On the Microeconomics of Quota Management in Fisheries

This paper compares the economic incentives created by transferable and non-transferable quotas in a fishery, in particular the incentives to discard fish of certain species or grades when quotas are enforced at the landing site. With a hypothetical efficient allocation of non-transferable quotas, the incentive structure is essentially the same as under transferable quotas. However, in the absence of the information provided by the quota price, outcomes may not be the same under all conditions. Inefficient allocations of non-transferable quotas will tend to reduce discards due to highgrading but increase discards in multispecies fisheries. The impact of discarding on the quota price in a transferable quota fishery is examined.fisheries management, quotas, ITQs, discards, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, D21, D45, Q22,

Vessel-level Modelling of a Landing Obligation in Scottish Fisheries

The paper presents a vessel level simulation model of the impact of a landing obligation on a typical Scottish demersal trawler under a discard ban in addition to existing quota management controls. The simulation model is based on a simple microeconomic model of firm behaviour and predicts landings, discards and trip profits in response to the imposition of a landing obligation for different target species. The model can be used to predict the effects of a landing obligation under different assumptions about the enforcement of both the discard ban and quota controls.Proceedings of the Eighteenth Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, held July 11-15, 2016 at Aberdeen Exhibition and Conference Center (AECC), Aberdeen, Scotland, UK

Quota prices, discarding and rents in a multispecies fishery

Based on a simple model of firm profit maximisation in a multispecies ITQ fishery, market clearing quota lease prices are modelled as a system of linear equations with dimensions dependent upon the number of quota species in the fishery and the number of different harvesting technologies. Finding a set of linear, uniform, quota prices that maximises resource rent during a fishing season reveals an interesting relationship between choke species, quota-induced discarding and the emergence of inframarginal rents. As equilibrium quota prices are jointly determined, discarding of choke species results in lower quota prices for species with quota still available and increased profits for firms with lower marginal harvesting costs for these species. The results are illustrated with a number of numerical simulations