Constitutional Theory and the Problem of Disagreement

For decades, constitutional theory has been haunted by the problem of disagreement: the reality that we are deeply divided on fundamental questions of justice and the good society. Theorists have generally responded to the problem of disagreement in one of two ways. One approach minimizes the extent to which constitutional theories rely on controversial moral premises and instead grounds constitutional theories in widely endorsed social practices. The other generally discards any social practices that reflect disagreement with the moral views that the theorist holds. Neither approach is sound. Constitutional theory requires both controversial moral claims and attention to social practices; it requires both ideal and practical theory. Indeed, we can see how to address the seemingly modern problem of disagreement by attending to the work of an ancient constitutional theorist: Cicero. Despite being the subject of intense scholarly interest outside the legal academy over the last few decades, Cicero’s work has been almost entirely overlooked by American constitutional theorists. But if we examine, refine, and revise his arguments about ideal and practical constitutional theory, we will find that the two dominant approaches to the problem of disagreement proposed by American constitutional theorists are mistaken. Because constitutional theory necessarily makes strong moral claims, it is not well-suited to mitigating the effects of disagreement, even as it must take into account non-ideal social practices. Rather, the task of ameliorating the problems stemming from disagreement falls to constitutional design: the enterprise of constructing a constitution that can channel disagreements productively, forge consensus, and produce a stable constitutional order. The failure to distinguish between constitutional theory and constitutional design when addressing the problem of disagreement has led to deep confusion within constitutional theory. Mitigating the problem of disagreement is a task of constitutional design, and whether that task succeeds depends on our role acting within that design as citizens, not as theorists

The Natural Law Moment in Constitutional Theory

Something new is happening in American constitutional theory. Never before have so many legal scholars sought to ground constitutional theory in the natural-law tradition. Indeed, we can truly say that we are living through a natural-law moment in constitutional theory, a period of unprecedented interest in natural law among constitutional theorists. This immediately calls to mind three questions. First: how, if at all, are the theorists of this moment different from prior theorists who sought to ground constitutional theory in natural law? Second: what explains the rise of natural law in American constitutional theory? Third: what are the implications for constitutional theory of our natural-law moment? This essay sketches answers to these questions, with the caveat that much more could be said about them. This essay was originally delivered as the Herbert W. Vaughan Memorial Lecture at Harvard Law School on April 9, 2024

Constitutional Theory and the Problem of Disagreement

For decades, constitutional theory has been haunted by the problem of disagreement: the reality that we are deeply divided on fundamental questions of justice and the good society. Theorists have generally responded to the problem of disagreement in one of two ways. One approach minimizes the extent to which constitutional theories rely on controversial moral premises and instead grounds constitutional theories in widely endorsed social practices. The other generally discards any social practices that reflect disagreement with the controversial moral views that the theorist holds.Neither approach is sound. Constitutional theory requires both controversial moral claims and attention to social practices; it requires both ideal and practical constitutional theory. Indeed, we can see how to address the seemingly modern problem of disagreement by attending to the work of an ancient constitutional theorist: Cicero. Despite being the subject of intense scholarly interest outside of the legal academy over the last few decades, Cicero’s work has been almost entirely overlooked by American constitutional theorists. But if we examine, refine, and revise his arguments about ideal and practical constitutional theory, we will find that the two major approaches to the problem of disagreement proposed by American constitutional theorists are mistaken.Because constitutional theory necessarily makes strong moral claims, it is not well-suited to mitigating the effects of disagreement, even as it must take into account non-ideal social practices. Rather, the task of ameliorating the problems stemming from disagreement falls to constitutional design: the enterprise of constructing a constitution that can channel disagreements productively, forge consensus, and produce a stable constitutional order. The failure to distinguish between constitutional theory and constitutional design when addressing the problem of disagreement has led to deep confusion within constitutional theory. Mitigating the problem of disagreement is a task of constitutional design, and whether that task succeeds depends on our role acting within that design as citizens, not as theorists

The Originalist Jurisprudence Of Justice Samuel Alito

Since Justice Alito’s appointment to the Supreme Court in 2006, constitutional theorists have struggled with how to characterize his approach to constitutional adjudication. Many scholars have argued that “Justice Alito is not to any significant extent an originalist” but is, instead, “a methodological pluralist” who uses both originalist and non-originalist tools of constitutional adjudication. Others have contended that “Justice Alito’s jurisprudence is originali[st], though not in the traditional sense.

The Moral Authority of Original Meaning

One of the most enduring criticisms of originalism is that it lacks a sufficiently compelling moral justification. Scholars operating within the natural law tradition have been among the foremost critics of originalism’s morality, yet originalists have yet to offer a sufficient defense of originalism from within the natural law tradition that demonstrates that these critics are mistaken. That task has become more urgent in recent years due to Adrian Vermeule’s critique of originalism from within the natural law tradition, which has received greater attention than previous critiques. This Article is the first full-length response to the natural law critique of originalism as represented by Vermeule, presenting an affirmative argument for originalism from within the natural law tradition. Although other theorists have offered natural law justifications for originalism, they have not yet developed a theory of legitimate authority, which is essential both to the natural law tradition and to originalism. This Article fills that gap by grounding originalism in the legitimate authority of the people-as-sovereign. In doing so, it draws upon and adapts centuries-old natural law arguments in favor of popular sovereignty that have rarely been mentioned in American law reviews and have never been presented as the basis for originalism. By creating a novel synthesis between this natural law theory of popular sovereignty and originalism, the Article offers new responses to longstanding objections to popular-sovereignty-based originalist theories, such as the exclusion of women and enslaved Black people from the ratification process. Finally, having answered those criticisms, the Article shows that obeying the orig- inal meaning of the Constitution is necessary to preserve the legitimate authority of the people, which is essential to achieving the common good. This allows the Article to confront the core of the natural law critique: that originalism is incompatible with the natural law because it privileges the original meaning above the natural law when they are in conflict. The Article demonstrates that this critique overlooks the natural law limits on judicial authority that undergird the common good. By grounding originalism in a moral argument drawn from the natural law, this Article shows that, far from being a morally empty jurisprudence, originalism is justified by the moral authority of original meaning

The Role of Emotion in Constitutional Theory

Although the role of emotion in law has become a major field of scholarship, there has been very little attention paid to the role of emotion in constitutional theory. This Article seeks to fill that gap by providing an integrated account of the role of emotion within the individual, how emotion affects constitutional culture, and how constitutional culture, properly understood, should affect our evaluation of major constitutional theories. The Article begins by reconstructing one of the most important and influential accounts of emotion in the philosophical literature: that of Thomas Aquinas. Because Aquinas’s description of the nature of emotion accords with modern science and the insights of many law-and-emotion theorists, it provides a firm foundation for an analysis of emotion in constitutional theory. Having laid that foundation, the Article examines the role of emotion in constitutional culture, the subset of national culture concerned with a constitution. Constitutional culture combines a society’s ideas about, and emotional attachments to, its constitution. Here, the Article develops a novel synthesis between Aquinas’s model of emotion and Edmund Burke’s sophisticated exploration of the importance of emotion in constitutional culture. Burke argues that theories of constitutional legitimacy shape constitutional culture and must accord with it. If a theory of legitimacy is at odds with a society’s constitutional culture, the society risks the instability of the regime. This insight—which is consistent with Aquinas’s model of emotion—is the primary basis for understanding the role of emotion in constitutional theory. Finally, the Article turns its attention to constitutional theory. Observing that popular sovereignty is the theory of legitimacy endorsed by our constitutional culture, the Article argues—based on the synthesis of the Thomistic and Burkean accounts— that emotion should play an important role in evaluating the contours and viability of theories of legitimacy. Theories of legitimacy that accord with popular sovereignty have a stronger argument in their favor because they reinforce the emotional attachments that lend stability to our Constitution. Theories of legitimacy that reject popular sovereignty, by contrast, must be modified or abandoned or, alternatively, must explain why attempts to change our constitutional culture will avoid the instability that the Thomistic and Burkean accounts would predict. The Article therefore has particular relevance to assessing radical constitutional theories—whether from the political right or the political left—that are critical of American constitutional culture. The Article concludes by exploring the implications of emotion for constitutional doctrine, focusing on stare decisis and the examples of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

The Moral Authority of Original Meaning

One of the most enduring criticisms of originalism is that it lacks a sufficiently compelling moral justification. Scholars operating within the natural law tradition have been among the foremost critics of originalism’s morality, yet originalists have yet to offer a sufficient defense of originalism from within the natural law tradition that demonstrates that these critics are mistaken. That task has become more urgent in recent years due to Adrian Vermeule’s critique of originalism from within the natural law tradition, which has received greater attention than previous critiques. This Article is the first full-length response to the natural law critique of originalism as represented by Vermeule, presenting an affirmative argument for originalism from within the natural law tradition. Although other theorists have offered natural law justifications for originalism, they have not yet developed a theory of legitimate authority, which is essential both to the natural law tradition and to originalism. This Article fills that gap by grounding originalism in the legitimate authority of the people-as-sovereign. In doing so, it draws upon and adapts centuries-old natural law arguments in favor of popular sovereignty that have rarely been mentioned in American law reviews and have never been presented as the basis for originalism. By creating a novel synthesis between this natural law theory of popular sovereignty and originalism, the Article offers new responses to longstanding objections to popular-sovereignty-based originalist theories, such as the exclusion of women and enslaved Black people from the ratification process. Finally, having answered those criticisms, the Article shows that obeying the original meaning of the Constitution is necessary to preserve the legitimate authority of the people, which is essential to achieving the common good. This allows the Article to confront the core of the natural law critique: that originalism is incompatible with the natural law because it privileges the original meaning above the natural law when they are in conflict. The Article demonstrates that this critique overlooks the natural law limits on judicial authority that undergird the common good. By grounding originalism in a moral argument drawn from the natural law, this Article shows that, far from being a morally empty jurisprudence, originalism is justified by the moral authority of original meaning

Liberalism and Disagreement in American Constitutional Theory

For forty years, American constitutional theory has been viewed as a clash between originalists and non-originalists. This depiction misunderstands and oversimplifies the nature of the debate within constitutional theory. Although originalism and non-originalism describe important differences between families of constitutional methodologies, the foundations of the disagreement among theorists are the justifications that they offer for those methodologies, not the methodologies themselves. Once the debate is refocused on the justifications that theorists offer for their constitutional methodologies, it becomes clear that the debate within constitutional theory is ultimately a debate about liberalism as a political theory. Specifically, it is a debate about two propositions that are central to the liberal tradition: individualism and rationalism. Viewed in this way, constitutional theorists often thought to be opposed to each other are, in fact, allies in the debate over liberalism, even if they disagree about whether their shared theoretical premises imply an originalist or non-originalist methodology. Conversely, theorists often seen as allies profoundly disagree about the premises of their constitutional theories because they disagree about liberalism. Reorienting American constitutional theory to focus on the disagreement over liberalism will help us identify which constitutional theory is best and better understand the outcomes in important constitutional cases

Originalism and Truth-Telling: A Reply to Stephen Sachs

Sachs focuses on my claim that a theory of constitutional adjudication needs to make a moral argument that justifies telling judges why they ought to decide constitutional disputes in a particular way rather than in some other way. Why be an originalist, for example, rather than a common-law constitutionalist? In answering that question, a theory of constitutional adjudication cannot depend exclusively on a positivist, descriptive account of what the law is—even if Sachs correctly identifies originalism as the law— because knowing that originalism is the “law” (in a positivist sense of “law”) does not tell us why anyone ought to follow originalism in resolving constitutional disputes. We need a moral account of why judges should choose originalism over its rivals

The October 2021 Term and the Challenge to Progressive Constitutional Theory

This Essay examines the ways in which the Supreme Court\u27s October 2021 Term challenges core theoretical commitments of progressive constitutional theory. Progressive constitutional theory originated in the progressive political theory of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Accordingly, progressive constitutional theory shares progressive political theory\u27s commitments to two propositions: rationalism and individualism. These commitments lead to an understanding of history as moving in a particular direction--one that is generally in line with progressive ideology. The originalist and traditionalist approaches of the Court\u27s October 2021 decisions call into question the progressive confidence in the direction of history while simultaneously rejecting the rationalistic and individualistic premises of progressivism. This helps explain why many progressive constitutional theorists have found the Court\u27s decisions so disorienting and confounding. The October 2021 Term challenged--even though it did not definitively refute--the progressive narrative of constitutional redemption through history. The implications of the Court\u27s decisions will reverberate through American constitutional theory for decades to come