Bayesian Monitoring.

This paper presents a modification of the inspection game: The ?Bayesian Monitoring? model rests on the assumption that judges are interested in enforcing compliant behavior and making correct decisions. They may base their judgements on an informative but imperfect signal which can be generated costlessly. In the original inspection game, monitoring is costly and generates a perfectly informative signal. While the inspection game has only one mixed strategy equilibrium, three Perfect Bayesian Equilibria exist in my model (one in pure strategies, two in mixed). These outcomes can be described with respect to their punishment styles: tyrannic, draconian, and lenient. The Bayesian Monitoring model, just as the inspection game, has different implications than enforcement models in the tradition of Becker (1968). Total deterrence of bad behavior is impossible, and the equilibrium probability of good behavior is independent of the suspect?s own payoff parameters. Hence, the maximum fine result does not apply. -- Dieses Paper präsentiert eine Modifikation des "Inspection Game". Bayesian Monitoring basiert auf der Annahme, daß Richter ein Interesse an korrekten Urteilen haben. Sie können ihr Urteil auf ein kostenlos verfügbares, aber imperfektes Signal stützen. Im "Inspection Game" ist Monitoring perfekt, wirft jedoch Kosten auf. Das Inspektion Game weist lediglich ein Gleichgewicht in gemischten Strategien auf, wohingegen es im Bayesian Monitoring Game drei Gleichgewichte gibt: eines in reinen, zwei in gemischten Strategien. Diese Gleichgewichte unterscheiden sich hinsichtlich des Bestrafungs-Stils: tyrannisch, drakonisch, freundlich. Wie das Inspektion Game führt Bayesian Monitoring zu anderen Ergebnissen als Rechtsdurchsetzungsmodelle in der Tradition von Becker (1968). Insbesondere gilt das "Maximum Fine"-Ergebnis nicht.Imperfect Decision-Making,Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,Enforcement,Maximum Fine Result

Belief–logic conflict resolution in syllogistic reasoning: Inspection-time evidence for a parallel process model

An experiment is reported examining dual-process models of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning using a problem complexity manipulation and an inspection-time method to monitor processing latencies for premises and conclusions. Endorsement rates indicated increased belief bias on complex problems, a finding that runs counter to the “belief-first” selective scrutiny model, but which is consistent with other theories, including “reasoning-first” and “parallel-process” models. Inspection-time data revealed a number of effects that, again, arbitrated against the selective scrutiny model. The most striking inspection-time result was an interaction between logic and belief on premise-processing times, whereby belief – logic conflict problems promoted increased latencies relative to non-conflict problems. This finding challenges belief-first and reasoning-first models, but is directly predicted by parallel-process models, which assume that the outputs of simultaneous heuristic and analytic processing streams lead to an awareness of belief – logic conflicts than then require time-consuming resolution

Pengaruh Kecakapan Profesional Dan Pengalaman Kerja Terhadap Kualitas Hasil Pemeriksaan Pada Kantor Inspektorat Kabupaten Kepulauan Talaud Dengan Kepatuhan Pada Kode Etik Sebagai Variabel Moderating

. The quality of the results of inspection is a complex issue, because so many factors that can affect the quality of the audit which depends on the point of view of each personal. The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of professional skills and work experience to the quality of examination results with adherence to the code of ethics as a moderating variable in the Inspectorate Talaud Islands. The population of this research is all internal auditors in Inspectorate Talaud Islands. Total respondents are 34 internal auditors who have worked in the Inspectorate Talaud Islands. The data were analyzed by using multiple linear regression analysis. To examine the f test moderation, moderated regression analysis (MRA) was employed. Result indicates that professional skill positively and significantly influences the quality of inspection result. On the other hand, work experience positively and insignificantly influences the quality of inspection result. It means that obeying the code ethics positively and significantly influences the quality of inspection result. Furthermore, professional skill that moderated on obeying code ethics does not influence the quality of inspection result; and work experience that moderated on obeying to code ethics does not influence the quality of inspection result

A Systematic Search for High Surface Brightness Giant Arcs in a Sloan Digital Sky Survey Cluster Sample

We present the results of a search for gravitationally-lensed giant arcs conducted on a sample of 825 SDSS galaxy clusters. Both a visual inspection of the images and an automated search were performed and no arcs were found. This result is used to set an upper limit on the arc probability per cluster. We present selection functions for our survey, in the form of arc detection efficiency curves plotted as functions of arc parameters, both for the visual inspection and the automated search. The selection function is such that we are sensitive only to long, high surface brightness arcs with g-band surface brightness mu_g 10. Our upper limits on the arc probability are compatible with previous arc searches. Lastly, we report on a serendipitous discovery of a giant arc in the SDSS data, known inside the SDSS Collaboration as Hall's arc.Comment: 34 pages,8 Fig. Accepted ApJ:Jan-200

On the capacity of information processing systems

We propose and analyze a family of information processing systems, where a finite set of experts or servers are employed to extract information about a stream of incoming jobs. Each job is associated with a hidden label drawn from some prior distribution. An inspection by an expert produces a noisy outcome that depends both on the job's hidden label and the type of the expert, and occupies the expert for a finite time duration. A decision maker's task is to dynamically assign inspections so that the resulting outcomes can be used to accurately recover the labels of all jobs, while keeping the system stable. Among our chief motivations are applications in crowd-sourcing, diagnostics, and experiment designs, where one wishes to efficiently learn the nature of a large number of items, using a finite pool of computational resources or human agents. We focus on the capacity of such an information processing system. Given a level of accuracy guarantee, we ask how many experts are needed in order to stabilize the system, and through what inspection architecture. Our main result provides an adaptive inspection policy that is asymptotically optimal in the following sense: the ratio between the required number of experts under our policy and the theoretical optimal converges to one, as the probability of error in label recovery tends to zero

Using Wavelets to reject background in Dark Matter experiments

A method based on wavelet techniques has been developed and applied to background rejection in the data of the IGEX dark matter experiment. The method is presented and described in some detail to show how it efficiently rejects events coming from noise and microphonism through a mathematical inspection of their recorded pulse shape. The result of the application of the method to the last data of IGEX is presented.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures. Submitted to Astrop. Phy

Do Inspection and Traceability Provide Incentives for Food Safety?

One of the goals of inspection and traceability is to motivate suppliers to deliver safer food. The ability of these policies to motivate suppliers depends on the accuracy of the inspection, the cost of failing inspection, the cost of causing a foodborne illness, and the proportion of these costs paid by the supplier. We develop a model of the supplier's expected cost as a function of inspection accuracy, the cost of failure, and the proportion of the failure cost that is allocated to suppliers. The model is used to identify the conditions under which the supplier is motivated to deliver uncontaminated lots. Surprisingly, our results show that when safety failure costs can be allocated to suppliers, minimum levels of inspection error are required to motivate a supplier to deliver uncontaminated lots. This result does not hold when costs cannot be allocated to suppliers. As a case study, we use our results to analyze the technical requirements for suppliers of frozen beef to the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service.diagnostic error, food safety, inspection, sampling error, traceability, Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,

Using emission standards under incomplete compliance

Using the case study of water pollution in the Flemish textile industry, we discuss three empirical questions concerning the use of emission standards. We find that the Becker result ("maximal fine / minimal inspection") does not hold if we include rule making, implementation and enforcement costs into the model. There is a balance between the fine and the inspection variables. Making enforcement more stringent does not mean to put the fine levels as high as possible and only then increase the inspections. We have also shown that is extremely important to have correct estimates of people's willingness to pay for environmental improvement. These WTP estimates determine in great part the optimal environmental strategy and its associated optimal monitoring and enforcement policy. Moreover, it really pays off to optimise the monitoring and enforcement strategy associated with an emission standard. This optimisation does not necessarily mean that monitoring and enforcement should be as stringent as possible. It is often possible to obtain the desired result by some intermediate value of the monitoring and enforcement parameters. This is due to the balancing of costs and benefits associated with monitoring and enforcement.Environmental Law; Illegal behaviour; Enforcement of Law

Improving aircraft maintenance, repair, and overhaul: A novel text mining approach

Aircraft Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) feedback commonly includes an engineer’s complex text-based inspection report. Capturing and normalizing the content of these textual descriptions is vital to cost and quality benchmarking, and provides information to facilitate continuous improvement of MRO process and analytics. As data analysis and mining tools requires highly normalized data, raw textual data is inadequate. This paper offers a textual-mining solution to efficiently analyse bulk textual feedback data. Despite replacement of the same parts and/or sub-parts, the actual service cost for the same repair is often distinctly different from similar previously jobs. Regular expression algorithms were incorporated with an aircraft MRO glossary dictionary in order to help provide additional information concerning the reason for cost variation. Professional terms and conventions were included within the dictionary to avoid ambiguity and improve the outcome of the result. Testing results show that most descriptive inspection reports can be appropriately interpreted, allowing extraction of highly normalized data. This additional normalized data strongly supports data analysis and data mining, whilst also increasing the accuracy of future quotation costing. This solution has been effectively used by a large aircraft MRO agency with positive results