converge to an asymptotic balanced growth path. Therefore, education does not necessarily promote sustained and sustainable growth.overlapping generations, public education, environmental maintenance, green awareness, sustainable growth

    The economics of airport noise: how to manage markets for noise licenses

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    Noise-induced pollution constitutes a hot and topical societal problem for all major airports. This paper discusses various issues in the implementation of a market for noise licenses as a solution to solve the noise externality between the residents located around airports and the aircrafts moving in and to airports.airport, environment, noise, licenses

    Model predictive control, the economy, and the issue of global warming

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    This study is motivated by the evidence of global warming, which is caused by human activity but affects the efficiency of the economy. We employ the integrated assessment Nordhaus DICE-2007 model [16]. Generally speaking, the framework is that of dynamic optimization of the discounted inter-temporal utility of consumption, taking into account the economic and the environmental dynamics. The main novelty is that several reasonable types of behavior (policy) of the economic agents, which may be non-optimal from the point of view of the global performance but are reasonable form an individual point of view and exist in reality, are strictly defined and analyzed. These include the concepts of “business as usual”, in which an economic agent ignores her impact on the climate change (although adapting to it), and of “free riding with a perfect foresight”, where some economic agents optimize in an adaptive way their individual performance expecting that the others would perform in a collectively optimal way. These policies are defined in a formal and unified way modifying ideas from the so-called “model predictive control”. The introduced concepts are relevant to many other problems of dynamic optimization, especially in the context of resource economics. However, the numerical analysis in this paper is devoted to the evolution of the world economy and the average temperature in the next 150 years, depending on different scenarios for the behavior of the economic agents. In particular, the results show that the “business as usual”, although adaptive to the change of the atmospheric temperature, may lead within 150 years to increase of temperature by 2°C more than the collectively optimal policy.environmental economics, dynamic optimization, optimal control, global warming, model predictive control, integrated assessment

    Markets for emission permits with free endowment: a vintage capital analysis

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    In this paper we develop a vintage capital model for a firm involved in a market for tradable emission permits. We analyze both the firm’s optimal investment plans and the market equilibrium. This allows us to scrutinize how firms use permits free endowment, and to highlight the implications of non-optimal uses both at the firm and at the market level. We provide a new rationale for the market of tradable permits not to be cost-efficient. The novel technical points in this context are the use a distributed (vintage) optimal control model of the firm, the use of optimality conditions for non-smooth problems, and the involvement of a nonlinear Fredholm integral equation of the first kind for the description of the equilibrium price of permits, and its practical meaning for market regularization.

    THE RACE FOR POLLUTING PERMITS

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    International markets for tradable emission permits (TEP) co-exist with national energy taxation. A firm trading emission permits in the international market also pays energy taxes in its host country, thus creating an interaction between the international TEP-market and national energy taxes. In this paper we model that interaction in a framework of a perfectly competitive international TEP-market, where heterogeneous firms trade their TEP endowments. National governments set energy taxes non-cooperatively so as to maximize fiscal revenue from energy and profit taxes. We identify the driving forces behind Nash equilibrium taxes. We show how they depend on the total amount of TEPs in the market, on firms ’ TEP-endowment and on the number of participating countries. We also show how energy taxation varies with the introduction of the market on a previously unregulated world. Finally, we highlight the fact that the TEP-market does not achieve abatement cost efficiency, despite its being perfectly competitive. JEL Classification: Q48; Q52; H23; H73

    Climate coalitions: a theoretical and computational appraisal

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    Using an updated version of the CWS model (introduced by Eyckmans and Tulkens in Resource and Energy Economics 2003), this paper intends to evaluate with numbers the respective merits of two competing notions of coalition stability in the standard global public goods model as customarily applied to the climate change problem. After a reminder of the model structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved namely, core stability and internal-external stability, the former property is shown to hold for the grand coalition in the CWS model only if resource transfers of a specific form between countries are introduced. It is further shown that while the latter property holds neither for the grand coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed "potential internal stability") for most small coalitions. The reason for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing rationale that inspires the transfers in either case. Finally, it is shown that the stable coalitions that perform best (in terms of carbon concentration and global welfare) always are composed of both industrialized and developing countries. Two sensitivity analyses confirm the robustness of all these results.climate change, coalitions, simulation, integrated assessment

    Adaptation and mitigation in long-term climate policies

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    The paper analytically explores the optimal policy mix between mitigation and environmental adaptation against climate change at a macroeconomic level. The constructed economic- environmental model is formulated as a social planner problem with the adaptation and abatement investments as separate decision variables. The authors prove the existence of a unique steady state and provide a comparative static analysis of the optimal investment. It leads to essential implications for associated long-term environmental policies. In particular, the dependence of the optimal ratio between abatement and adaptation investments on economic efficiency appears to have an inverted U-shape. Data calibration and numerical simulation are provided to illustrate theoretical outcomes.environmental adaptation, mitigation, optimal investment, long-term climate policies
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