Emission trading beyond Europe: linking schemes in a post-Kyoto world

This paper assesses the economic impacts of linking the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) to emerging schemes beyond Europe, in the presence of a post-Kyoto agreement in 2020. Simulations with a numerical multi-country model of the world carbon market show that linking the European ETS induces only marginal economic benefits: As trading is restricted to energy-intensive industries that are assigned generous initial emissions, the major compliance burden is carried by non-trading industries excluded from the linked ETS. In the presence of parallel government trading under a post-Kyoto Protocol, excluded sectors can however be substantially compensated by international trading at the country level, thus increasing the political attractiveness of the linking process. From an efficiency perspective, a desirable future climate policy regime represents a joint trading system that enables international emission trading between ETS companies and governments. While the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) cannot alleviate the inefficiencies of linked ETS, in a parallel or joint trading regime the access to abatement options of developing countries induces large additional cost savings. Restricting CDM access via a supplementarity criterion does not significantly decrease the economic benefits from project-based emission crediting. --EU ETS,Emission Trading,Kyoto Protocol,Clean Development Mechanism

Reducing Deforestation and Trading Emissions: Economic Implications for the post-Kyoto Carbon Market

This paper quantitatively assesses the economic implications of crediting carbon abatement from reduced deforestation for the emissions market in 2020 by linking a numerical equilibrium model of the global carbon market with a dynamic partial equilibrium model of the forestry sector. We find that integrating avoided deforestation in international emissions trading considerably decreases the costs of post-Kyoto climate policy – even when accounting for conventional abatement options of developing countries under the CDM. At the same time, tropical rainforest regions receive substantial net revenues from exporting carbon-offset credits to the industrialized world. Moreover, reduced deforestation can increase environmental effectiveness by enabling industrialized countries to tighten their carbon constraints without increasing mitigation costs. Regarding uncertainties of this future carbon abatement option, we find both forestry transaction costs and deforestation baselines to play an important role for the post-Kyoto carbon market. --Climate Change,Kyoto Protocol,Emissions Trading,Deforestation

Emission Trading Beyond Europe: Linking Schemes in a Post-Kyoto World

This paper assesses the economic impacts of linking the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) to emerging schemes beyond Europe, in the presence of a post-Kyoto agreement in 2020. Simulations with a numerical multi-country model of the world carbon market show that linking the European ETS induces only marginal economic benefits: As trading is restricted to energy-intensive industries that are assigned generous initial emissions, the major compliance burden is carried by non-trading industries excluded from the linked ETS. In the presence of parallel government trading under a post-Kyoto Protocol, excluded sectors can however be substantially compensated by international trading at the country level, thus increasing the political attractiveness of the linking process. From an efficiency perspective, a desirable future climate policy regime represents a joint trading system that enables international emission trading between ETS companies and governments. While the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) cannot alleviate the inefficiencies of linked ETS, in a parallel or joint trading regime the access to abatement options of developing countries induces large additional cost savings. Restricting CDM access via a supplementarity criterion does not significantly decrease the economic benefits from project-based emission crediting

Developing Supra-European Emissions Trading Schemes: An Efficiency and International Trade Analysis

Given the coexistent EU priorities concerning the competitiveness of European industries and international emissions regulation at the company level, this paper assesses the efficiency and competitiveness implications of linking the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to emerging trading schemes outside Europe. Currently, countries like Canada, Japan or Australia are contemplating the set up of domestic ETS with the intention of linking up to the European scheme. While a stylized partial-market analysis suggests that the integration of trading systems is always beneficial in efficiency terms, our applied general equilibrium approach shows that the aggregate welfare impacts of linking the EU ETS are rather limited. We further find that the trade-based competitiveness effects of linking the European ETS crucially depend on the linked trading system: Although EU economy-wide competitiveness varies only moderately across linking scenarios, the sectoral decomposition of these aggregate effects shows that European industries are much more sensitive to the linking constellation. Similarly, the incentives for non-EU regions to join the European system display considerable heterogeneity. A stricter allowance allocation within domestic ETS can, however, substantially improve the overall prospects for establishing supra-European emissions trading schemes. --Emissions Trading,EU ETS,Linking,Competitiveness,CGE model

Macroeconomic Impacts of the Clean Development Mechanism: The Role of Investment Barriers and Regulations

This paper quantifies the macroeconomic impacts of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of international trade and energy use. Employing project-based CDM supply data we assess the relative importance of transaction costs and investment risks as well as CDM regulations through supplementarity and additionality criteria. Our numerical results show that the macroeconomic impacts of transaction costs and investment risks are negligible: Given the large supply of cheap project-based emissions credits in developing countries, compliance to the Kyoto Protocol can be achieved at a very low cost. However, regulatory restrictions such as a supplementarity criterion can substantially curtail the potential efficiency gains from where-flexibility in climate policy. --Kyoto Protocol,Emissions Trading,Clean Development Mechanism,Computable General Equilibrium

Interactions of Reduced Deforestation and the Carbon Market: The Role of Market Regulations and Future Commitments

Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) has been proposed as a potentially inexpensive and plentiful source of emission abatement to supplement other longterm climate policies. However, critics doubt that REDD credits are environmentally equivalent to domestic emission reductions, and suggest an excess supply may disrupt carbon markets. In this context, we investigate the economic implications of emissions market regulations and future emissions reduction commitments, as well as uncertainties in REDD credit supply. Numerical simulations with a multi-country equilibrium model of the global emissions market show unrestricted exchange of REDD units reduces the international carbon price by half and cuts Annex I compliance costs by roughly one third. Restricting supply or demand of REDD credits reduces price impacts, but comes at the cost of economic efficiency. Alternatively, Annex I reduction commitments could be increased by almost two thirds at constant carbon prices. While REDD provides large economic benefits for tropical rainforest regions, any REDD policy scenario also reduces wealth transfers to traditional CDM host countries through increased competition on the supply-side of the carbon market. --Climate Change,Kyoto Protocol,Emissions Trading,Deforestation,REDD

Differentiation of Green Taxes: A Political-Economy Analysis for Germany

In this paper we study political-economy determinants of the differentiation of environmental taxes between sectors. Using a common-agency model, we provide predictions on tax differentiation which are then tested using data from the German Ecological Tax Reform. As the reform is revenue neutral and reduces labor costs, tax differentiation is not only determined by the activity of lobby groups favoring reduced tax rates, but also by the groups? interest in revenue rebates to labor. Empirical data underpin our theoretical findings: A regression analysis of Germany?s green tax reform explains environmental tax differentiation by the presence of sectoral interest groups. Besides market concentration and energy demand elasticities, the exposure of industries to international trade flows plays an important role in the environmental tax design. --environmental tax reform,interest groups,common agency

Public Interest vs. Interest Groups: Allowance Allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

This paper presents a political-economy analysis of allowance allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). A common-agency model suggests that a politicalsupport maximizing government considers the preferences of sectoral interest groups besides public interest when allocating emissions permits. In the stylized model, industries represented by more powerful lobby groups face a lower regulatory burden, which for sufficiently high lobbying power leads to an inefficient emissions regulation. An empirical analysis of the first trading phase of the EU ETS corroborates our theoretical prediction for a cross-section of German firms, but also shows that the political-economy determinants of permit allocation depend on firm characteristics. We find that large carbon emitters that were heavily exposed to emissions regulation and simultaneously represented by powerful interest groups received higher levels of emissions allowances. In contrast, industrial lobbying power stand-alone or threats of potential worker layoffs did not exert a significant influence on the EU ETS allocation process. --Emissions trading,interest groups,regression analysis

Alleviating Adverse Implications of EU Climate Policy on Competitiveness: The Case for Border Tax Adjustments or the Clean Development Mechanism?

Ambitious unilateral EU environmental policy has raised concerns about adverse competitiveness implications for European energy-intensive and export-oriented sectors. We analyze the economic and environmental implications of two different measures to address these concerns in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS): border tax adjustments (BTA) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Numerical simulations with a computable general equilibrium model of the global economy demonstrate that alternative BTA regimes are suitable to alleviate adverse competiveness implications of unilateral European climate policy on energy-intensive and export-oriented industries. The regulatory protection of these industries via subsidies for EU exporters and tariffs for non-EU importers goes, however, at the expense of sectors which are excluded from the EU ETS. We show that the choice of alternative benchmarks (i.e. carbon intensities) for the level of BTA substantially affects these competitiveness implications. The simulations further indicate that limited access to low-cost emission abatement via the CDM in the EU ETS alleviates adverse competitiveness impacts to a comparable extent as the most ambitious BTA scheme. Increasing where-flexibility of emission abatement thus represents an attractive market-based alternative to the application of border tax adjustments in unilateral climate policy. --Emissions Trading,EU ETS,Competitiveness,Border tax adjustments,Clean Development Mechanism,CGE model

A new era of EU energy policy? Delivering on the Energy Union by National Plans. CEPS Commentary, 6 June 2017

Prior to the adoption of the EU’s 2030 Framework for Energy and Climate and its subsequent endorsement by the European Council in 2014,[1] the delivery of European objectives for 2020, the needed predictability for investors and transparency for citizens were ensured through national targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions, renewable energy and energy efficiency as well as through sectoral planning and reporting obligations on member states. Not only was this energy and climate policy regime adapted in 2014 essentially by setting energy policy targets at the EU level, but it was complemented by a holistic energy policy strategy in 2015. The latter comprises the Energy Union and its five policy dimensions, which include – besides the 2030 Framework targets – energy security, the internal energy market and research, innovation and competitiveness.[2