39 research outputs found
Employment and productivity: disentangling employment structure and qualification effects
This paper studies the effect of changes in the employment rate on labour productivity per hour, taking an empirical approach. By splitting the workforce into three qualification categories, this study allows us to distinguish the effects of changes in the employment rate structure from those of changes in the qualification structure. With the results obtained, we are then able to emphasise the mechanical effect on GDP, for each country in our panel, of a catch-up with the best practice with respect to employment rate structure and qualification level. It appears that the two effects are more or less of the same magnitude. Moreover, this methodology allows us to rank the countries in our panel depending on the gains they could expect from adopting the best practices in each of the two areas.Productivity; Growth; Employment; Education
Gender Biases in Bank Lending: Lessons from Microcredit in France
The evidence on gender discrimination in lending remains controversial. To capture gender biases in banks' loan allocations, we observe the impact on the applicants of a microfinance institution (MFI) and exploit the natural experiment of a regulatory change imposing a strict EUR 10,000 loan ceiling on microcredit. Descriptive statistics indicate that the presence of the ceiling is associated both with bank-MFI co-financing and with harsher treatment of female borrowers. To investigate causal links, we develop an econometric approach that addresses the concerns of selection biases, multicollinearity, and endogeneity. Our empirical findings suggest that the change in the MFI's gender-related attitude was triggered by banks through co-financing. Hence, we speculate that co-financing pushes ceiling-constrained MFIs to import whatever biases in loan granting that the banks are prone to. Overall, this paper stresses that apparently benign regulations such as loan ceilings can significantly harm the women's empowerment efforts made by MFIs
Employment and productivity: disentangling employment structure and qualification effects
This paper studies the effect of changes in the employment rate on labour productivity per hour, taking an empirical approach. By splitting the workforce into three qualification categories, this study allows us to distinguish the effects of changes in the employment rate structure from those of changes in the qualification structure. With the results obtained, we are then able to emphasise the mechanical effect on GDP, for each country in our panel, of a catch-up with the best practice with respect to employment rate structure and qualification level. It appears that the two effects are more or less of the same magnitude. Moreover, this methodology allows us to rank the countries in our panel depending on the gains they could expect from adopting the best practices in each of the two areas
Business Training Allocation and Credit Scoring: Theory and Evidence from Microcredit in France
The microcredit market, where inexperienced micro-borrowers meet experienced microfinance institutions (MFIs), is subject to reversed asymmetric information. Thus, MFIs' choices can shape borrowers' beliefs and their behavior. We analyze how this mechanism may influence microfinance institution decisions to allocate business training. By means of a theoretical model, we show that superior information can lead the MFI not to train (or to train less) riskier borrowers. We then investigate whether this mechanism is empirically relevant, using data from a French MFI. Confirming our theoretical reasoning, we find a non-monotonic relationship between the MFI's decision to train and the risk that micro-borrowers represent
Handbook of remote working for social innovators
Sem resumo disponĂvel.publishe
Handbook of remote working for social innovators
No abstract available.publishe
Microfinance Institutions and Banks in Europe: The story to date
There is a large variety of MFI-bank partnerships in Europe. They are shaped by legislative and economical national contexts. MFIs generally have more than one partnership, in some cases with a consortium of banks. In most European countries, MFIs and banks are not in direct competition. They serve different segments of the market and provide complementary services. Collaboration benefits all parties. For MFIs, partnerships ease access to funding and cost reducing technologies. They contribute to the expansion of MFI lending activities and improve their financial performance. Banks benefit from a better image through corporate social responsibility. Microfinance facilitates the construction of a pool of prospective, profitable clients. Additionally, collaboration creates cross-selling opportunities for banks. Entering the microfinance market is in some cases risk free for banks. Clients have the advantage of proximity when the provision of microfinance takes place through bank branches. Borrowing from/through an MFI in cooperation with a mainstream bank represents the first step toward financial inclusion. Additionally, the services provided by MFIs are tailored to better address the needs of micro-borrowers. Regulatory constraints are not necessarily perceived as impediments by MFIs. Nevertheless, MFIs need to benefit from more autonomy to successfully comply with their social mission. The main challenge for MFIs involved in partnerships with banks is to make sure that the objectives of banks and MFIs are aligned to avoid the risk of the mission drift. Cooperation can be improved through long term commitments, the creation of multi-bank partnerships models, larger decision power given to MFIs, decreased complexity of the partnerships, increased awareness of banks about microfinance and standardisation of methods and criteria employed. MFIs in Europe diversify their funding sources using funding opportunities available from the European Union or using innovative alternative partnerships with crowdfunding and peer to peer platforms. They moreover collaborate with microinsurance companies, and to a smaller extent, mobile banking and transfer companies.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe
Gender Biases in Bank Lending: Lessons from Microcredit in France
International audienceThe evidence on gender discrimination in lending remains controversial. To capture gender biases in banksâ loan allocations, we observe the impact on the applicants of a microfinance institution (MFI) and exploit the natural experiment of a regulatory change imposing a strict EUR 10,000 loan ceiling on microcredit. Descriptive statistics indicate that the presence of the ceiling is associated both with bank-MFI co-financing and with harsher treatment of female borrowers. To investigate causal links, we develop an econometric approach that addresses the concerns of selection biases, multicollinearity, and endogeneity. Our empirical findings suggest that the change in the MFIâs gender-related attitude was triggered by banks through co-financing. Hence, we speculate that co-financing pushes ceiling-constrained MFIs to import whatever biases in loan granting that the banks are prone to. Overall, this paper stresses that apparently benign regulations such as loan ceilings can significantly harm the womenâs empowerment efforts made by MFIs
Essays on microfinance in developed countries : the role of business training, information, and regulation
Cette thĂšse est composĂ©e de quatre chapitres. Le chapitre 1 analyse comment les diffĂ©rentes interventions publiques impactent l'octroi des microcrĂ©dits. Nous montrons que la garantie des prĂȘts peut avoir un effet contreproductif en rĂ©duisant le nombre d'entrepreneurs bĂ©nĂ©ficiant de l'accompagnement offert par l'Institution de Microfinance (IMF). Alternativement, nous montrons que les subventions visant l'accompagnement peuvent ĂȘtre plus efficaces relativement Ă la garantie des prĂȘts.Le chapitre 2 Ă©tudie comment les dĂ©cisions d'une IMF concernant l'accompagnement peuvent impacter le comportement des emprunteurs. Nous montrons que l'asymĂ©trie d'information renversĂ©e peut conduire Ă une relation non-monotone entre le type de l'emprunteur et l'offre de l'accompagnement. Cet Ă©quilibre apparaĂźt suite Ă l'effet "soi-miroir". Notre modĂšle probit bivariĂ© confirme l'existence d'un tel Ă©quilibre.Le chapitre 3 s'intĂ©resse aux seuils de crĂ©dit imposĂ©s aux IMFs. Nous montrons que les seuils de crĂ©dit peuvent gĂ©nĂ©rer l'Ă©loignement de la mission en facilitant le co-financement avec les banques classiques des projets les plus larges au dĂ©triment des projets les plus petits. Notre modĂšle probit diffĂ©rence-en-diffĂ©rences confirme l'existence de cet effet pervers Ă partir des donnĂ©es d'une IMF française.Le chapitre 4 compare les prĂȘts octroyĂ©s aux entrepreneurs hommes et femmes par une IMF française avant et aprĂšs l'introduction du seuil de crĂ©dit. Nous montrons que, sans le seuil, l'IMF choisit les femmes avec les demandes de crĂ©dit les plus Ă©levĂ©es. Cependant, cela n'est plus le cas aprĂšs l'introduction du seuil de crĂ©dits qui dĂ©tĂ©riore la situation des entrepreneurs femmes.This thesis is organized in four chapters.Chapter 1 theoretically analyses how various forms of state intervention impact microfinance institutions' (MFIs') lending behavior. We show that loan guarantees can have a counterproductive effect on financial inclusion triggered by unsubsidized business development services (BDS). Alternatively, we show that, BDS subsidization can do better in terms of financial inclusion than the loan guarantee. Chapter 2 analyses how decisions of an MFI on BDS provision can impact borrowers' behavior. We show that, reversed asymmetric information can lead to a non monotonic relationship between borrowers' type and assignment to BDS. In this equilibrium the MFI does not train the lowest and the highest type borrowers. This relationship occurs due to the "looking-glass self" effect. Our empirical bivariate probit model confirms the existence of such equilibrium. Chapter 3 tackles the issue of loan ceilings imposed to MFIs. We show that loan ceilings can trigger mission drift by facilitating the co-financing of large projects with regular banks at the expense of small projects. We test this prediction by exploiting the natural experiment of a French MFI. Difference-in-differences probit estimations show that the risk of the mission drift is real.Chapter 4 compares the loans granted to male and female entrepreneurs by a French MFI before and after the enforcement of the loan ceiling. We find that the ceiling free MFI selected women with larger requested amounts. However, under ceiling enforcement this was no longer the case, suggesting that female entrepreneurs are worse off after ceiling enforcement
The Regulation of Prosocial Lending: Are Loan Ceilings Effective?
Regulatory loan ceilings are commonly found in the prosocial lending sector, yet they can have unintended perverse effects. By mitigating the risk of adverse selection, loan caps catalyze co-financing arrangements between subsidized lenders and commercial banks. These arrangements can, in turn, crowd out the most vulnerable borrowers, i.e. those typically targeted by regulators. To assess this claim, we proceed in two steps. First, we build a theoretical model. Second, we test it, drawing on a rich hand-collected dataset on the clientele of an unregulated French microcredit provider that turned into a regulated institution following a shock affecting its funding sources. Using a difference-in-differences linear probability model with propensity score matching, we empirically confirm the theoretical prediction that the imposition of a loan ceiling will lead to missiondrift.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe