An experimental analysis of the existing differences of productivity across genders

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the connection between productivity and gender by using experimental methods in order to produce the relevant data that is missing. This experiment is based on a principal agent game in which principals offer payments and agents choose a costly level of effort, unobservable to the principal. The experimental findings confirm that, an uncertain outcome activity, females are less productive than males.Experiment, Gender, Productivity, Principal-agent game

Managerial incentives under competitive pressure: Experimental investigation

We investigate the effects of competition on managerial incentives and effort in a laboratory experiment. Each owner offers compensation to his manager in two different contexts: monopoly and Cournot duopoly. After accepting the compensation, the manager chooses an effort level to increase the probability of reduced costs of his firm. Theory predicts that the entry of a rival firm in a monopolistic industry affects negatively both the incentive compensation and the effort level. Our experimental findings confirm that the entry of a rival firm reduces the incentive compensation but not the manager’s effort level. However, despite the reduction of the incentive compensation, the manager continues to accept the contract offers and exert the same level of effort.Managerial Incentives, Effort, Competition, Moral hazard, Experiments

Performance of the ambient tax: does the nature of the damage matter?

The ambient tax is often considered as an effcient instrument to achieve a …rst best outcome of ambient pollution when the regulator is less informed than the polluters. Since the ambient tax was never imple- mented in the …eld, empirical evidence is missing. Available experimental …ndings provide mixed evidence: effciency is higher under external dam- age, i.e. if ambient pollution affects non-polluters (Spraggon, 2002, 2003) than under internal damage, i.e. if ambient pollution a¤ects polluters themselves (Cochard et al., 2005). Since these two types of experiments relied on very different designs, it is worthwhile to compare them under a common experimental design. Our main …nding is that the ambient tax is equally effcient under external damage than under internal damage.

Optimal Incentives under competitive pressure

Cette thèse s'intéresse aux effets de l'environnement concurrentiel de l'entreprise sur la rémunération incitative et sur l'effort de son dirigeant. Elle comporte trois essais, traitant chacun d'un aspect spécifique de cette problématique. En premier lieu, nous étudions, au travers d'un modèle théorique, le schéma de rémunération optimal et le niveau d'effort à l'équilibre. L'effet de la concurrence est analysé par l'entrée d'une entreprise sur un marché monopolistique. Ainsi, nous comparons les schémas de rémunération et le niveau d'effort du dirigeant entre ceux caractéristiques d'une situation de monopole et d'un duopole à la Cournot. Ce modèle est ensuite étendu à l'hypothèse d'aversion à l'inégalité. Nous montrons que l'entrée d'une entreprise affecte négativement la rémunération incitative et le niveau d'effort. Aussi, face à un dirigeant averse à l'inégalité, l'entreprise doit proposer une rémunération plus élevée afin d'implémenter le même niveau d'effort. En second lieu, nous examinons grâce à l'outil expérimental les prédictions théoriques de ces deux modèles. Nous confirmons ainsi que l'entrée d'une entreprise sur le marché réduit la rémunération incitative du dirigeant. En revanche, malgré cette réduction, le dirigeant continue à fournir le même niveau d'effort. Enfin, en troisième lieu, nous introduisons dans une nouvelle expérience la compétition entre les dirigeants en créant un différentiel de rémunération. Nous montrons que cette compétition permet à l'entreprise de réduire encore la rémunération de son dirigeant en duopole. De plus, le dirigeant compare sa rémunération avec le profit de son entreprise d'une part et avec celle de l'autre dirigeant d'autre part et cette double comparaison affecte son niveau d'effort.This dissertation analyzes the effects of the competition on the managerial incentives and effort. The dissertation is made of three essays, each dealing with a particular aspect of the general setting. Firstly, based on a model, we focus on the compensation schemes and the effort level of the manager in equilibrium. We examine the effects of a firm entry on the monopolistic market on these schemes and on the effort level. In this model we then introduce an additional assumption that managers are averse to inequity. We show that the firm entry affects negatively both the incentive compensation and the effort level. Furthermore, the firm has to propose a high compensation so as to implement the same effort level if the manager is inequity averse. Secondly, we test the theoretical predictions of these models in the laboratory. We confirm that the firm entry reduces the incentive compensation. In return, the manager continues to supply the same effort level in spite of the reduction of the incentive compensation. Finally, we implement, in a new experiment, the competition between the managers. We show that the competition allows the firm to reduce the compensation for her manager in the duopoly environment. Furthermore, the manager compares his compensation to the firm's profit and to the other manager's compensation. These comparisons have significant effects on the manager's level of effort

Design and Simulation of a Solar Energy System for Desalination of Brackish Water

In light of a sort of crisis of water scarcity which begins to loom worldwide as well as the economic constraints for achieving sustainable development, it becomes essential to find appropriate solutions to face this challenge. Morocco, which has considerable brackish water resources and an important solar resource deposit, is required to use desalination techniques; however, the reliability of such techniques can no longer be applied just in terms of their value as renewable sources of energy. The solution presented in this publication, establishes a rather reliable way to produce drinking water. The technique of desalination by reverse osmosis is considered in this study to be a promising technique. The objective of our study is the implementation of a prototype for desalination of reverse osmosis, which is a low-cost small unit used to treat brackish water based on solar energy

Remote Lab Experiments: Measuring and Monitoring of Temperature Changes

The physical training education systems of the faculties of science focus on practical manipulations. Remote Labs are a recent approach used for educating experimental manipulations by using the performance of information and communication technologies. This article presents a real remote laboratory using low-cost embedded systems addressed to engineering and undergraduate students. The manipulation is based on the electronic control system to change the temperature with a plate-form, which is developed to permit students and teacher access to this manipulation. Our purpose of this study is the development of a control system to improve current educational systems in Moroccan universities by managing practical manipulations for a large number of students, based on a web from anywhere and anytime. Measuring and Monitoring of Temperature changes is a new experience of a remote monitoring system that will be allowed the users to access the experiment thought a specific web site

Remote Lab Experiments: Measuring and Monitoring of Temperature Changes

The physical training education systems of the faculties of science focus on practical manipulations. Remote Labs are a recent approach used for educating experimental manipulations by using the performance of information and communication technologies. This article presents a real remote laboratory using low-cost embedded systems addressed to engineering and undergraduate students. The manipulation is based on the electronic control system to change the temperature with a plate-form, which is developed to permit students and teacher access to this manipulation. Our purpose of this study is the development of a control system to improve current educational systems in Moroccan universities by managing practical manipulations for a large number of students, based on a web from anywhere and anytime. Measuring and Monitoring of Temperature changes is a new experience of a remote monitoring system that will be allowed the users to access the experiment thought a specific web site.</p