The US Trade Deficit, the Decline of the WTO and the Rise of Regionalism

This paper argues that the growing US trade de.cit has caused the decline of the WTO and the rise of regional trade agreements. A country in de.cit prefers to retain market power against countries with a large surplus. Multilateral cooperation restricts its choice. This notion is formalized in a three-country game in which countries negotiate multilaterally and, if that fails, bilaterally. The multilateral agreement only holds for sufficiently even trade balances. When one country's deficit grows too large, a regionalist equilibrium emerges. A VAR analysis shows that the US trade balance explains over 50% of the variation in regional trade agreements.Regionalism, RTA, Multilateralism, WTO, Trade balance, US trade deficit

Firm Heterogeneity and the Two Sources of Gains from Trade

Recent empirical work identi.es two main channels through which consumers benefit from trade. Trade liberalization lowers prices, while it raises product variety. This paper develops the first model that connects both channels and interprets their interaction. It shows that heterogeneity in firm productivity is the source behind both. Upon liberalization efficient exporters enter, pushing out the least efficient domestic firms. Two countervailing forces emerge, both stylized facts. Liberalization leaves a moreconcentrated market. But exporters o¤er more variety than the .rms that they replace. Remarkably, total variety unambiguously increases. Exploration of comparative statics leads to an intuitive explanation.Trade, Firm selection, Product Variety, Heterogeneous firms

Excessive bank risk taking and monetary policy

Why should monetary policy "lean against the wind"? Can’t bank regulation perform its task alone? We model banks that choose both asset volatility and leverage, and identify how monetary policy transmits to bank risk. Subsequently, we introduce a regulator whose tool is a risk-based capital requirement. We derive from welfare that the regulator trades off bank risk and credit supply, and show that monetary policy affects both sides of this trade-off. Hence, regulation cannot neutralize the policy rate’s impact, and monetary policy matters for financial stability. An extension shows how the commonality of bank exposures affects monetary transmission

Will macroprudential policy counteract monetary policy’s effects on financial stability? Bruegel Working Paper Issue 01 / 2018

HHow does monetary policy impact upon macroprudential regulation? This paper models monetary policy’s transmission to bank risk taking, and its interaction with a regulator’s optimization problem. The regulator uses its macroprudential tool, a leverage ratio, to maintain financial stability, while taking account of the impact on credit provision. A change in the monetary policy rate tilts the regulator’s entire trade-off. We show that the regulator allows interest rate changes to partly “pass through” to bank soundness by not neutralizing the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Thus, monetary policy affects financial stability, even in the presence of macroprudential regulatio

What does European institutional integration tell us about trade integration?

The start of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has spurred a new interest in the debate on the effects of monetary unions on regional economic integration. This literature either investigates past episodes of monetary unions or attempts to gauge any effect with a few years of EMU data. This paper takes instead a more general perspective - it investigates the link between economic integration and the overall institutional process of regional integration in Europe – of which monetary integration was only one step – over the last 50 years. We look mainly at two dimensions - European institutional integration – whose main steps were the customs union in 1968, the single market in 1993 and the single currency in 1999 – and intra-European trade. We pay special attention to the successive EU enlargements which took place in 1973, 1981, 1986, and 1995. Different facets of openness and trade linkages are presented. After looking at some descriptive links between institutional and trade integration, the paper uses some causality tests to assess the direction of causality and magnitude of impact. The evidence provided is consistent with the idea that the interaction between regional institutional and trade integration before monetary union matters. Such interaction runs in both directions, although the link from institutional to trade integration dominates. Many open questions remain, however

Behind the Scenes of Globalization: Strategic Trade Policy, Firm Decisions and Worker Expectations.

Foreign trade and employment; Investments, Foreign, and employment;

Managing External Volatility: Policy Frameworks in Non-Reserve-Issuing Economies

Since the Global Financial Crisis, non-reserve-issuing economies (NREs) have been highly sensitive to episodes of external pressures. With monetary policy independence constrained by this sensitivity, many NREs have utilized other policy instruments. This paper confirms the vulnerability of NREs to external shocks and finds that, in some circumstances, managing such shocks with multiple instruments can both lessen the policy response required from any one policy tool to financial and external shocks and increase the effectiveness of policies in stabilizing macrofinancial conditions. Effectiveness, however, does not always imply appropriateness, which rests on an evaluation of potential trade-offs and unintended consequences

Behind the Scenes of Globalization: Strategic Trade Policy, Firm Decisions and Worker Expectations

Defence date: 15 December 2008Examining board: Pascal Courty, European University Institute ; Gianmarco Ottaviano, Università degli Studi di Bologna ; Diego Puga, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ; Karl Schlag, Supervisor, Universitat Pompeu Fabr