Planning Passenger Rail Services in a Competitive and Shared-Use Environment

This research couples game theory and optimization models and puts forward a comprehensive framework aiming at efficient planning of intercity passenger rail services in competitive and shared-use environment. This framework consists of three models: air-rail competition model, train scheduling model, and capacity allocation and access charging model. In the air-rail competition module, we propose a game-theoretic model whose aim is to determine rail frequency and fare. In addition, we investigate impacts of train technology on air-rail competition. We present a three-stage game, in which the rail agency determines the train technology, as its most strategic decision, at the top stage. Then the rail agency and airline compete sequentially on frequency and fare. We adopt a backward approach to solve the three stage game. In the train scheduling module, we develop strategic-level train models for planning high performance passenger and freight train operations on shared-use corridors, given passenger rail service frequency. In particular, we develop a hypergraph-based, two-level approach to sequentially schedule train services. On the passenger side, we assume that each passenger has a preferred departure time (PDT) and tries to minimize his/her schedule delay defined as the difference between the traveler’s desired departure time and the closest scheduled departure time. The objective is to minimize total passenger schedule delay cost subject to a set of constraints guaranteeing operational feasibility of passenger train schedules. We then insert freight trains among the fixed schedule of passenger trains such that freight total cost, which consists of freight lost demand cost, departure delay cost, and en-route delay cost, is minimized subject to constraints ensuring operational feasibility of freight train schedules. The upper level of the sequential scheduling model yields the preferred passenger train schedules, given which schedules for freight train are determined subsequently. However, the host freight railroad may not be willing to implement such schedules and would like to bargain with the passenger rail agency for either improved freight service or compensation for not getting that. To model this bargaining process, we assume a set of feasible passenger train schedules is given. For each feasible passenger train schedule, we develop the corresponding freight train schedules and calculate the associated cost. The access charging and capacity allocation model receives the set of feasible passenger train schedules and corresponding freight train schedules, as well as rail fare from the air-rail competition model, and emulates the negotiation process between the passenger rail agency and the host freight railroad. We develop a bargaining model which determines rail access charges and detailed plans for allocating the shared-use line capacity

Capacity allocation in vertically integrated rail systems: A bargaining approach

This paper presents a game-theoretic bargaining approach to allocating rail line capacity in vertically integrated systems. A passenger rail agency negotiates with the host freight railroad to determine train schedules and the associated payment. The objective on the passenger side is to maximize utility, i.e., revenue minus costs of passenger train operations, passenger schedule delay and en-route delay; the freight side minimizes the costs of train departure delay, en-route delay, loss of demand, and track maintenance. Bargaining in both complete and incomplete information settings are considered; the latter arises because the freight railroad may withhold its private cost information. With complete information, the authors find that the equilibrium payments proposed by the passenger rail agency and the host freight railroad will each be invariant to who initiates the payment bargaining, although the actual payment does depend on who is the initiator. The equilibrium schedule maximizes system welfare. With incomplete information, the passenger rail agency may choose between pooling and separating equilibrium strategies while proposing a payment, depending on its prior belief about the cost type of the freight railroad; whereas the host freight railroad will adopt strategies that do not reveal its cost type. To identify equilibrium schedules, a pooling equilibrium is constructed along with conditions for the existence of equilibrium schedules. The authors further conduct numerical experiments to obtain additional policy-relevant insights

Assessing the impacts of state-supported rail services on local population and employment: A California case study

The State of California has been financially supporting Amtrak intercity passenger rail services since 1976. This paper studies the impacts of this support on local population and employment at both county and city levels. We use datasets which include geographic, transportation, and socioeconomic characteristics of California counties and cities from 1950 to 2010. Propensity score, one-to-one matching models are employed to draw units from the control group, which are counties/cities that do not have a state-supported Amtrak station, to match with units from the treatment group, which are counties/cities that do. Using regression analysis, we find that state-support Amtrak stations have significant effect on local population in the long term, and the effect increases with time. However, the effect on civilian employment is almost non-existent. This suggests that state-supported Amtrak services can provide quality rail mobility and accessibility, which attract people to live in a rail-accessible region. However, the economic influence seems limited