Trade, Competition, and Efficiency

We present a general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition featuring pro-competitive effects and a competitive limit, and investigate the impact of trade on welfare and efficiency. Contrary to the constant elasticity case, in which all gains from trade are due to product diversity, our model allows for a welfare decomposition between gains from product diversity and gains from pro-competition effects. We then show that the market outcome is not efficient because too many firms operate at an inefficiently small scale by charging prices above marginal costs. Using pro-competitive effects and the competitive limit, we finally illustrate that trade raises efficiency by narrowing the gap between the equilibrium utility and the optimal utility.Pro-competitive effects, competitive limit, excess entry, trade and efficiency, monopolistic competition

Transportation, freight rates, and economic geography

We investigate the role of the transport sector in structuring the location of economic activity within two-region economic geography models of the footloose capital and core-periphery types. In our setting, competitive carriers offer transport services for shipping manufactured goods across regions and freight rates are determined endogenously to clear transport markets. Each carrier commits to the maximum capacity for a round-trip and thus faces a simple logistic problem: there are costs associated with 'returning empty', and those costs increase the freight rates charged to manufacturing firms. Since demand for transport services depends on the spatial distribution of economic activity, agglomeration in one region raises freight rates to serve foreign markets, thus generating an additional dispersion force. We show that a more equal equilibrium distribution of firms prevails when freight rates are endogenously determined than when they are exogenous and that multiple equilibria (including partial agglomeration) usually coexist.transport sector, freight rates, economic geography, trade.

Tax competition, location, and horizontal foreign direct investment

We develop a model of capital tax/subsidy competition in which imperfectly competitive firms choose both the number and the location of the plants they operate. The endogenous presence of horizontal multinationals is shown to attenuate the “race to the bottom” and yields some results that are opposite to traditional findings in the tax competition literature. First, in the presence of horizontal multinationals, increasing subsidies decrease firms' profits by exacerbating price competition due to more firms ‘going multinational’. Second, instead of being always subsidized, capital may actually be taxed in equilibrium. Third, taxes/subsidies become strategically independent policy instruments, instead of being strategic complements. Last, there may exist multiple equilibria with either low or high subsidies.capital tax competition; international trade; horizontal multinationals; foreign direct investment; imperfect competition

City Size and the Henry George Theorem under Monopolistic Competition

We analyze the equilibrium and the optimal resource allocations in a monocentric city under monopolistic competition. Unlike the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) case, where the equilibrium markups are independent of city size, we present a variable elasticity of substitution (VES) case where the equilibrium markups fall with city size. We then show that, due to excess entry triggered by such pro-competitive effects, the "golden rule" of local public finance, i.e., the Henry George Theorem (HGT), does not hold at the second best. We finally prove, within a more general framework, that the HGT holds at the second best under monopolistic competition if and only if the second-best allocation is first-best efficient, which reduces to the CES case.City size, Henry George Theorem, monopolistic competition, first-best and second-best allocations, variable elasticity

City size and the Henry George theorem under monopolistic competition

We analyze the equilibrium and the optimal resource allocations in a monocentric city under monopolistic competition. Unlike the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) case, where the equilibrium markups are independent of the city size, we present a variable elasticity of substitution (VES) case where the equilibrium markups fall with the city size. We then show that,due to excess entry triggered by such pro-competitive effects, the 'golden rule' of local public finance, i.e., the Henry George theorem (HGT), does not hold in the second best. We finally prove, within our framework, that the HGT holds in the second best if and only if: (i) the second-best allocation is first-best efficient, which turns out to be equivalent to the CES case;or (ii) a marginal change in the city size has no impact on equilibrium product diversity at the second best.city size, Henry George theorem, monopolistic competition, first-best and second-best allocations, variable elasticity

‘Dual’ gravity: using spatial econometrics to control for multilateral resistance

We propose a quantity-based `dual' version of the gravity equation that yields an estimating equation with both cross-sectional interdependence and spatially lagged error terms. Such an equation can be concisely estimated using spatial econometric techniques. We illustrate this methodology by applying it to the Canada-U.S. data set used previously, among others, by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2002, 2004). Our key result is to show that controlling directly for spatial interdependence across trade flows, as suggested by theory, significantly reduces border effects because it captures `multilateral resistance'. Using a spatial autoregressive moving average specification, we find that border effects between the U.S. and Canada are smaller than in previous studies: about 8 for Canadian provinces and about 1.3 for U.S. states. Yet, heterogeneous coefficient estimations reveal that there is much variation across provinces and states.gravity equations, multi-region general equilibrium trade models; spatial econometrics, border effects

Trade Crisis? What Trade Crisis?

We provide an analysis of the 2008-2009 trade collapse using microdata from a small open economy, Belgium. First, we find that changes in firm-country-product exports and imports occurred mostly at the intensive margin: the number of firms, the average number of destination and origin markets per firm, and the average number of products per market changed only very little. Second, econometric analysis reveals some composition effects in the intensive margin fall along firm, product and country characteristics. The most important factor explaining changes in exports is the destination country's growth rate of GDP. Had growth rates in 2008{2009 been the same as in 2007{2008, Belgian exports would have fallen by about 57% less than what we observe. Trade in consumer durables and capital goods fell more severely than trade in other product categories, which explains another 22% of the observed fall. Financial variables and involvement in global value chains have some explanatory power on the exports and imports fall respectively, but appear to have affected domestic operations in equal proportion. More generally, exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios at the firm level did neither systematically decrease nor reveal strong firm- or sector-specific patterns. Overall, our results point to a demand-side explanation: the fall in trade was mostly driven by the fall in economic activity. It is not a trade crisis | just a trade collapse.trade crisis, trade collapse, margins of trade, firm-level analysis, Belgium.

Transfer pricing rules, OECD guidelines, and market distortions

We study the impact of transfer pricing rules on sales prices, firms’ organizational structure, and consumers’ utility within a two-country monopolistic competition model featuring source-based profit taxes that differ across countries. Firms can either become multinationals, i.e., they serve the foreign market through a fully controlled affiliate; or they can become exporters, i.e., they serve the foreign market by contracting with an independent distributor. Compared to the benchmark cases, where tax authorities are either unable to audit firms or where they are able to audit them perfectly, the use of the OECD’s Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP) or Cost-Plus (CP) rule distorts firms’ output and pricing decisions. The reason is that the comparable arm’s length transactions between exporters and distributors, which serve as benchmarks, are not efficient. We show that implementing the CUP or CP rules is detrimental to consumers in the low tax country, yet benefits consumers in the high tax country.transfer pricing, OECD guidelines, multinationals and exporters, organizational choice, arm's length principle

"Dual' gravity: Using spatial econometrics to control for multilateral resistance"

We propose a quantity-based 'dual' version of the gravity equation that yields an estimating equation with both cross-sectional interdependence and spatially lagged error terms. Such an equation can be concisely estimated using spatial econometric techniques. We illustrate this methodology by applying it to the Canada-U.S. data set used previously, among others, by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2002, 2004). Our key result is to show that controlling directly for spatial interdependence across trade flows, as suggested by theory, significantly reduces border effects because it captures 'multilateral resistance'. Using a spatial autoregressive moving average specification, we find that border effects between the U.S. and Canada are smaller than in previous studies: about 8 for Canadian provinces and about 1.3 for U.S. states. Yet, heterogeneous coefficient estimations reveal that there is much variation across provinces and states.

Density (dis)economies in transportation: revisiting the core-periphery model

We study how density (dis)economies in interregional transportation influence location patterns in a standard new economic geography model. Density economies may well delay the occurrence of agglomeration when compared to the case without such economies, while agglomeration is both more likely and more gradual under density diseconomies than under density economies.density (dis)economies economic geography transport costs core-periphery model