217 research outputs found
A PRINCIPAL-AGENT APPROACH TO THE DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY
This paper applies a multi-tasking model of moral hazard to study the delegation of regulatory authority for health and environmental risks. The model characterizes the conditions under which single and multiple bureaucratic agencies are optimal, and relates these findings to discussions of appropriate regulation of agricultural biotechnologyPolitical Economy,
AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATION OF COMMON AGENCY
An equilibrium solution is developed for a common-agency game that is used to study the structure of regulatory bureaucracy. Contrary to existing results, this equilibrium maintains powerful incentives for the agent. An experiment is conducted to test the competing hypotheses. The implications of common-agency on reciprocity are also examined.Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,
Ambiguity in Individual Choice and Market Environments: On the Importance of Comparative Ignorance
After Ellsberg’s thought experiments brought focus to the relevance of missing information for choice, extensive efforts have been made to understand ambiguity theoretically and empirically (Ellsberg 1961). Fox and Tversky (1995) make an important contribution to understanding behavioral responses to ambiguity. In an individual choice setting they demonstrate that an aversion to ambiguous lotteries arises only when a comparison to unambiguous lotteries is available. The current study advances this literature by exploring the importance of Fox and Tversky’s finding for market outcomes and finds support for their Comparative Ignorance Hypothesis in the market setting.ambiguity, asset market experiment, comparitive ignorance
Right-to-Choose Auctions: A Field Study of Water Markets in the Limari Valley of Chile
Field experiments were conducted with farmers in the Limarà Valley of Chile to test extant theory on right-to-choose auctions. Water volumes that differed by reservoir source and time of availability were offered for sale by the research team. The auctions were supplemented by protocols to elicit risk and time preferences of bidders. We find that the right-to-choose auctions raise significantly more revenue than the benchmark sequential auction. Risk attitudes explain a substantial amount of the difference in bidding between auction institutions, consonant with received theory. The auction bidding revealed distinct preferences for water types, which has implications for market re-design.water market, field experiment, auction design, Farm Management, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Risk and Uncertainty,
Information Cascades: Evidence from An Experiment with Financial Market Professionals
Previous empirical studies of information cascades use either naturally occurring data or laboratory experiments with student subjects. We combine attractive elements from each of these lines of research by observing market professionals from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in a controlled environment. As a baseline, we compare their behavior to student choices in similar treatments. We further examine whether, and to what extent, cascade formation is influenced by both private signal strength and the quality of previous public signals, as well as decision heuristics that differ from Bayesian rationality. Analysis of over 1,500 individual decisions suggests that CBOT professionals are better able to discern the quality of public signals than their student counterparts. This leads to much different cascade formation. Further, while the behavior of students is consistent with the notion that losses loom larger than gains, market professionals are unaffected by the domain of earnings. These results are important in both a positive and normative sense.
The investigation of flame spreading over the surface of igniting solid propellants Final summary report
Flame spreading over surface of igniting solid propellants in different gas mixtures at various pressure
Right-to-Choose Auctions: A Field Study of Water Markets in the Limari Valley of Chile
Field experiments were conducted with farmers in the Limarí Valley of Chile to test extant theory on right-to-choose auctions. Water volumes that differed by reservoir source and time of availability were offered for sale by the research team. The auctions were supplemented by protocols to elicit risk and time preferences of bidders. We find that the right-to-choose auctions raise significantly more revenue than the benchmark sequential auction. Risk attitudes explain a substantial amount of the difference in bidding between auction institutions, consonant with received theory. The auction bidding revealed distinct preferences for water types, which has implications for market re-design.auction design, field experiments,water market
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